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POLLUTION AND NORPAC: A CHRONOLOGY TO 1980; 
THE LEGACY OF THE LAST MINING DONE AT TUI 
 
Abstract: This paper does not focus on the mining undertaken at Tui 
from the 1960s until Norpac ceased operating, but instead concentrates on its 
environmental impact. To clarify the struggles to prevent and then to rectify 
the pollution, the story is outlined chronologically. It is a story about a 
company seeking to avoid additional costs by evading, if possible, some of the 
environmental constraints that were imposed, and, once it abandoned the 
field, leaving the clean up to others. Not till the twenty-first century was the 
problem finally solved. 
 
PRELUDE TO NORPAC 
 
South Pacific Mines, a private Canadian company, first commenced 
mining investigations in New Zealand in 1959, having acquired claims in 
various areas in the Coromandel-Hauraki mining field. Late that year it 
was considering re-opening mines in the Ohinemuri and Te Aroha areas, 
and in particular in treating the sands in the Ohinemuri River which, 
because of the inadequacies of earlier treatment methods, still contained 
gold. This immediately raised concerns about the rivers being turned into 
sludge channels. In mid-1960 there were meetings with the catchment 
board and other local bodies, which were worried about cyanide leaking into 
the rivers and affecting dairy factories.1 Dr John Francis Dawson, the 
Medical Officer for the area, who in the late 1940s had been concerned 
about the impact of mining on the Te Aroha water supply,2 said the river 
would be testing for cyanide pollution. In contrast, Alfred Allen of South 
Pacific Mines assured the public that there would be no need for this 
because the cyanide ‘was neutralized before it was discharged, and there 
was absolutely no danger. One mill in Canada discharged into a lake which 
provided a town water supply’.3  
After concentrating on the Ohinemuri area, in early 1962 some initial 
work was done at the Tui. After prospecting for only a few weeks, the 
                                            
1 Press Statement, 22 August 1960, in A.M. Isdale, ‘Meetings with Catchment Board and 
Te Aroha Borough Council People’, typescript, 17 June 1969, p. 1, Norpac Papers, MSS 
and Archives, Vault 4, Box 1, NMC 5, University of Auckland Library (hereafter UA). 
2 See paper on pollution in the Te Aroha Mining District. 
3 Isdale, p. 1, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
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company claimed that in July ‘the people at Te Aroha wanted us to take up 
special Quartz Claim, “for permanency” ’. Bert McAra, formerly the 
Auckland Smelting Company’s first mine manager at Tui and now the 
Inspector of Mines for the district,4 ‘kept agitating for us to do this for a long 
time thereafter’.5 Further exploration was disrupted by Norman Annabell, 
Te Aroha’s Borough Engineer, refusing access to the waterworks reserve. 
After Dr Arthur Pentland, a Canadian geologist who was managing director 
of South Pacific Mines, interviewed local body members on 3 August, he 
noted that ‘even ones thought to be against in support’.6 A meeting with 
Annabell and the borough solicitor was held three days later to discuss 
access, and that evening Pentland talked with McAra and Benjamin John 
Dunsheath ‘against being turned aside’.7 Dunsheath had been managing 
director of the Auckland Smelting Company, which had mined at Tui ten 
years earlier.8 On 10 August, Alistair Isdale, who was the company’s 
secretary and accountant, ‘found through engineer Annabell that Borough 
Council wanted filtration plant if mining, according to Health Officer (they 
said) (which would have meant Company being responsible for cost). But 
Health Officer when telephoned said no such thing’.9 He recalled in 1969 
that Henry William Dickens Skidmore, the mayor of Te Aroha, talked to 
him of having to provide a filtration plant costing £10,000; however after 
the Health Department reported its satisfaction with faecal samples, on 14 
August ‘Mayor Te Aroha rang - O.K. for Tui’.10 Skidmore and others 
continued to worry about bacteriological samples, and Isdale recalled that 
‘the Borough continued niggling at intervals about who data about our 
samples was to go to. The pathologist at Thames Hospital thought they 
“were just being difficult.” (22 Feb. 1963)’.11 Despite this alleged 
obstructiveness, on 16 August Annabell informed the manager of South 
Pacific Mines that the borough had granted permission to use the ‘Tui Mine 
                                            
4 See paper on the Auckland Smelting Company. 
5 Isdale, p. 1, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
6 Isdale, p. 2, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
7 Isdale, p. 2, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
8 See paper on the Auckland Smelting Company. 
9 Isdale, p. 2, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA; see also Memorandum by J.B. McAra, 10 
August 1962, Inspector of Mines, Box 16B, 13/11/D, vol. 1, Inspector of Mines files held 
by Ministry of Commerce, Hamilton (hereafter MC). 
10 Isdale, p. 2, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
11 Isdale, p. 2, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
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Track’ to get to their prospecting license; the company was reminded not to 
create any pollution.12 
On 24 December, South Pacific Mines applied to prospect 1,000 acres 
stretching from the old mines at Tui to those at Stoney Creek. There were 
immediate objections on the grounds of pollution, not only by the Te Aroha 
Borough Council but also by the Paeroa Borough Council, to protect the 
Waitawheta Valley catchment that was part of its water supply, and the 
Tourist Department to protect the Hot Springs Domain. The Te Aroha 
council pointed out that the area was part of its catchment and that some of 
its streams had been exempted from mining by the Te Aroha Borough 
Water Supply Empowering Act of 1962.13 As a result of the objections, the 
application was withdrawn in May 1963 and replaced by one for a special 
quartz claim of 100 acres at Tui.14 In July, the council approved their 
solicitor’s lodging a formal objection. One councillor, Herbert Leslie Hill, 
who wanted the council to support mining in every way possible, was told 
that approximately two-third of the borough water supply came from this 
area. Hill therefore seconded the amendment finally adopted that the 
council would be prepared to waive its objection ‘provided the conditions 
imposed on previous licenses, for the protection of the Borough water supply 
be imposed’.15  
The recommencement of mining led the council to consider moving its 
water supply intake from the Ruakaka area to streams further to the 
southeast, if a subsidy could be arranged.16 By December 14 men were 
working in the ‘Tui lead mine’, and the directors were considering building 
a mill nearby.17 The local body was now more enthusiastic about mining, 
possibly because a new engineer, Graham Bower Thorpe,18 had (briefly) 
                                            
12 Norman Annabell to Manager, South Pacific Mines Ltd, 16 August 1962, Te Aroha 
Borough Council, A/26/6/1, Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
13 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1962, 11/1962, BCDG 11289/5a, ANZ-A; 
for an explanation of the intent of this Act, see New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 16 
August 1962, vol. 331, p. 1490  
14 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1962, 11/1962; Mining Applications 1963, 
2/1963, BCDG 11289/5a, ANZ-A. 
15 Te Aroha News, 26 July 1963, p. 1. 
16 Te Aroha News, 23 August 1963, p. 1. 
17 Te Aroha News, 17 December 1963, p. 1. 
18 Piako Electoral Roll, 1963, p. 241. 
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replaced Annabell, who had resigned because of ill health,19 and Skidmore 
was given several guided tours of the mine. After one such visit in October, 
Isdale noted Skidmore as being ‘enthusiastic’ because Te Aroha had been 
‘going down’ and was now ‘coming up’ with the television transmitter being 
erected and mining reviving.20 When Isdale gave a lecture to a seminar at 
Thames on the mineral possibilities of the peninsula, he was introduced by 
Skidmore ‘in a cordial atmosphere to catchment board representative Mr 
Harris.... Mr Skidmore told me the “number of men allowed at Tui could be 
liberally interpreted”’.21 
The next move noted was on 10 June 1964, when Skidmore told 
Pentland he was ‘willing to give site for battery on water reserve up hill’ 
and wanted to supply electricity ‘rather than the Power Board - he would 
put it in free and charge low rates’.22 Late that year, Carlton Skinner, an 
American director of South Pacific Mines, visited the mine after first 
meeting with the Minister of Mines, whose department had met some of the 
prospecting costs. In a press interview he gave an optimistic assessment of 
the amount of ore to be mined, and said that arrangements were being 
made to form a new company with its subsidiary North Island Mines and 
the New Zealand company Cable Price Downer. The company was 
considering possible sites for a flotation plant and smelter near Te Aroha. 
Any site would ‘have to be carefully situated because of fumes from the 
smelting operations and the need to make provision for the disposal of 
substantial quantities of waste materials’.23 After further discussions, 
approval to mine under a prospecting license was granted by the warden on 
15 June 1965, subject to the condition that the water supply be protected.24 
By this time the company had added 3,000 feet of tunnels to the 1,500 
                                            
19 Te Aroha News, 24 May 1963, p. 5; interview with Frederick Maurice Alfred (Sam) 
Guernier, in Te Aroha, 18 August 2001; Death Certificate of Norman Annabell, 21 
November 1968, 1968/39742, BDM. 
20 Isdale, p. 2, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA.  
21 Isdale, p. 2, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
22 Isdale, p. 2, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
23 Waikato Times, 7 November 1964, p. 17. 
24 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1965, 4/1965, BCDG 11289/5a, ANZ-A; 
I.E. Feasey to F.J. Handcock, 23 October 1968, Te Aroha Borough Council, A/26/6/1, 
Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha; Te Aroha News, 13 October 1959, 
p. 5. 
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driven by earlier miners, and anticipated the mine lasting at least 15 years, 
producing 100 tons daily of high-grade lead, zinc, copper, silver and gold.25  
On 7 December Pentland, Isdale, Skidmore, councillors and borough 
staff discussing using ten acres at Fern Flat near the mine for a treatment 
plant and tailings site.26 The borough representatives wanted guarantees 
that the purity of the water supplied to the dairy factory and town would 
not be harmed. They were told that a pipe along the bottom of Fern Flat 
would ensure that the small stream there would not be polluted by 
tailings,27 that the tailings dam would be secure, and that the tailings 
would be stable during rain because of ‘quick setting of finely ground 
material’. They were assured that the system used in the dam ‘would have 
cementing effect’ and prevent any seepage.28 Isdale was investigating 
several sites on flat land near the town that could be to dump large 
quantities of tailings.29 The Te Aroha announced that a flotation mill was to 
be erected and that an additional mineral, cadmium, would be produced.30 
No mention was made of mercury, although it would cause the end of 
mining at Tui.  
 
NORPAC 
 
1966 
 
On 6 December 1965, Norpac Mining Limited was registered. A private 
company, it was owned by North Island Mines, a private Californian 
company which had helped South Pacific Mines develop the Tui mine since 
1962, South Pacific Mines, a private Canadian company, and the New 
Zealand public company Cable Price Downer. The latter was involved 
                                            
25 Te Aroha News, 6 July 1965, p. 1. 
26 Te Aroha News, 6 July 1965, p. 1. 
27 A.G. Pentland to Town Clerk, Te Aroha Borough Council, 18 November 1965, Tui Access 
[etc] file, Norpac Papers held by Mineral Resources (in 1986) at Union Hill, Waihi, and 
made available, before their destruction, by Eric Coppard of Waihi (hereafter Union 
Hill). 
28 Alistair Isdale, ‘Conversation with Mr Skidmore etc., 7/12/1965’, typescript, Norpac 
Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
29 Alistair Isdale, ‘Land for Tailings etc. on Flat. Examined 7/12/65, and Conversation Mr 
Bowler’, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 5, UA. 
30 Te Aroha News, 7 December 1965, p. 1. 
6 
because the government required some local participation in the venture, 
which had been difficult to arrange.31 Its name was a combination of NORth 
Island Mines and South PACific Mines.32 A meeting between mine 
manager, metallurgist and assayer, and the company secretary later that 
month considered methods of disposing of the tailings. There was a 
possibility of filling in a valley on land rented on the Dick Estate at Te 
Aroha, or of selling the sands for pre-stressed concrete. They decided to 
consult the Hauraki Catchment Board about the feasibility of using 
shallow-draught barges to take them to Auckland. All the grinding and 
flotation would be done at Fern Flat, only the tailings being piped to the 
flat. As large sums were spent extracting sand from the Waikato River and 
then having to get rid of the pumice, whereas the pyrites in the Tui tailings 
were separable by flotation, they were optimistic about sales; some firms 
had already expressed interest.33 
These three men discussed methods of disposing of tailings with 
Arthur Downer, Norpac’s chairman of directors, on 10 January 1966. They 
estimated that from 20,000 to 24,000 tons of sands would be produced each 
year, which, if free of pyrite, could be used for pre-stressed concrete. If the 
sand was separated by grade, there could be a profitable sale of the higher 
quality material (£6 per ton and more was postulated). Good grade white 
quartz chips would be sold for around £20 per ton. Crushed mullock could 
be sold for road making.34 A week later, methods of sieving the material and 
piping it to the base of the mountain were discussed, and it was decided to 
investigate land near Te Aroha as a disposal area. ‘Possibilities of requiring 
                                            
31 Roger Dewhurst to R.W. Harris, Memorandum entitled ‘History of Tui Mine and Tailings 
Dam’, 26 October 1978, Hauraki Catchment Board (hereafter HCB), Series 1, Box 206, 
2/7, vol. 2, held by Waikato Regional Council, Hamilton (hereafter WRC); Earl Kent 
Massey Palmer and Hamer to Secretary of Mines, 7 March 1975, Inspector of Mines, Box 
16A, 13/25, vol. 1, MC. 
32 Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 1, UA; Te Aroha News, 7 December 1965, p. 1; E.K. Haddy 
(Secretary, Norpac Mining Ltd.) to Chief Cashier, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Norpac 
Papers, Reserve Bank of NZ file, Union Hill. 
33 Notes of Meeting of 22 December 1965, Norpac Papers, Correspondence: Downer file, 
Union Hill. 
34 Notes of Meeting of 10 January 1966, Norpac Papers, Correspondence: Downer file, 
Union Hill. 
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only limited area, and of ultimately selling all sand. (Room Fern Flat for 
some temporary disposal)’.35 
 
FRANK HANDCOCK 
 
From 1 February 1966, Frank Joseph Handcock was the full-time 
general manager of Norpac. He had worked for Downer and Co. for many 
years, had ‘wide civil engineering construction experience, including open 
cast mining’,36 and was devoted to its interests. A history of this company 
recorded that he had worked for it since 1941.37 
 
He had been working on a programme of bridging level crossings 
when Arnold Downer engaged him. His first major job was to take 
charge of building a bridge at Orawaiti, the first bridge on which 
the company made any real money. From Orawaiti Frank 
Handcock went to the Cobb. In 1940/41 he was on Downers’ 
second major Waipori hydro contract, the driving of a duplicate 
supply tunnel to the No 2 power station, before going on to Fiji. 
After the war Handcock’s positive approach, his steadfast refusal 
to let any setback undermine his confidence, his skill at setting 
up a job, and his qualities of leadership were to be tested to the 
full when he became project manager at the Roxburgh hydro-
electric project.38 
 
His personality would be a feature of the coming conflicts over 
pollution. One miner recalled him as being ‘pig-headed and arrogant’ and 
very hard to deal with, his mood not being improved by a heavy intake of 
whisky and brandy.39 He lived in a little bach on the mine site, right next to 
the mill, only going home on weekends. ‘He was not the sort of man whom I 
                                            
35 Notes of Meeting of 17 January 1966, Norpac Papers, Correspondence: Downer file, 
Union Hill. 
36 A.F. Downer to J.F.A. Taylor, 15 February 1967, Norpac Papers, Box 1, NMC 35, UA; for 
full details of his career, see Mines Department, MD 1, 17/11/1584, Mines Department, 
Wellington. 
37 Arthur Manning, Walking Tall: the Downer story 1933-1983 (Wellington, 1983), p. 2 
[This booklet omits any mention of Downers’ involvement with Norpac]. 
38 Manning, p. 11; for photograph of Handcock, see p. 12. 
39 Interview with Eric Coppard, Waihi, 7 July 1995; James Henry Lynam, in interview on 1 
July 1995 at Te Aroha, confirmed the heavy intake of whisky, as did Dave Nelson, 
Norpac’s plant electrician, in a telephone conversation on 7 October 1996. 
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felt ... that you could rely on or trust.... He reminded me of an old fox, he 
was pretty sly, pretty cunning, and ... he would obtain his ... end by almost 
circular reasoning, and he wasn’t particularly well-liked’.40 A borough 
councillor recalled him as ‘a typical Australian’ who drove a hard bargain in 
his attempts to obtain cheap electricity and low rental for the land 
occupied.41 James Henry Lynam, Transmission Superintendent for the New 
Zealand Broadcasting Corporation, recalled him as a ‘very hard man’ who 
was solely concerned with Norpac’s interests and whom outsiders like 
himself found very hard to work with. He disliked government departments, 
local bodies, and public servants of all varieties, and ‘rode rough-shod over 
everyone’. As for the environment, ‘he couldn’t have cared less’, and was 
unwilling to spend any money controlling pollution. When Lynam 
complained of mullock washing across the mountain road, Handcock denied 
responsibility, claiming it was mining debris from the previous century - 
until shown that it included tannalized pine and plastic-covered electric 
wire.42 To prove an interest in enhancing the environment, he planted ‘a 
dozen or so Hydrangeas and a number of other flowering shrubs’ outside the 
office at the mill; ‘all eventually succumbed to the toxic soil’. Lynam recalled 
that he ‘blatantly disregarded’ environmental restraints and managed to 
hoodwink the authorities, ‘especially the Mines Dept’.43 
These attitudes to Handcock and the mining interests he championed 
were occasionally recorded at the time. In 1970, for example, John Reginald 
White, town clerk from 1968 to 1977, after an exchange of letters with 
Handcock over pollution and financial issues told the Minister of Mines that 
his council had ‘endeavoured at all times to be reasonable in its many 
dealings with the Company but such reasonableness’ was ‘apparently 
regarded as weakness rather than courtesy and a desire to assist’.44 
So devoted was Handcock to Norpac that, at a meeting of the Board of 
Directors of Norpac held on 11 August 1971,  
 
the Board expressed its appreciation of the time and effort Mr 
Handcock had expended on the Company’s behalf but it was felt 
                                            
40 Interview with Eric Coppard, Waihi, 8 December 1985, p. 61 of transcript. 
41 Interview with Sam Guernier, Te Aroha, 18 August 2001. 
42 Interview with J.H. Lynam, Te Aroha, 1 July 1995. 
43 J.H. Lynam to Philip Hart, 30 September 1996. 
44 J.R. White to Minister of Mines, 21 December 1970, Te Aroha Borough Council, A/26/6/1, 
Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
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that he was not being completely fair to himself or to his wife and 
family with his present arrangements. Accordingly he was 
instructed to extend the length [of] time which he spent at his 
home in Auckland at the weekends.45  
 
Handcock’s irritation with those who interfered with the way the 
company ran its mine, thereby increasing costs, was reflected in a comment 
when Norpac had to seek new markets after the Japanese refused to take 
further concentrates because of their mercury content. Handcock ‘claimed 
that his Company was being aided in negotiation by what he termed the 
growing realisation in the western world that it had over-reacted on some 
aspects of the pollution debate’.46 
 
PLANS AND CONCERNS 
 
In an interview with the Te Aroha News published on 4 February, 
Handcock gave details of the mill to be built at Fern Flat, 1,000 feet up the 
mountainside. Of the ore treated, about 20 percent would be shipped to 
Japan as concentrates for smelting, the remainder being ‘finely powdered to 
a degree that it resembles cement’, the company hoping ‘to find a ready 
market for it as first class concreting material’.47 Five days later, he 
confidently informed Norpac’s directors that the finely ground tailings 
‘would be ideal for the construction industry and could be a valuable by-
product of the mine’. He claimed that the Ministry of Works ‘had expressed 
interest’.48 But already the company was having doubts about piping 
tailings to depressions at the foot of the mountain. In March, Downer wrote 
that he opposed the plan to carry fines in a 2-inch pipe because ‘both cost 
wise and operationally this would not … be as trouble free’ as previously 
thought.49 (He was correct: the amount of kaolin in the mullock caused 
pugginess and would have made such a long pipeline impractical.)50 Downer 
                                            
45 Minutes of the 36th Meeting of Directors, 11 August 1971, Norpac Papers, Box 9, UA. 
46 Te Aroha News, 17 April 1973, p. 1. 
47 Te Aroha News, 4 February 1966, p. 1. 
48 Minutes of Second Meeting of Directors, 9 February 1966, Norpac Papers, Box 9, UA. 
49 A.F. Downer to F.J. Handcock, 22 March 1966, Norpac Papers held by Inspector of 
Mines, Box 17B, file X98, MC. 
50 See, for instance, F.J. Handcock, Report 10/6 for period ending 2 October 1971, Norpac 
Papers, Box 6, NMC 19/6, UA. 
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proposed using the three to four acres at Fern Flat for a tailings pond; this 
could be created ‘by excavating say 5 feet below surface, and stop banks say 
10 feet high’. The tailings could be recovered later if proved to be of 
commercial value.51 
An indication of the difficulties a dam would encounter in an area of 
high rainfall had already occurred. At the end of February, heavy rain 
caused serious flooding in the Ohinemuri and Te Aroha districts, and its 
impact on the Tui mine site was graphically reported by Isdale: 
 
Water is gushing from 3 level, making a waterfall, and the tip 
frame is out in mid air. The road to 4 level has suffered extensive 
damage.... Where the stream crosses the road from 3 at top, there 
is some debris.... From there to 4 level and half way down to 5 the 
stream bed has been thoroughly gutted. Everything went, huge 
boulders and all, successive blockages further and further down 
became bigger and were successively swept away. 
At 4 the iron at the end of the building overlooking the stream, 
now high up and on the edge, was badly battered. On the side a 
moraine of big rocks and tree trunks is piled up nearly as high as 
the building and has filled the drying room almost to the ceiling, 
taking the wall.... 
The road by the entrance at 4 is a shambles, and going down 
towards 5 has had a good deal of general scouring and depositing 
of big rocks.... 
At 5 water and debris came over between the compressors and 
the ventilation set up.... The tap at the end of the hose from the 
diesel oil tank up above was torn off and 400 gallons lost. The 
ventilation engine was buried in debris up to the starting 
handle.... 
The mine dump was all carried away practically back to the hard, 
leaving a section of tramline 4 or 5 rails long sagging in midair. 
There is a deep gulch below.52 
 
In late February, a committee appointed by the borough council to 
draw up conditions to be observed by Norpac should it be permitted to use 
ten acres of council land reported to the full council. Councillors were shown 
a plan of the site, 100 feet by 100 feet, cleared with Skidmore’s approval, 
and agreed to several conditions. ‘No water in the area or coming through or 
                                            
51 A.F. Downer to F.J. Handcock, 22 March 1966, Norpac Papers held by Inspector of 
Mines, Box 17B, file X98, MC. 
52 Alistair Isdale to Frank Handcock, 2 March 1966, Norpac Papers, Correspondence: 
Downer file, Union Hill. 
11 
from it’ was to be ‘polluted by tailings or like material’, Norpac was to 
indemnify the council for any loss of water by riparian owners, solid tailings 
were to be deposited in consultation with the catchment board ‘in such a 
manner so as not to be a nuisance or a danger’, and once mining ceased the 
area was to be left ‘in a clean and tidy condition’. The company was to be 
reminded that they would be operating within ‘the Council’s water 
catchment granted to it and protected by Special Act of Parliament’ and was 
required to ‘do everything possible to guard Council’s rights in the area’.53 
On 5 April, the council and Handcock, Isdale, and Norpac’s solicitor 
discussed, amongst other matters, the installation of septic tanks; Handcock 
stated that he would not employ more than 20 men.54 The following month, 
Norpac applied for a license to mine in an area of 200 acres. On 26 May, the 
Minister of Mines and the council signed an agreement permitting 100 
acres of borough land to be granted to Norpac, on specified terms and 
conditions. Norpac was not to  
 
pollute or tend to pollute the water in any stream whether 
supplying the Te Aroha Borough Water Supply or not and will not 
cause or allow earth rock or minerals removed from any works 
carried on by the Licensee or any mining tailings debris or refuse 
to enter any such stream. All tailings or waste materials shall be 
deposited in such manner as not to be a nuisance or danger. 
 
Adequate sanitation was to be provided. Should the Medical Officer of 
Health consider any of its operations were ‘detrimental to the purity of the 
Te Aroha Borough Water Supply’, these must cease until authorised to 
recommence. No more than 20 men were to be employed, there was to be no 
‘unnecessary damage’ to the forest, and when work ceased Norpac was to 
remove ‘all buildings and plant and leave the said land in a clear clean and 
tidy condition’.55 The deputy mayor of the time recalled, 20 years later, that  
                                            
53 Report of Special Committee to meeting of Te Aroha Borough Council held on 21 
February 1966, Te Aroha Borough Council Minutes 1965-1966, Sam Guernier Papers, Te 
Aroha. 
54 Minutes of conference held between Te Aroha Borough Council and Norpac 
representatives, 5 May 1966, Te Aroha Borough Council Minutes 1965-1966, Sam 
Guernier Papers, Te Aroha. 
55 Agreement of 26 May 1966 between the Minister of Mines and the Mayor Councillors 
and Citizens of the Borough of Te Aroha, Te Aroha Borough Council, A26/6/1, Matamata-
Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
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the Borough was quite keen for Norpac to succeed in its approach 
to the Mines Department to work the Norpac Mine because this 
was going to be another industry in Te Aroha. My recollection is 
that after negotiations with the Mines Department the Te Aroha 
Borough got the agreement of 26 May 1966 and regarded it as all 
the protection it needed.56 
 
The Hauraki Catchment Board inspected the site, noting that the 
topography was ‘generally steep to very steep’ and that mining could 
potentially endanger the success of the new Waihou Valley Scheme of flood 
control. It wanted conditions requiring minimal disturbance of the 
vegetation, no discharge of ‘mining wastes, tailings or debris’ into ‘any 
watercourse either directly or indirectly’, and that the working area at No. 5 
Level have a suitable culvert to enable the stream to flow without causing 
blockages or scouring. ‘The precise location, height and extent’ of rock 
dumps were to be such that would be no slips. Tailings pits should be so 
constructed and operated that no sudden or gradual discharge of tailings or 
tailings water into any stream would occur, and streams were not to enter 
the pits. When mining ceased, tailings were to be ‘left in such condition that 
they cannot be carried by water or other natural forces into any 
watercourse’.57 Handcock told Roger Harris, its chief engineer, that he 
appreciated the visit and their ‘very patient interest and guidance’, and 
provided copies of letters from Norpac’s advisers who were working on the 
details.58 One such adviser, after discussion with Dave Haszard, assayer 
and metallurgist for Norpac, was convinced that the system proposed ‘would 
in no way present a pollution problem or hazard’. Reusing mill water taken 
from the pond after settling meant that there would be very little water to 
be discarded.59 Thus assured of a trouble-free future, the hearing went 
ahead without controversy and the conditions requested by the catchment 
                                            
56 Statement by Donald K. McConnachie, 7 June 1985, Te Aroha Borough Council, 
A/26/6/1, Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
57 C.H. Walsh (Secretary, Hauraki Catchment Board) to Mining Registrar, 1 July 1966, Te 
Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1966, 8/1966, BCDG 11289/6a, ANZ-A. 
58 F.J. Handcock to R.W. Harris, 28 June 1966, HCB, Series 1, Box 205, File 7/2, vol. 1: 
Mining Applications: Te Aroha, WRC. 
59 M.H. Buckenham (Senior Lecturer in Mineral Technology, University of Otago) to F.J. 
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board were agreed to by the warden.60 The borough council was so pleased 
at the prospect of a mine that it insisted, successfully, that the license be 
granted under a section of the Mining Act that would give the rental for the 
land to itself, not the Crown. It argued that although the mine was on 
Crown land, the battery and tailings sites were on borough land. As a 
result, the borough would gain £100 a year from each of the four sites to be 
taken up.61  
On 1 September the company applied for special sites for their mill and 
treatment sites plus five acres for a tailings pond at Fern Flat. When the 
catchment board considered these applications at its meeting later that 
month, several members voiced concerns. The chairman, Reginald Seymour 
Bates, commented that, in a previous discussion with Handcock, ‘it had 
been indicated that an area of two or three acres was required for the 
disposal of the tailings, but now they require a much larger area’. He was 
concerned at the amount of time the board’s engineers had had to spend in 
investigating the applications, a point taken up by Harris: ‘The previous 
application from the Company took a lot of my time in investigation work, 
which I don’t think is my job’. Bates complained that there was no plan of 
how the tailings would be contained, commenting that it was ‘completely 
wrong that our engineer should spend his time working out a plan for the 
Company’. Robert William Andrews also complained about the inadequate 
data provided: ‘We don’t know at what height the stop bank at the site will 
be or whether it could break and send a deluge down on us’. Harris warned 
that the mountain ‘was prone to heavier rainfall and flash storms’ than the 
township; for example, the new meteorological station on the mountain had, 
over a three-day period, recorded five and a half inches compared with 3.1 
inches in the town.62 As a result of an unanimous vote, the secretary 
informed the mining registrar that the board 
 
understood the residue from the treatment of the ore will be in 
the form of finely ground tailings. Board is disturbed at the 
possibility of large quantities of tailings being stacked on 
relatively steep slopes. The material is likely to be infertile and to 
be exposed to high intensity rainfall and there are serious doubts 
whether quite extensive wash (i.e. local erosion) over long periods 
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can be prevented. With the existing claim, and the additional 15 
acres concerned in the present applications, the area of general 
disturbance on steep mountain slopes is beginning to reach 
comparatively large proportions. The methods to be used in 
milling and treating the ore and disposing of the tailings is of 
prime importance and until Board is in possession of this 
information, in full, and its fears are allayed it must formally 
oppose the applications.63 
 
Harris sent a copy to Norpac with a covering letter stating that he had 
understood that their original application ‘was the only claim needed’ and 
that he was ‘somewhat surprised and even alarmed, that a further 10 to 15 
acres’ was now required. Quite apart from the need to preserve the bush as 
part of the Waihou Valley Scheme, there was ‘the long term water resource 
potential and the recreation function’. As the mountain was ‘a recognized 
scenic area’, there was ‘little doubt that extensive dumps of tailings on the 
mountain side could be quite detrimental’. Before making any 
recommendations, he required ‘satisfactory answers’ to two questions: 
 
(1) Why cannot the tailings be dumped elsewhere on flat ground 
away from the mountain? 
This would minimise general disturbance, eliminate erosion 
hazards, and, on the face of things, seems to be by no means 
impossible, either physically or financially. 
(2) Without implying any commitment or approval to such an 
operation, in the event that tailings were to be dumped on the 
mountainside, would you please submit full detailed proposals 
which would ensure that the Board’s interests would be fully 
safeguarded.64 
 
Part of the alarm was caused by the board’s belief that Norpac was 
seeking an additional area, when in fact its application related to the site 
already covered by their mineral license. Norpac’s consulting engineer in 
pointing this out wrote that he was ‘somewhat disturbed’ by the report of its 
meeting, for it would receive full details of the pit and Norpac would abide 
by the conditions imposed. He suggested ‘that in future should any 
information be required, either the Company or our firm be contacted 
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rather than that doubts should be expressed publicly and thus throwing the 
onus of justification on the Company’.65 
In consultation with Gensiro Sakai, senior metallurgist for the Matsui 
Mining and Smelting Company of Japan, and Hiromi Tarasawa, that 
company’s liaison representative in Auckland, both of whom inspected the 
sites for the mill and tailings pond,66 detailed plans and drawings were 
prepared by J. Bruce Wallace, a consulting engineer.67 Handcock reported 
that Mitsui provided ‘a good practical tailings dam design that will permit 
of early site preparation and construction’.68  
 
A toe bund of “pit soil” was to be constructed at the western 
boundary of the tailings disposal area, with a gravel filter mat on 
its upstream slope. Deposition of the tailings would then occur 
behind the bund and with time the dam height would be 
increased using the coarse fraction of the tailings while the fine 
fraction would be deposited nearer the decant points towards the 
eastern side of the area. As the height of the dam was increased 
the centreline of the crest would be shifted towards the pond area 
using what is termed the “upstream method” of construction.69 
 
The tailings site was granted on 22 December, with the conditions 
required by the board imposed, but applications for the other two special 
sites were abandoned by Handcock because ‘eleventh hour conditions 
imposed by the Te Aroha Borough Council could not be met’.70 To carry out 
the requirement to keep tailings out of all streams, Norpac decided ‘to 
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install at the downstream toe of the dam at the outlet of the 10” diameter 
pipe a concrete pump chamber for which to pump all tailings water back to 
a head tank ... for re-use’. This water, along with water from the mine that 
was held in another tank, would be re-cycled within the milling operation. 
In additional, ‘all wash water used at Mill will be discharged clear of 
tailings pond’.71 
 
1967 
 
 When Roger Harris inspected the partly constructed earth dam on 27 
January, what he saw confirmed his ‘serious concern’ that the small valley 
at Fern Flat had been dammed ‘to an appreciable height, without any 
effective provision for safe overflow, in the event of heavy storm run-off’. He 
reminded the company that it had been agreed that the tailings pit should 
allow for an ‘unrestricted flood-way for the small stream’. The work being 
done departed ‘almost completely from this principle and the method, 
apparently, originally envisaged by your consultants’, making the dam a 
potential hazard.72 This led to a visit to the site by Wallace, Harris, the 
chairman of the catchment board, and two board members, as a result of 
which Wallace agreed to Harris’ request for improved piping of waste water 
and an emergency spillway.73 Norpac also agreed to build an earth bank on 
the streamside.74 Harris was mollified, as the plans were now ‘reasonably in 
line with principles originally agreed upon’, but he repeated that all dams 
must be completely safe, all natural streams, springs, and local run-off must 
be kept completely separate from mining operations, and floodways must be 
kept clear. Although the board required ‘to be re-assured on various 
matters’, the responsibility for ensuring that all requirements were 
adequately met lay ‘entirely with the Company’.75 
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To meet the board’s requirements, changes were made, as explained in 
a 1974 report, which also described how the pond operated: 
 
The tailings area was not initially developed over the total area, 
in order to allow spring and surface runoff water to pass around 
the northern limits of the area rather than enter the pond. Thus a 
breach was made at the northern end of the earth bund and a 
side bund was constructed to form the northern limits of the 
smaller pond area.... 
Initially the discharge water from the tailings pond was recycled 
through the mill. In order to make use of the area to the north of 
the side bund the spring and runoff water was collected in pipes 
and the main earth bund extended to the north. At this stage 
tailings deposition was diverted to the area to the north of the 
side bund and the tailings in the first area were allowed to dry 
out and desiccate. These dried tailings were then excavated using 
normal earthmoving plant and were deposited mainly on the 
downstream side of the clay bund at the western end of the area. 
Tailings were then deposited in the areas both north and south of 
the side bund. The main tailings dam was built up over a number 
of years by separating the coarse and fine fraction using 
“cyclones;” the fine fraction was allowed to deposit on the 
downstream slope. A rubber tyred loader was used to move the 
coarse fraction (sand) and spread it out to build up the dam, using 
its wheels to provide compaction. The dam was thus built up by 
what is known as the “centreline method,” the bund being 
maintained approximately 5 feet above the tailings level.76 
 
McAra added that when the fine fraction went to the pond at the back 
of the dam, a siphon ‘installed on solid country’ removed the surplus liquid; 
it could handle 12 inches of rainfall in 24 hours, the ‘fines’ creating ‘an 
impermeable cake’.77 
Although Harris had got his modifications to the pond, he remained 
concerned over possible future problems. He told the chairman that the 
board’s responsibilities and powers over Norpac needed to be clarified. 
‘Rightly or wrongly’ he understood that the license under the Mining Act 
meant that the company was ‘not necessarily obliged to satisfy or reassure 
the Board on any particular points that might be raised’. As ways to protect 
the environment had not been worked out in advance, there must be 
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‘acceptable assurances’ that Norpac took full technical responsibility for the 
design, construction, and continued safe operation of the pit. ‘Occasional 
site visits’ by his staff were ‘no substitute for this and should be 
discontinued in the absence of such “acceptable assurances”’. So far, he had 
received none about the details of construction: would the company adhere 
to agreements reached? ‘At least one incident has occurred involving a very 
considerable departure from the agreed layout of the tailings pit, (since 
rectified) which would appear to offer confirmation to the above’. He 
recommended that the board should publicly state that it accepted no 
responsibility at this stage. It ‘must, at the least, keep a general watch on 
the situation’ and make Norpac provide ‘acceptable assurances’.78 
Privately, the company grumbled about the cost of modifying their pit. 
Downer, writing to an overseas director to explain the need to spend more 
funds preparing the mine and mill to enable production to start in July, 
claimed that ‘some quite costly requirements of the Catchment Board in 
respect to the disposal of the tailings have largely accounted for the cash 
run down’.79 In fact the dam was estimated to cost only £8,500 out of the 
estimated cost of £148,500 to bring the mine and mill into production.80  
That Norpac’s directors did not anticipate any environmental problems 
was indicated by a meeting of 15 May at which they discussed a letter from 
the Department of Health about possible air and water pollution. ‘It was 
arranged that the General Manager should reply in suitable terms pointing 
out that it was not anticipated that there would be any air pollution and 
precautions would be taken to minimise any possible nuisance’.81 But they 
did employ Dr Lionel Stanley Davis as a consultant to report on any 
contamination of the streams. Davis had formerly worked as a Medical 
Officer for the Health Department, including in the Paeroa district,82 
specializing in effluent problems. The August meeting of directors was told 
that samples of water taken from the Tui Stream were being analysed ‘so 
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that the Company would have an official record of the natural mineral 
content of the water and would be in a position to gauge the level of 
contamination caused by the mill, particularly in regard to lead content’.83 
When Davis visited the site on 1 August he was shown around by Handcock 
and Dave Haszard, the mill manager. Handcock explained his expectations 
of selling the sands: in a similar mill tailings were added to fertilisers 
because of the trace elements. Davis described the pond in detail: 
 
Tailings disposal is into a tailings dam situated just below the 
mill at the head of the Omahu gully.... Discharge of the tailings is 
onto the internal surface of the lower bank of the dam structure 
and the deposit of material from the tailings will gradually build 
up this bank of the dam both internally so that the dam will be 
gradually reduced in area and also upwards above the present 
level of the dam structure so the depth of the [heap] will be 
increased. The dam will eventually be replaced by a mound of 
solid tailings. 
Extending through this lower bank of the dam and along the floor 
of the dam upwards towards the mill is a nine inch concrete pipe 
drain with a four inch field tile drain along each side and these 
are also connected up with field tiles lining the whole internal 
face of this lower bank of the dam. It is hoped that any seepage 
from the dam will be caught up in these field tiles. 
The nine inch concrete drain within the dam will have upright 
pipes perforated with 3 inch openings every six inches. As the 
tailings water in the dam settles the supernatant water after 
settlement of the settleable solids will be decanted through these 
openings into the nine inch drain. Lower openings in the pipe will 
be plugged as the settled tailings rise and so on up the pipe until 
the whole pipe is plugged when one higher up the dam will be 
brought into use. Water from the mine main drain and also the 
field tiles referred to will be caught up in a sump just below the 
dam and pumped back into the mill for reuse through a 2 inch 
rising main. The purpose of this [was] two fold. Firstly to recover 
the chemical reagents and secondly to comply with the 
requirements of the licence that no pollution of the streams shall 
take place. 
 
Although emphasizing that he had been asked a question ‘somewhat’ 
out of his field, for he had no knowledge of the chemistry of the metals 
concerned, was not an engineer, and had no experience of disposal pits, 
Davis was confident, because of his ‘long experience of assessing disposal 
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projects of all sorts and conditions of trade wastes’, that the methods used 
would ‘prove very satisfactory’. The dam was well constructed, ‘the material 
being reasonably water proof’, and the deposition of tailings would 
continuously strengthen it. Its capacity of 1,900,000 gallons was ‘generous’, 
and the 50,000 gallons to be used in the mill daily would never cause 
excessive hydraulic pressure. He expected that seepage through the floor of 
the dam would not be a problem, for ion exchange while passing through 
the clay would remove most if not all of the metals in solution before water 
reached the stream. If thought necessary, the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research could be consulted on the capacity of the clay to extract 
metals in this way. Unless there were accidents such as a breakdown of the 
pumps, ‘fissure formation in the dam structure (unlikely)’, or a burst 
pipeline there was little likelihood of any serious pollution of the Omahu 
Stream. ‘Some pollution’ of the Tui Stream was ‘likely’ because of ‘the 
exposure of metal bearing ore to the leeching effect of rain, spillages, 
leaking glands etc in the mill’ would inevitably pollute surface water 
draining into it. But as he thought that these metals were not very soluble 
in water, plus the small amount of such water compared with that of the 
stream, any serious pollution seemed ‘unlikely’. The greatest hazard was 
lead, and he was ‘concerned to learn’ that the stream was used on the golf 
course to water the greens and in a dairy factory to wash floors. ‘From 
experience’ he knew that such water was ‘frequently used for drinking’. 
The first of his five recommendations was that, before the mill started, 
water samples taken from the Omahu and Tui streams should be tested for 
lead, copper and zinc. Once it started, samples should be taken at least 
monthly for the first year. As any pollution of these streams would ‘for sure 
be blamed on the Company’, it must be able to prove that the streams 
normally contained a certain amount of lead. Secondly, having checked the 
existing uses of the streams, the company might ‘suggest or make available 
alternative water supplies, which was ‘common practice’. Thirdly, the use of 
water for the golf course and the dairy factory needed to be addressed. ‘In 
view of the possibility of pollution to a dangerous degree - I say possibly not 
probably or even likely - the matter becomes a serious one’. A rise in lead 
levels in the Tui Stream would require action (unspecified). Fourthly, 
controls and health tests should be set up to safeguard the workers’ health 
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from lead poisoning. The last recommendation was to de-sludge the septic 
tank every 12 months: ‘it will then be less likely to give rise to complaint’.84 
When sending this report to his directors, Handcock commented that 
examining workers for lead poisoning ‘was impossible in NZ as miners had 
always resisted it’. He also reported that the local authorities had told him 
that the Tui and Tunakohoia streams were no longer used for the borough 
water supply but that one farmer watered his stock from them. Only a 
temporary stoppage of the water supply would cause the borough engineer 
to draw water from the Omahu Stream.85  
On 19 September, McAra visited the site at the request of Harris, who 
was concerned over possible pollution of the Tui Stream. McAra recorded 
that Harris thought it might ‘be used for human consumption, not just for 
watering greens’, a point that would have to be sorted out. He then called at 
the mine ‘and found the arrangements for tailings disposal appeared 
satisfactory’.86 On 22 September, at Harris’ request McAra discussed the 
danger of erosion with Harris, Handcock, and Haszard. McAra recorded 
that  
 
Harris was generally satisfied with the precautions taken, but 
pointed out that seepage or a spring which appears to be coming 
from beneath the downstream end of the tailings dam should be 
drawn to the notice of the dam consultants, as it might affect its 
security. Mr Handcock makes the point that seepage from the 
dam will probably be taken up by the deposit of slimes and I 
agree that this is most likely. However, it seems reasonable that 
the source of the water should be located.... After inspecting the 
plant Mr Harris remarked on the apparent importance of the 
undertaking.87 
 
Later that month, after receiving a complaint about pollution of the 
Tui Stream, McAra asked the Hamilton Medical Officer of Health to test the 
water. Chemical analysis of samples taken above the golf club intake 
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revealed no copper, lead, or zinc, but bacteriological examination revealed 
‘heavy pollution’, probably from sources other than the mine. The Medical 
Officer suggested only one main condition be applied: ‘adequate provision be 
made to prevent the escape of any poisonous wastes or other deleterious 
materials into any watercourse’. A copy of this test was sent to the 
catchment board.88 
Norpac was regularly in touch with its Japanese advisers about the 
best machines and techniques to use in its mill. When seeking advice on the 
best reagent to use, it is clear from Handcock’s letter in June that he was 
conscious that there were environmental limitations on what he could use: 
‘For reasons of the Catchment and River Control Board’s requirements, we 
would not wish to use sodium cyanide’.89 
 
1968 
 
At the beginning of this year the height of the tailings dam was 
increased and the total area planned to hold the initial tailings was being 
used.90 But the company’s optimism that pollution would not be a problem 
would soon prove to be unfounded, and during the year it became of 
increasing concern to the local authorities. In April 1969, Ian Edward 
Feasey, Health and Buildings Inspector for the Te Aroha Borough Council, 
listed all the pollution that had occurred from April 1968 till then. The first 
time that he had been informed of pollution was in April, then on 18 and 19 
October discolouration of the stream was again noticed, causing him to 
inspect the dam, as detailed below. More discolouration occurred on 11 
November, and two days later ‘frothing agent in stream adjacent to dam’ 
was reported by him to the mine management.91  
On 9 August, Peter John Carter, appointed office manager after Isdale 
left the company’s employment in December 1966, noted:  
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Visit from a Mr McMillan, interested in buying our entire 
production of quartz chips. Phone call from Richardson, who had 
visited us a year ago, regarding the sale of sand. McMillan to take 
a lorry load of samples and submit a firm offer in writing soonest. 
McMillan to visit tailings dam in the near future.92 
 
On 15 August Wallace, still Norpac’s consulting engineer, accompanied 
Downer to examine the mine tips and ‘to examine tailings sand proposals’,93 
but this possibility of selling the tailings did not proceed.  
Engineers had been asked for advice on how to deal with the tailings. 
A Cable Price Downer engineer, noting that 100 tons were produced each 
day, warned that the existing dam would be too small by the end of the 
year. The earlier idea of piping the tailings away was impractical, for the 
sands were ‘highly abrasive being predominantly silica and any flume or 
pipe carrying the tailings’ was ‘quickly abraded’. He recommended that 
around 1,000 tons of ‘good white sand’ (the plus 300 mesh material) be 
stockpiled and sold. Slimes would need an area of three acres, to be covered 
to a depth of nine feet.94 Norpac’s consulting engineers again inspected the 
site, and warned that rainwater draining from the road onto the pit was 
creating the ‘possibility of water topping the dam’.95 In September they gave 
a more detailed report of their investigations. The useable area, although 
‘not as large as was thought before the lines were cut through the scrub’, 
provided approximately 0.4 acres for the two pits and a practical depth of 
ten feet (180,000 cubic feet storage). The area by the cattle stop also seemed 
smaller then envisaged. The combined areas would not be sufficient ‘for 
continually storing the fines’. 
 
We are looking into the possibility of finding a market for the 
fines and with this in view we are having an analysis carried out.  
Should there be a sale new pits at Fern Flat could be used for de-
watering and temporary storage only. 
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Should there be no market we are of the opinion that the fines 
should be piped to some convenient piece of land at the foot of the 
mountain and held safely for all time in an earth dam.96 
 
Handcock’s report to his directors written on 15 October detailing all 
aspects of the mining operation included some references to pollution issues. 
Despite earlier not wishing the use cyanide, from 23 September it was being 
used in the lead copper conditioner, and as an improvement in the 
concentrate was immediately evident it would be used in all future 
treatment. As it was now ‘very urgent’ to increase the size of the tailings 
area, a scheme to alter the method of their disposal had been worked out. 
This provided for the continued rise in height of the presently used area. 
The enlargement of it ‘by provision of piped drainage (of small creek and 
springs)’ would double the available storage area.  
 
A tailings thickener and filter will dewater tailings to approx 12 
to 15 percent moisture. All water will return to mill head tank 
and all dewatered tailings will be dry stacked. The proposal has 
been submitted to the Catchment Board and we await approval 
before proceeding to construction.97 
 
Harris was advised by Wallace that, under this system, once the mine 
closed ‘a channel of clay and loam’ could be formed over the surface of the 
tailings which would ‘give a permanent water way for the rainfall from the 
small catchment’. It was ‘not uncommon overseas for tailings pits to be 
spread with soil and crops grown thereon’.98 This scheme was being 
examined by the Mitsui Mining Company, which provided advice on all 
aspects of the treatment of ore, and no action would be taken until costs 
were known.99 It was put forward at a time when the local bodies were 
increasingly aware that the mine was causing pollution. A memorandum by 
Feasey written in late October (a copy being given to the catchment board) 
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vividly revealed the pollution issues and the problems he would have in 
getting compliance: 
 
During the past few months I have received a number of 
complaints about the discolouration and taste of the water from 
Members of the Golf Club and occupiers of the dwellings which 
use water from the supply point situated on the Tui Stream.... 
Norpac Mines Ltd ... have been periodically polluting this stream 
with water from the “tailings pond.” 
Until Friday the 18th of October, I had not seen any evidence of 
pollution in the stream. Previous to this date I had made a 
number of visits to the point where the stream meets the main 
highway by the Golf Course. 
I received many phone calls [on] the Friday and later that day I 
took a sample of the water from the stream. This sample has been 
sent away to be analysed for evidence of pollution. Later that day 
I called on the Manager of the Mine Extraction Plant and 
discussed the stream pollution problem. He stated that during the 
night the hose from the mine extraction plant to the pond had 
broken and the water had found its way into the stream. This 
hose had been fixed during that morning and was functioning 
satisfactorily at the time of my visit. I did not see any evidence of 
water flowing over the dam wall at the time of my visit. 
During the discussion with the Mine Plant manager, the 
comment was passed by the manager, that sooner or later this 
problem must come to a head and mentioned further that his 
company was trying to avoid pollution of the stream. I explained 
to him that I was particularly concerned because the stream was 
used as a domestic water supply. 
On Monday morning I was informed of further discolouration of 
the stream. This was confirmed by my inspection during the 
morning. Early in the afternoon together with the Ohinemuri 
County Health Inspector we went up to the mine plant to further 
investigate the pollution problem. I met the company’s chemist at 
the mine and mentioned that we intended to investigate the 
source of discolouration. While returning to the dam I noticed a 2 
inch alkathene pipe draped over the wall of the dam near the 
back of the dam. 
As we proceeded around the top of the dam to the point in 
question a member of the staff came down from the factory and 
removed the pipe from the dam, then returned to the factory. This 
pipe was syphoning water out of the dam into the stream. This 
was direct pollution of the stream with full knowledge of the mine 
staff. 
When we arrived at the point of pollution the stream above this 
point was slightly discoloured and a clay brown in colour. Below 
the point of pollution the stream was grey in colour and there was 
a large amount of settled sand of the same colour as the tailings 
26 
from the plant. The water below this point was frothy and showed 
ample evidence of being polluted with a frothing agent. 
While returning to town we met the Manager of the company.... 
During subsequent discussion I reiterated the fact that I was very 
concerned about the pollution of the stream and emphasized that 
the water was used for domestic purposes. The manager 
expressed surprise at this statement and maintained that he was 
not aware that anyone used the water for domestic purposes. I 
informed him what we had noted at the mine tailing pond and he 
appeared to know these facts. I requested his assurance that no 
further pollution of the stream be permitted. He gave me this 
assurance. I also requested that efforts be made to solve this 
problem between the parties as soon as possible. 
Later I wrote a letter to the Manager and to the Golf Club with 
respect to this matter.100 
 
Feasey’s brief letter to Handcock did not describe what he had seen but 
simply reminded him that the license to mine required that there be no 
pollution. As the company had polluted the stream ‘on not less than two 
separate occasions’, he required Handcock to take ‘all steps necessary’ to 
prevent further pollution. Should any pollution occur or be likely to occur, 
his office must be told so that those using the stream could be warned.101  
Handcock’s report to his directors stated that the pipe between the mill 
and the tailings pond had broken early in the morning of 18 October and 
that when this was noticed at 7.30 a.m. the mill was stopped and 
replacement pipes fitted. Before this was done, tailings had entered the Tui 
Stream. He reported that Feasey was worried, and that although the golf 
club had put the matter in their solicitor’s hands no legal action had been 
taken. There was a ‘minimal’ area available for storage, and the ‘water 
settling area and depth adjacent to tailings return water decant pipe’ was 
‘so restricted as to make efficient settling difficult’. Early approval for an 
extension of the pond was needed, and he was working out the details with 
the catchment board.102  
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Handcock’s response to Feasey’s letter was to repeat that the pollution 
on 23 October ‘was entirely involuntary on my company’s part and was 
caused by circumstances beyond its control’. The pollution in April was the 
result of exceptional rainfall causing a washout in the dam: ‘The damage 
was repaired by the company forthwith and no further trouble has been 
experienced from the dam’. He was not attempting to evade responsibility, 
Norpac was fully aware of its obligations, and he could ‘confidently’ say that 
since the inception of processing it had ‘been assiduously careful in its 
endeavours to avoid any pollution or other nuisance’. He was instructed to 
assure Feasey that the company would ‘do everything in its power’ to 
prevent pollution, would rectify it should any occur, and would notify him 
immediately of any accidental pollution. Subject to obtaining catchment 
board consent, Norpac proposed to increase the capacity of its pond and 
install a thickener and filter plant, at an estimated cost of some $50,000. 
This scheme would prove Norpac’s bona fides because it would ‘virtually 
eliminate any possibility of further pollution’, all liquids being ‘recovered 
and re-used in the company’s mill’.103 
On 14 November the Government Analyst reported that a sample of 
the Tui Stream taken above the golf course had disclosed a lead content of 
0.08 parts per million, above the maximum of 0.05 ppm allowable by the 
World Health Organisation, which meant the water should be rejected ‘as a 
public supply for domestic use’.104 After discussions between Handcock, 
Skidmore, and White, Norpac agreed to meet the cost of piping water from 
the borough water supply to the golf club, the Te Aroha Dairy Company, 
and others. In return, Norpac wanted an assurance that if it sought more 
mining privileges that affected this stream, the council would support it. 
This agreement was to be communicated forthwith to the catchment board, 
for reasons Handcock explained to White:  
 
You will be aware of the position that Norpac Mining Limited is 
faced with an urgent problem connected with its tailings and has 
submitted a major scheme for approval of the Hauraki Catchment 
Board. Unless this scheme is implemented immediately Norpac 
Mining Limited is faced with the closure of its operations. There 
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is no need for me to detail the disastrous impact closure will have 
on my Company and its employees. 
I take this opportunity to record the courtesy and consideration 
extended by your Mayor and yourself and look forward to your 
early answer.105 
 
No doubt the discussions had included the impact on the local economy 
of Norpac’s closure, although this was not raised when the council debated 
the issue that evening and agreed to require Norpac to meet the cost of the 
temporary water supply to those affected. When White informed Handcock 
of this, he did not mention Handcock’s conditions, and as a result no 
agreement was reached.106 Indeed Handcock withdrew the offer of meeting 
the installation costs when he received details of the analysis of the water 
sample taken at the golf club, which he claimed showed the water was 
within World Health Organisation standards. He told White that, as Norpac 
had not been ‘advised officially that pollution had taken place ... the use of 
“Stream Pollution” as a letter subject heading’ was ‘in error’.107 
Negotiations between Norpac and the catchment board over the 
proposal had begun after the board visited the site on 7 November and 
discussing the issue with representatives of Norpac and their consulting 
engineers.  Afterwards, Handcock assured the chairman that he appreciated 
their visit and trusted that it ‘did fully illustrate the proposal and our 
urgency in seeking a favourable decision, so permitting us to proceed to 
construction’. He added that another of the advantages of dry storage was 
that it would ‘enhance the storage volume on the area and provides for 
ready access to transport to cart away sand’.108 McAra, who had visited the 
mine at Harris’ request on the same date, examined the proposed works and 
discussed them with the consulting engineer. He reported that they were 
‘well planned and reasonable to meet the situation’, adding that the 
                                            
105 F.J. Handcock to Town Clerk, Te Aroha, 19 November 1968, Te Aroha Borough Council, 
A/26/6/1, Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
106 Te Aroha News, 21 November 1968, p. 1; Town Clerk to F.J. Handcock, 20 November 
1968, Te Aroha Borough Council, A/26/6/1, Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te 
Aroha; F.J. Handcock, Report 12/3 for period ending 30 November 1968, Norpac Papers, 
Box 5, NMC 19/3, UA. 
107 F.J. Handcock to Town Clerk, 4 December 1968, Te Aroha Borough Council, A/26/6/1, 
Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
108 F.J. Handcock to Chairman, Hauraki Catchment Board, 11 November 1968, HCB, 
Series 1, Box 205, 7/2, vol. 1, WRC. 
29 
question of existing water rights was ‘obscure and it was felt that it would 
be better if any rights on the Tui stream were cancelled or transferred’ to 
the Tunakohoia.109 
Norpac’s advisers recorded that the 7 November meeting discussed 
technical points concerning drainage and pollution: ‘No recorded objections 
were noted to the proposed scheme’.110 However, silence did not yet mean 
consent. Harris reported at a meeting of the catchment board held on 20 
November that although Norpac had kept tailings out of the stream, ‘it had 
apparently not been able to keep the stream free from pollution’, for 
Feasey’s tests had revealed a ‘certain amount of lead’. After discussing 
Norpac’s plans for the new tailings system, it decided to reach agreement 
with the council on pollution and then to deal with the application.111 
Accordingly, a meeting was held on 25 November between representatives 
of the board, the council, and the Ohinemuri County Council. Feasey raised 
the issue of lead in the Tui Stream, and Harris expressed fears of a dam 
failure. It was accepted that cost ruled out dumping the tailings elsewhere. 
Harris then asked if the councils wished to see the details of the agreement 
the board was working out with Norpac, or whether they would be satisfied 
to know that it would insist on ‘all possible precautions’. He stressed that 
the board ‘could not decline the application for a reasonable system’ without 
‘good reasons’. The Ohinemuri representative, who wanted Norpac to keep 
operating, responded that his council was content to leave the board to work 
out an agreement. Harris said that, while he was satisfied with the 
consulting engineers’ plans, there could be no guarantee that the tailings 
would be safe, and their commercial use was questionable because their 
chemical composition might ‘make them unsuitable for some particular uses 
(e.g. concrete)’. All agreed that Norpac must not pollute the stream, even if 
the borough no longer used it for their water supply.112 
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At a meeting held four days later between the board, Norpac, and 
McAra, Handcock presented a letter stating that it would take some time to 
reach agreement:  
 
Unfortunately certain requirements must be met forthwith to 
avoid some possible pollution of the Tui Stream, and also to avoid 
closing down of the Mill. 
This work will be limited to meet the immediate urgency, and 
still be a part of the final installation. It will consist of placing 
approximately 200 feet of 18” pipe in the location discussed 
between Mr Harris and Mr Bruce Wallace, and the extension of 
the clay embankment, to its original location. This will permit the 
safe containment of the Mill waste until such time as the 
proposed new installation is completed.113 
 
Handcock once more explained the proposed system, adding that as the 
moisture content would be only eight percent the sands could be used in 
road filling or cement; ‘it was possible that large quantities’ of the 100,000 
cubic yards would be removed. In response to the board’s worries about 
pollution and the collapse of the dam because of the weight of the ‘enormous 
dump’, Handcock said that rainfall would only saturate the top three to four 
feet and would drain away quickly. McAra ‘was satisfied that (1) the heap 
would not create any problems as feared & (2) that there would be no 
pollution’. The reagents to be used were not toxic, apart from the cyanide, 
but so little of that would be used that it would be ‘virtually undetectable’. 
After discussing ways of strengthening the dam and piping flood waters, the 
board’s representatives agreed to the proposal, on condition that a 
registered civil engineer assured them that the design and construction of 
the dam and related works were satisfactory.114 
McAra’s report on this meeting stated that he attended at Harris’ 
request, and that 
 
after receiving complaints from Norpac Mining Ltd. that in spite 
of all their efforts to meet all reasonable demands from the 
Engineer of the Hauraki Catchment Board and the undertaking 
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submitted to cost $50,000, the Engineer wanted a number of new 
conditions.... 
There was lengthy argument between the parties, Mr Handcock 
advising at one stage that he would have no option but to close 
the mine if agreement could not be reached. At my suggestion a 
basis for discussion was established by the submission of a 
formula by the Engineer and eventually a satisfactory 
arrangement was reached. 
My feeling was that the Engineer was far too non-committal and 
was not prepared to state specific requirements or to approve or 
condemn proposals submitted. 
I had previously spoken to the Medical Officer of Health by phone 
when he advised that the stream in question was not an 
authorised water supply and was unsatisfactory in any case from 
a bacteriological point of view. He also advised that the lead 
content was well below the harmful limit. 
It seemed to me that the question was one of possible pollution 
from erosion. 
I assured the Chairman that if the tailing was dry stacked after 
the filter as proposed it would not collapse due to saturation as it 
would be sufficiently porous to allow the water to escape. I also 
assured him that the level of chemical reagents in the tailing 
could not reach a dangerous level as they were destroyed by 
reaction and dilution.115 
 
In sending McAra a summary of the agreement between Norpac and 
the board, Handcock wrote that the company was ‘appreciative of the 
discussion time and spirit of co-operation manifested’.116 
If Handcock believed this ‘spirit of co-operation’ included Harris, he 
was mistaken, for Harris stressed the implications of Norpac’s plans in a 
confidential memorandum written immediately afterwards. Several years of 
dumping tailings were envisaged, which meant the filling of the small 
valley with from 100,000 to 200,000 cubic yards of material with a dump 
face 30 or 40 feet high. Since Norpac had been granted its mining license, 
the Water and Soil Conservation Act had been passed in 1967; under this 
all catchment boards became Regional Water Boards as well. The board 
therefore had new responsibilities for stream pollution, and must not permit 
Norpac to increase this. At the same time, it was not ‘in any position to 
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assume liability for any risks that might be involved, either concerning 
pollution, erosion, etc’. As the tailings were on a ‘particularly steep 
mountain with a reputation for very high intensity storms’ and some 
springs were not ‘likely to be tapped’, there was the likelihood of ‘fretting at 
the lower end’. As part of the heap could ‘become sufficiently saturated to 
threaten stability’, the dam wall must be strong, possibly constructed from 
a series of stone gabions. It was ‘not possible to assess the risk, or 
otherwise’, of leaching: only ‘actual experience’ would determine if this 
would be ‘minimal or non-existent’. He recommended that the board impose 
a ‘continuing condition’ that Norpac had ‘no mandate to pollute the stream’, 
and that, should pollution occur, the company must eliminate this, even if 
that meant abandoning their method of disposal. After first checking with 
other competent authorities such as the Medical Officer of Health, ‘this 
should be made very clear to the Company’.117 On the immediate issue, 
Harris with the backing of his board confirmed with Norpac’s consulting 
engineers that the changes proposed for piping the stream and building 
over-flow floodway and retaining structures could proceed.118  
Pentland, now a Norpac director, regularly advised the company on 
technical points. In late November he wrote to Downer that he had gone 
over the information Mitsui had provided about a revised tailings scheme: 
 
I still think it is a shame that a new and struggling industry 
should be saddled with such heavy costs just to satisfy the egoism 
of a few nincompoops. I can see no reason why the proposed set-
up will not do what it is designed for. However, it is not an open 
sesame to trouble-free operation. There is still the danger that 
the de-watered tailings may be washed down the hill by a flash 
flood, and you may find that there is a build-up of chemicals, 
resulting in troubles in the flotation plant, because of using the 
water over and over again. 
I have heard stories that there may be a demand for the coarser 
part of the tailing for road material or other uses. If this is true, it 
may pay to make two products, one coarse and the other fine. 
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Even if you gave the coarse part away for hauling it down the hill, 
there would be some advantage because it would be that much 
less to store.119 
 
At the foot of this letter, Downer noted, for the information of a fellow 
director, that after talking the matter over with Pentland, it was agreed 
that the latter would come to New Zealand 
 
so that we can get all of one mind on the problem and the way to 
progress ahead. His reactions are of course those of all of us, but 
the fact the industry is struggling doesn’t help us - could go in 
reverse. 
The fact is that whilst the original plan was altered by the 
Catchment Bd. we did not ... drain the springs (most of our 
problem). The tonnage of tailings is about 6 1/2 tons per ton of 
concentrate, originally estimated at 4; so we were rapidly running 
out of space. The life of the mines could be many years, so we are 
forced to do something now, which, even with our original plan 
working, we would be doing in 12 month’s time. I have asked 
Frank to prepare a report.120 
 
Handcock’s continuing battle with the ‘nincompoops’ was mentioned in 
his report on the period to 30 November: 
 
We have continued almost a day to day running skirmish aided 
by our Consulting Engineer and Solicitor, to get a decision. At a 
meeting held at the Hauraki Catchment Board offices on 
November 29th, it was resolved that the following “Heads of 
Agreement” applied:- 
       (1) Dry tailings disposal system is acceptable. 
       (2) Drawings and supporting James/Wallace letter of October 
17th, 1968, is accepted with the additional requirement that a 
gabion structure be placed downstream. 
       (3) All detail design be accepted on James & Wallace 
certificates. 
There is marked confusion in the minds of all interested parties, 
as to the functions of the various acts and ordinances that govern 
mining water added to this, the extraordinary indecision of the 
Hauraki Catchment Board, and we have an expensive and time 
consuming delay. 
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The board was permitting them to pipe the stream at the pond, but 
there were several requirements which he and his colleagues did not want 
to accept. As ‘it would not be politic in our view to open these points to local 
discussion’, a case should be put to the Warden when they sought an 
additional five-acre special site license.  
 
With early completion of concrete pipe laying in stream bed and 
drainage of springs area which can now proceed along with 
restoration of clay bank dam continuity of milling is assured. 
During the Christmas shutdown of mill we will endeavour, by 
dozing of existing tailings dump, to reform the available area (to 
such depth as permitted after decanting all water) to provide a 
minimum of six months tailings storage volume.121 
 
The first step in negotiations was a meeting on 4 December between 
Handcock, Wallace, McAra, Paul Augustine Carroll (Norpac’s solicitor), and 
the board at which Handcock explained the new plans. The possible height 
of the pond would be 40 feet, the moisture content being eight percent. He 
would be happy for the tailings to be taken away for use in concrete or other 
purposes. Board members worried about heavy rain leading to the dam 
slumping and the tailings sliding down the mountain, as well as pollution 
caused by the spring underneath the pond. Norpac’s response was that rain 
would make only the top layer wet, and it could be quickly drained; they did 
not expect any slumping. Norpac quoted McAra as being satisfied there 
would be no slumping and no pollution, which he did not deny. As for 
pollution from the reagents used in treatment, these tended to be 
neutralized as they reacted to extract the minerals and ‘generally’ were non-
toxic, with the exception of cyanide, which would be used in extremely small 
amounts. The meeting concluded with the board suggesting improved ways 
of strengthening the dam.122  
When the board and others concerned with the problem visited the site 
three days later, Handcock told them that the company did ‘not accept 
responsibility beyond the requirement of the Mining Act’. It would ‘not 
undertake to arrest seepage and run off from rainfall’. In his record of this 
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visit, he claimed the board was impressed with the site and had approved 
the plans to improve it. ‘McAra pointed out that it was a well thought out 
scheme providing improved control of tailings’.123 
On 10 December, Handcock formally sought the council’s approval to 
extend the storage capacity and applied to the Warden two days later for a 
special site for extra tailings. He explained to the council that dry storage 
would be an improvement on the existing wet pond system: 
 
Tailings in the wet form as discharged from the present mill 
building will be cycloned, overflow going to a thickener will be 
pumped back to mill head water tank, underflow will join cyclone 
feed to filter. 
Filter discharge will be a damp, fine sand product which will 
stack. Presently used wet pit will on its northern side be provided 
with concrete pipe drain to carry spring water down stream clear 
of storage area. Downstream toe of storage area will be protected 
by a gabion structure.124 
 
Four days later, Pentland attended a meeting of Norpac directors that 
was informed that the present pond could only be used for another six 
months and that the delivery and installation of dry tailings equipment 
would take that time. Accordingly, they ordered the dry treatment plant 
designed by Mitsui.125  
McAra arranged to meet with Harris to ‘iron out any problems’ so that 
there would be no delay in having the necessary reports written for the 
Warden’s Court meeting in January.126 He found Harris  
 
inclined to procrastinate and I suggested that as the matters 
connected with the application had already been fully discussed 
in my presence at a meeting of the Board he should be able to let 
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the Registrar have a report at short notice. He could not promise 
but undertook to forward the report as soon as possible.127 
 
As the pond was completely full by 20 December, the mill was closed 
and over the holiday period diversion pipes for the springs were completed 
so that the flow was clear of the downstream toe of the dam. The height of 
the main dam and its wing wall was raised, and in January 1969 the No. 2 
tailings area was first used. Handcock reported that it would give sufficient 
storage for over 12 month’s operation, providing ‘a period sufficient in which 
to extract the maximum of sand from Area 1’.128 
 
1969 
 
Pollution of the Tui Stream during 1969 led to increasingly bad 
relations between Norpac and the local bodies attempting to control its 
impact on the environment. The year started badly: Feasey in an April 
memorandum recorded the first problem as occurring on 15 January, when 
the dam bank gave way because of rain. Discolouration of the stream was 
noted from 24 to 27 January: ‘Stream discoloured grey residue on 17th 
green [of golf links]. Tailings pipe broken. Management notified’. 
Discolouration was again noticed on 16 and 17 February and 26 March, 
when a sample was taken from a house in Tui Road.129 
The hearing of the application for a special site to handle the ever-
growing pond was held on 22 January at the mill site, immediately in front 
of the concentrate storage area and overlooking the tailings. In his report to 
the warden, McAra made his sympathies with Norpac clear in his 
explanation of the present system and of future possibilities: 
 
The tailings which have the consistency of fine sand quickly settle 
in the dam and the solution which contains minor and non-
injurious amounts of chemicals is pumped back into the mill to be 
made up to the required strength for treating the ore so that 
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there is no discharge of any solutions from the mill into any water 
course, all these being recirculated constantly. 
The dam into which the tailings are discharged consists of 
compacted clay provided with drainage and provision for by-
passing any flow of stormwater which may occur in the 4 acre 
catchment above the mill. 
It is common practice in mining overseas to discharge mill 
tailings into large stacks by pumping, constantly building up the 
outer edge from the material deposited. Some of these stacks 
cover many acres in some mining areas and may reach a height of 
over 100ft and are sometimes a major feature of the landscape. As 
a rule they are very stable and difficult to shift and tend to set 
and become hard while still remaining permeable. I consider that 
only by a rare accident would the discharge of tailings into the 
Tui Stream occur. 
I understand that tests of the water in this stream have shown 
that there is no dangerous concentration of lead or chemicals in it 
but that the water is not satisfactory for human consumption 
from a bacteriological point of view and that this condition 
probably existed before the mill was built. 
I understand that this stream is not an authorised water supply. 
I understand that the Company is considering the installation of 
dewatering plant at considerable expense to extract the water 
from the tailings before it is discharged into the tailings dump by 
a belt conveyor when it would be in a condition like damp fine 
sand containing about two percent of moisture. 
I am of the opinion that the Company has made every effort in 
the past to comply with the provisions of the Mining Act and has 
done so in all important respects. 
I have not received any official complains regarding either 
pollution of any water supply or danger of erosion resulting from 
their activities although I have been told of pollution of the water 
supply to the Te Aroha Golf Club which urged me to secure the 
report mentioned from the Department of Health.  
In the circumstances it seems rather unfair that the Company 
should be asked to carry out, in addition to the requirements 
under the Mining Act which already provide for the prevention of 
erosion and pollution, additional cost measures of a purely 
preventive nature based on the opinions of persons unconnected 
with the mining industry and I believe it would be better if 
interested local authorities could request action by the Mines 
Department in the event of their considering that danger of 
pollution or erosion existed rather than to seek to apply 
restrictive measures individually which have the effect of 
seriously hampering mining operations. 
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It would thus appear that the restrictive conditions applied by the 
Hauraki Catchment Board to the original Special Site Licenses 
should be omitted from the one now applied for.130 
 
McAra enclosed the report he had received in December 1967 that had 
revealed no pollution of the Tui Stream by mining. Noting the dispute over 
the adequacy of prevention measures between Norpac and the catchment 
board, he commented that Norpac’s position had been ‘rendered difficult’ by 
‘the multiplicity of authorities involved’, and recommended that the license 
be issued under the Mining Act of 1926. This would mean that conditions 
would be administered by the Inspector of Mines, ‘thus avoiding the 
difficulty and confusion of multiple control’.131 
Explaining the reasons behind his report, McAra told the under-
secretary that the board’s conditions were ‘far too restrictive’, and detailed 
his view on erosion and pollution: 
 
Erosion: 
The stream concerned is a small one about a mile in length which 
discharges into the Waihou River which carries such large 
quantities of silt from the active erosion of many square miles of 
pumice country at its headwaters that the normal erosion of a 
small tailings dump resulting from production of 30,000 tons per 
year must be insignificant. The catchment above the tailings is 
only 4 acres so that it should be safe and easy to construct a by -
pass trench to carry any stormwater round the tailings dump, in 
which case it can only then be eroded by rain falling on it or 
springs underneath it. 
These matters are simply and easily attended to by proper 
drainage and do not, in my opinion, require expensive structures 
such as have been suggested by the Board’s Engineer. 
 
Pollution: 
In the first place this stream is not an authorised water supply ... 
and the water should be boiled, and in the second place there is 
no injurious concentration of chemicals or minerals in the 
tailings. Cyanide content has been tested by Mr Haszard giving a 
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very low figure. Pollution other than pre-existing bacteriological 
pollution is therefore limited to pollution by erosion, which must 
in any event, take place during wet periods and again therefore 
the minor amounts produced by the rain which falls on the 
tailings running off it seems of little consequence. 
Part of the trouble seems to arise through some unauthorized use 
of the stream. If therefore a secure by-pass for floodwaters is 
provided, drains are inserted beneath the pit to take off spring 
water, and a trap built at the foot of the tailings and periodically 
cleaned out, this should suffice to maintain the present status of 
the stream. However I understand that the Company have 
undertaken to do a great deal more than this including building a 
gabion structure at the lower end of the dump, installing filtering 
and dry stacking equipment and drainage without the assurance 
that further demands will not be made. 
I believe that the Company’s dissatisfaction with the conditions 
required by the Catchment Board is justified in the circumstances 
and that it would generally be in the interests of mining that any 
such conditions should be subject to this Department’s 
approval.132 
 
The catchment board’s recommendations to the Warden wanted the 
same controls as in the earlier licenses to prevent erosion and pollution, and 
emphasized its ‘limited resources for investigations of this nature’. It was 
worried about ‘what might eventually become a very large dump in this 
small valley’ high up the mountain. ‘In view of the serious consequences 
which could possibly follow from a collapse or slipping of the tailings, the 
depositing of the tailings and the form of the tailings heap’ should be 
supervised by a registered civil engineer.133 At the hearing, the board 
stressed that its interpretation of ‘mining wastes’ included water flowing 
out of all the mine adits as well as water seeping from the pond and rainfall 
run-off from the dam; it wanted this water ponded and treated for metallic 
contamination.134 The borough council also required the existing conditions 
reimposed as well as the retaining or planting of trees along the southern 
boundary of the site ‘to provide screening of the area (made unsightly by the 
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operation of the Applicant)’ as it wished ‘to develop the scenic potential of 
the route from the Borough to the summit of Mount Te Aroha’.135  
The warden accepted McAra’s views and did not impose any conditions 
apart from those required under the Mining Act as agreed to in 1966 plus a 
contour drain to protect the tailings.136 As all the catchment board’s 
objections were disregarded, Handcock cancelled the tailings treatment 
plant ordered from Mitsui.137 There being enough space for the tailings, the 
directors agreed the extra plant would not be needed for at least a year; 
however, as the slimes would eventually be a problem, $15,000 was put 
aside for future needs.138 
In his annual report, Handcock complained that the catchment board 
had ‘made it difficult to establish proven tailings storage methods’ and had 
‘occasioned delays and increased costs’. The Warden’s decision meant that 
wet storage continued in the enlarged area ‘with a contour channel 
protecting area from surface run off and an underground concrete pipe 
drainage system for collection of and disposal of seepage and natural 
springs’. He considered that they had adequate storage for wet disposal for 
one and a half years, and would ‘proceed to make our position more secure 
in tailings disposal by approach to the Court for such mining privileges as 
considered essential’.139 That the board’s objections ‘were in their entirety 
disregarded’ was ‘a most satisfactory decision’, but there could still be 
difficulties ahead, as Norpac would need to get the warden’s approval for 
access to the Tui Stream for seepage and rainfall run-off from its 
operations.140 Handcock feared that the board’s restrictive interpretation of 
the conditions would mean the company ‘would be faced with a considerable 
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plant and installation cost aggregating mine water at all levels and treating 
it. It would be a difficult and costly project to pond seepage and runoff at 
tailings and provide a treatment plant efficient at peak run off periods’. 
These ‘unrealistic conditions’ went beyond those envisaged at the meeting 
with the board on 29 November, and he complained that had not the latter 
interfered when the dam was being built in January 1967 ‘we would still be 
placing tailings inside it’.141 
In response to the warden’s decision, Harris asked A.W. Gibson, the 
Director of Soil and Water Conservation, what were the board’s 
responsibilities now that none of its conditions were imposed. He also asked 
how much expense the board would be expected to bear, because the costs 
were ‘an unfair burden on the ratepayers of this Catchment’.142 The reply 
was discouraging: Gibson had received a solicitor’s advice that a right 
granted under the Mining Act prevailed over powers granted under the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act. Although the board could request that 
special conditions be imposed, ‘the Warden could reject this if he considered 
that they would inhibit the proper development of a mining venture’.143 
These concerns would be heightened by the continuing pollution of the 
Tui Stream. At the end of March Charles Alfred Thom, Health and Building 
Inspector for the Piako County Council as well as acting Health Inspector 
for the Te Aroha Borough Council, wrote to the Minister of Mines, Tom 
Shand, as captain of the Te Aroha Golf Club rather than in his official 
capacity: 
 
Effluent, which is of a most repulsive colour, has over a period of 
months at intervals come down the stream and in the piped 
supply to the Clubhouse, adjoining houses and to the course 
watering system. 
On one occasion a syphon had been placed in the dam containing 
the effluent and was discharging it into the stream. Witness of 
this is available if this fact is doubted. 
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As several people had complained to Norpac but were ‘not being 
treated seriously’, he asked Shand to revoke Norpac’s license because it was 
not fulfilling the conditions. The golf club, ‘seriously concerned about the 
damage to their amenities, and in particular to their water supply for the 
course which may already have been harmed by the excess silt etc. in the 
pipes’, was considering obtaining a Supreme Court injunction plus 
damages.144 
McAra told Shand that the pollution was caused by clay being 
disturbed when building the dam. The only record of pollution by mining 
effluent was the siphoning referred to by Thom, which was ‘to prevent a 
dam being topped during a short period of pump failure’. The company had 
assured the Mines Department that this would not recur. As the stream 
was unfit for human consumption, he recommended that the club obtain its 
water from the borough supply.145 Thom’s response was to list the eight 
cases of pollution from October 1968 to March 1969; he assured Shand that 
he was trying to avoid publicity and was writing as an individual as a 
‘result of procrastination and difficulty in getting anything done at a local 
level’.146 Failing to obtain any action from Shand, he showed the 
correspondence to Harris on 21 April.147 
 On 16 April, the same day that the Borough Engineer from 1964 to 
1976, Jon Endert, confirmed the pollution and warned that this was ‘very 
difficult to control and police’,148 Feasey reported the result of the testing of 
a sample of tap water given to him by a family living in Tui Road. It was 
the worst sample he had seen of pollution of the Tui Stream. As the Health 
Department would not act because it was not a public supply, he suggested 
the council write to the Mines Department ‘expressing dissatisfaction’ that 
                                            
144 C.A. Thom to T.P. Shand (Minister of Mines), 29 March 1969, HCB, Series 2, Box 33, Te 
Aroha General, VIC4-5, vol. 4, WRC. 
145 T.P. Shand to C.A. Thom, 10 April 1969, HCB, Series 2, Box 33, Te Aroha General, 
VIC4-5, vol. 4, WRC. 
146 C.A. Thom to T.P. Shand, 17 April 1969, HCB, Series 2, Box 33, Te Aroha General, 
VIC4-5, vol. 4, WRC. 
147 Noted on the above three letters, HCB, Series 2, Box 33, Te Aroha General, VIS4-5, vol. 
4, WRC. 
148 J.E. Endert (Borough Engineer) to Town Clerk, 16 April 1969, Te Aroha Borough 
Council, A/26/6/1, Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
43 
conditions on the mining license were ‘not being complied with, and 
requesting that appropriate action be taken’ to protect the water supply.149  
On 17 April, McAra investigated Thom’s complaints. After visiting 
Handcock’s office to tell him that he was investigating a complaint, he 
accompanied Thom and Feasey on an inspection of the dam and the water 
intakes for the golf course and two houses. 
 
I inspected a jar of water drawn from a house tap in a house 
adjacent to the Golf Course. This jar contained about an inch of 
sediment, apparently of pulverized grey rock. It had been drawn 
off during fine weather. Mr Thom complained of silt from the 
water supply covering the 17th green and of the normally clear 
rocky stream which runs through the course being fouled with 
greyish silt. It was felt that the silting of the stream, if continued, 
would convert it from an asset of considerable beauty and an 
attraction to visitors to a mere drain and thus would represent an 
irreplaceable loss to the Golf Club and would adversely affect 
visitors’ fees and subscriptions, while the silting of the water 
supply to the houses rendered the water unusable. When I 
pointed out that the Health Department had tested this water 
supply and found that it was unfit for human consumption 
without being boiled because of its bacterial content, Mr Feasey 
said that these people had become adjusted to the water and had 
used it for a number of years without ill-effects and that similar 
water supplied not certified as bacteriologically pure were often 
used in rural areas. This water was rendered unusable by the 
quantity of sediment and discolouration said to have been caused 
by the escape of tailings into the mill tributary of the Tui Stream. 
 
After being given Feasey’s list of dates when pollution had occurred, he 
inspected the tailings dam. This had 
 
recently been reconstructed and extended and appears to be a 
much more efficient design than previously, the creek being 
carried through an 18” pipe under the dam, a well, fitted with a 
automatic pump, has been sunk at the upper end of the dam to 
pick up seepage out of the country and the area for the disposal of 
tailings increased. It is proposed to build a trap at the lower end 
of the tailings dam to trap silt washed off the sides by rain water 
and to install launders in place of the alkathene pipe which 
caused trouble through breaking. 
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It would appear that with these very much improved 
arrangements and with proper attention the escape of tailings 
into Tui Stream could be maintained at an acceptable level. 
I inspected the intake to the golf course supply which has a 
branch line going to the old town supply pipeline but which I 
understand is not used. There was a considerable amount of grey 
silt in the creek at this point and this had apparently been 
entering the intake which I thought was poorly designed.... 
There appears to be little doubt that the Golf Club and the users 
of water have been injuriously affected by the discharge of 
tailings and are therefore entitled to some compensation. 
 
He endorsed as ‘a fair and reasonable solution’ Thom’s suggestion that 
Norpac should meet the estimated cost of $326 to provide water from the 
borough supply and also ensure that the discharge of tailings was kept at 
‘an acceptable level’. Feasey also supported this ‘as an expression of good 
faith by the Company’. However, Norpac was reluctant to meet this cost 
‘without receiving positive assurance’ that it would be the final one. McAra 
believed this was ‘not possible under the circumstances’ but that if the 
latest demands were met this would be a good basis for future co-operation. 
He thought that Norpac’s invitation to the council to visit the dam was an 
encouraging step towards securing agreement.150 That Norpac, ‘in its own 
interests’, met the cost of a new water supply had previously been suggested 
to him by Lloyd Jones, Chief Inspector of Mines and Chief Mining Engineer 
for the Mines Department.151  
Feasey told White that the new disposal method ‘would work 
satisfactorily’ providing it was operated ‘with a real determination by the 
Management and staff to obviate pollution. This could mean the addition of 
adequate standby equipment’. He recommended giving the new method a 
trial period of six months.152 McAra told Handcock that he was satisfied 
that Norpac had polluted the stream, and suggested corrective measures; in 
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reporting this, Handcock insisted that no tailings had been discharged 
during 1969.153 
 In a letter to one of his directors, Norpac’s Secretary, Ernest Kennth 
Haddy,154 wrote that  
 
Frank is having more “pollution” problems. Someone has 
complained to the Health Department that we are polluting the 
Tui Stream and, although the company has not been approached 
officially, there is reason to believe that some sort of investigation 
is being made. Frank has been asked to attend a special meeting 
of the Borough Council on the matter. Originally he declined but 
has subsequently agreed to attend.... Frank believes that the 
Council is split over it. I personally think that the only real 
answer ... is to have the Tui Stream defined as classified water.155 
 
Downer sought Shand’s support for this proposal in a letter 
complaining that 
 
the Hauraki Catchment Board have, in our opinion, been difficult 
to work with in matters relating to tailings pond and stream run 
off from the area, and where the Tui stream enters the Te Aroha 
borough problems can arise through their Building Inspector 
acting in his capacity as Health Inspector, making certain 
demands although up to the present moment neither the 
Inspector of Mines nor the Health Department have raised any 
issue. This matter can only be settled satisfactorily by the 
category of the Tui Stream being changed from unclassified water 
to classified water under the new Water and Soil Conservation 
Act 1967.... Until this had been done ... the Company is in a very 
vulnerable position. 
 
He asked that the Mines Department deal with Norpac’s application 
for this change ‘as a special case forthwith’.156 Asked for his opinion on 
Downer’s request, McAra thought the department should agree:  
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With regard to the escape of tailings, there is no doubt that 
damage to the aesthetic value of the Tui Stream which winds 
picturesquely through the Te Aroha Golf Course, is a real loss to 
the Golf Club if the past pollution continues and they are 
therefore entitled to some compensation which I imagine could 
only be arrived at by arbitration. This must be regarded as an 
establishment cost as it is logical that the industry should pay for 
any losses caused to the community by its activities. Pollution 
should therefore be controlled as far as possible and an 
arrangement made by the Company with the Golf Club without 
prejudice.157 
 
When writing to Downer the day before he was to meet the council to 
discuss the water supply, Handcock expressed opinions he would never 
reveal publicly. He began by explaining that water samples were currently 
being tested, and then commented on Haszard’s idea that some or all of the 
tailings water should be discarded, as at some other mills:  
 
I do feel that to some extent we must do just this; we should 
never undertake (as Catchment Board requires) to completely 
arrest seepage and tailings area rain-fall run off and mine 
drainage where metallic content is present. 
We must at mill hold metal content of water to a minimum and 
will endeavour so to do. 
Mine drainage cannot be treated, it would be an intolerable 
financial cost. In my view N.Z. has never known a heap of tailings 
and if NZ wants mining it must grow up with tailings 
aggregation. 
In the past all tailings washed down streams. We can retain 
tailings sands only by building free draining structures.158 
 
When Handcock met the council, Skidmore hoped ‘by ‘free and frank 
discussion’ to resolve the question of Norpac paying for the connection to the 
water supply of those using the Tui Stream. When he stated that ‘several 
complaints had been received of gross discolouration and silting’ and that 
Feasey had proved several cases of pollution, Handcock ‘denied that 
pollution of the stream had been proved’. In response, his letter of 19 
November 1968 offering to pay the cost of connection to the water supply 
was read. Handcock said that he would meet this cost only if the council 
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supported Norpac’s applications for more mining privileges and would tell 
the catchment board that it had no objection to Norpac using the Tui 
Stream. White responded that these conditions were not possible under 
existing legislation, and Skidmore suggested that the council would support 
Norpac’s conditions only if it was paid $25,000. Handcock ‘proceeded, at 
considerable length, to record his Company’s feeling of frustration at its 
efforts to establish and develop its operation’. Skidmore ‘denied this and 
said that from his recollection Council had done all it could to help the 
Industry get started’. When White added that the council had understood 
that the stream would be piped so that no tailings or waste water would get 
into it, Handcock brazenly ‘denied that piping of the stream was ever 
envisaged’. After more fruitless debate, Skidmore closed the meeting by 
regretting that no solution had been found and said they awaited McAra’s 
recommendations.159 
 Certain that he alone was right, Handcock continued to treat the local 
bodies belligerently, as illustrated by a letter from Thom to White 
concerning the visit on 17 April to the mine site with Feasey and McAra. 
The latter had been ‘insistent on our accompanying him’, but as Handcock 
was reported to have said that Thom was trespassing he asked that 
Handcock be informed that as a duly appointed Health Inspector he had 
right of entry.160 This was done; Handcock’s response was a brief 
acknowledgment and a request that in future he be told in advance, to avoid 
‘misunderstandings’.161  
 Norpac’s directors supported Handcock’s stance. After they met at Te 
Aroha at the beginning of May, a ‘complete tour of the tailings area and 
related underground pipe drains and surface contour channel was made and 
the stable nature of fines in the drained area was particularly noted’.162 
Haszard returned from a trip to Japan early in May with details of tailings 
solids placement and tailings water disposal in Japanese mines: ‘timely and 
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can be used to advantage’, noted Handcock. He did not need to use this new 
knowledge when six men from the golf club visited: ‘a pleasant party 
without awkward questions and any suggestions’.163 
 In mid-May, Shand told Thom that McAra had confirmed that 
pollution had happened and that the company would build a silt trap at the 
lower end of the dam to contain silt washed off its walls. Shand 
recommended altering the intake of the borough pipeline to avoid silt 
getting in.164 On McAra’s copy of this letter, the Under-Secretary instructed 
him to ensure that the silt trap was provided and that Norpac provided an 
alternative water supply. He considered ‘the company should clean out and 
improve the pipeline intake as a “good neighbour” gesture’.165 McAra 
directed Handcock to build a silt trap, provide an alternative source of 
drinking water for the golf club, do everything possible to prevent pollution, 
and suggested ‘as a gesture of good neighbourliness’ that he improve the 
pipeline intake ‘to reduce as far as possible the intake of silt’.166 Handcock’s 
response was pained:  
 
In view of the close co-operation which has existed between your 
office and the Norpac management, it was a matter of some 
surprise that a directive letter such as that of 23rd May should 
have been forwarded without some discussion between the 
parties. Norpac Mining Limited is completely uninformed of the 
scope of your investigations, what pollution offences were 
committed, if any, or the origin of the complaint. 
Norpac have a sizeable investment both of government and 
private capital, and if permitted to succeed, can continue to create 
a substantial source of overseas earnings, from an indigenous 
New Zealand industry. It has installed a modern and efficient 
mill, and has brought in experienced overseas underground 
management for the development of the mine. Substantial 
knowledge in the grinding and flotation of complex ores, and the 
stacking of finely ground tailings has been developed, and this 
knowledge is available to your department and the industry at 
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any time, and it is in this light we would prefer to view the 
future.167 
 
On the same day that this letter was sent, Handcock visited McAra to 
discuss the golf club’s complaint and agreed to provide $270 for the 
alternative water supply. McAra reported that ‘he later rang me and 
advised that the sum mentioned had been accepted by the President of the 
Golf Club. Amicable relations appear to have been restored’.168 To restore 
amicable relations with Handcock, McAra wrote to thank him for reaching 
the agreement with the golf club: 
 
I would like to say that your co-operation in this respect is 
appreciated and I am now hopeful that a much better atmosphere 
has been created with all parties concerned. 
I assure you that I fully realize the difficulties with which you are 
faced in disposing of mining wastes and I am also aware of the 
considerable effort and expense to which your Company has gone 
in your efforts to obtain a solution and I will therefore be pleased 
to assist in any way which is possible to me.169 
 
To his directors, when reporting McAra’s requirements, Handcock 
repeated that the managers had ‘not been officially aware of this 
investigation, the need for it, or the nature of it’, and was sure that no 
tailings had entered the stream has during 1969.170 In fact, McAra had 
visited him before inspecting the dam and stream, and later had told him 
his conclusions and suggestions, as Handcock’s previous report had 
reported.171 Unwillingly, as well as supplying water to the golf club Norpac 
also agreed to meet the cost of providing town water supply to the two 
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properties adjacent to it.172 For its part, after discussions about what action 
to take, the council decided to take no action unless a formal complaint was 
received.173 
On 29 May, five of the nine borough councillors visited the mill and 
tailings pond:  
 
A complete walkover of the tailings area included sighting the 
discharged water gathered by some eleven hundred feet of 
underground pipes from several seepage points; noting the extent 
of the seepage in an open ditch presently the commencement 
point of a 15” diameter drainage pipe, the operative contour 
channel with its minimal flow of water and the decant pipe 
carrying settled tailings water to the pump that returns it to the 
Mill head tank supply. Councillors walked over the area where 
tailings were being placed without the need for footwear other 
than shoes. Water discharge from seepage and decant water from 
tailings carried no solids at all and was very clear. 
 
 Or so Handcock reported to White. In addition, they were shown 
Haszard’s slides of the Kamioka mine ‘depicting the stowage of some ten 
million tons of tailings in a valley in country steeper than at Tui, some of 
these retaining dam structures were up to 300ft high and built entirely of 
tailings from lead zinc concentrate mills’. Handcock told them (and later 
White) that because the borough declined to accept his conditions for 
solving the Tui Stream water supply problem, Norpac had ‘no alternative’ 
but to apply under the Mining Act for privileges seen as ‘essential for the 
operation of the industry’.174 He told his directors that, when it was seen 
that the tailings decant water gravitating to the return pump was 
completely clear of solids, a councillor remarked that there was ‘no reason 
following chemical analysis of water as acceptable that this flow could not 
be channelled into the Tunakohoia Stream’.175 Haszard’s slides and the 
blueprint of one of the Japanese dams were, Handcock told them, ‘of 
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significant interest and use’ in illustrating methods of retaining tailings, 
and the information might ‘well be of assistance in the pending case at the 
Warden’s Court’.176 
This was an application for a tailrace,177 needed because of 
metallurgical problems at the mill caused by the oxidation of ore between 
the time it was broken out and processed. As Downer explained to Pentland, 
it was  
 
proving necessary for the best results to discharge mill water 
after ore use under certain conditions, instead of constantly 
circulating it. With some new reagents this brings us back to the 
Warden’s Court to have our license amended. I won’t bore you 
with all the details required to clear this point, but no stone is 
being left unturned to present a case which will overcome the 
objections of modern conservationists.178 
 
Not all his staff were sensitive to the views of ‘modern 
conservationists’. Whilst the company’s solicitor urged that the application 
should state the water would be free from slimes and solids, Handcock 
insisted that the company must have the right to discharge water ‘on 
unrestricted terms for proper operation of the mill’.179   
The new pollution control system was working well, the directors were 
told by Handcock in July: 
 
A sand cone has been installed for separation of sand and slime in 
the disposal area. This appliance is virtually doing the work of a 
cyclone sand plant without moving parts and at a very small 
capital cost. Disposal is now greatly simplified and ultimately 
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abundant sand will be available for building of retention walls 
etc.180  
 
His next monthly report stated that ‘sand slime separation by cone 
operation’ was satisfactory, and the accumulated sand was being used to 
raise the dam level and to cover the exposed clay. ‘With the coverage by 
sand heavy rains have had little affect in sloughing of walls etc’, and the 
position would ‘further improve’ as more sand became available.181  
 The council lodged a formal objection to the tailrace, as did the 
catchment board, which wanted to protect the rights of existing users of the 
Tui Stream by insisting that water quality must not be lowered.182 These 
objections were formalities to allow time for investigation. A meeting in 
early August of the Works and Town Planning Committee of the council 
recommended that, because ‘every assistance should be given to the Mining 
company’, it be permitted to discharge into the north branch of the 
Tunakohoia Stream.183 When Handcock and Carter subsequently met 
Skidmore, White, and Jon Endert, the borough council’s engineer, it was 
agreed that the decant waste water from the pond be piped to the north 
branch of the Tunakohoia Stream, already polluted by mining. When the 
council was asked to confirm this agreement, an amendment was carried 
that ‘the matter be referred back to the committee for further details as to 
the effect of the proposed discharge of waste water’ because the stream had 
several riperian owners and was used by children, horses, and cattle.184 
A special meeting of the Works and Town Planning Committee was 
held after Endert had arranged for samples to be taken. Samples taken 
from the stream had revealed that, allowing for the amount of water in it, 
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the levels of lead, zinc and copper were ‘well within the tolerance allowed by 
World Health standards for domestic use’. As Endert believed there would 
be ‘no serious pollution’, the committee agreed to the discharge.185 A 
subsequent sample from the recycled water in the tailings pond, which had 
a higher concentration of minerals than if ‘run to waste’, revealed no traces 
‘of any of the usual chemicals used in the process which would suggest that 
quantitatively such chemicals are used in minute proportions’. 
Furthermore, as this water would be diluted ten times before it reached the 
town, there was ‘no danger of any kind to animals or humans as the water 
passes through town’.186 Early in September Handcock informed his 
directors that agreement had been reached, although the catchment board 
would object despite Handcock’s discussions with Harris. He also reported 
that, as further sand went into the pond, the position was ‘improving 
continually’, run-off being ‘very little after heavy rain’.187 The board shortly 
afterwards withdrew its objection to the tailrace on condition that the 
quality of the Tunakohoia and Omahu Streams was not permitted to go 
below their existing ‘D’ classification and the rights of existing users and 
riparian owners were safeguarded.188 
The day before the warden’s court hearing, McAra informed the 
warden that the company was not seeking to discharge any solid materials. 
Because the build-up of some chemicals made the water unsuitable for 
recirculation, some water had to be replaced to get satisfactory treatment. 
As traces of potassium cyanide and other chemicals used in the ore 
treatment process might remain, he agreed it was ‘reasonable’ that the 
discharge should be regulated to avoid ‘danger to plant or animal life’. 
Records of regular sampling and testing should be kept for him to check. He 
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also recommended that the Regional Water Board provide standards of 
purity required, but this suggestion was withdrawn at the hearing.189 The 
warden was convinced by the evidence from Norpac’s mine manager and 
consulting engineer that the decanting method proposed would efficiently 
remove all solids in suspension and the mineral content did not ‘constitute a 
hazard to public health’. The license was issued subject to copies of the 
weekly analyses of the effluent from all decant pipes being sent each month 
to McAra and the mineral content not exceeding the level determined by the 
Medical Officer of Health.190 Norpac’s directors, after noting that this 
decision meant that the control of the tailrace remained under the Mining 
Act and the catchment board had no jurisdiction, recorded their ‘recognition’ 
of Handcock’s ‘part in the success of this application’.191  
Later that same month, in a report sent also to the Health 
Department, Norpac’s consulting chemist wrote that the Tui and 
Tunakohoia Streams were polluted by the mountain, not by mining: 
 
All the water flowing from the watershed is contaminated with 
amounts of lead, copper and zinc to the extent that it is no longer 
potable. This is nothing to do with the operations of the Norpac 
mine or mill. It appears that the whole of the mountain and the 
soil in the area contains a considerable concentration of metals 
which are leached out by the passage of rain water through and 
over it. 
 
The tailings effluent would not cause discolouration or silting of the 
stream. The maximum daily effluent discharge permitted into the stream of 
120,000 gallons would have a ‘negligible’ impact because it had a daily flow 
of from five to ten million gallons. Some analyses indicated that the metal 
content of the effluent was less than that of the streams, and the mill 
obtained its water from a spring which already contained toxic metals. The 
Tunakohoia was not suitable for human consumption, but the influence of 
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the mill was ‘quite negligible’.192 McAra reported that the effluent showed 
no traces of cyanide.193 In November Dawson was told by the Regional 
Veterinary Officer of the Department of Agriculture that dilution meant 
that the lead in the Tui Stream should have no effect on stock.194 After 
receiving this advice, Dawson told Hancock that he had no objections to 
discharges from all the decant pipes, but he would arrange for periodic 
checks of water quality.195 Handcock informed his directors that Dawson 
had accepted the consulting chemist’s recommended mineral content of the 
waste water discharge (zinc 15.00 ppm, copper 2.50 ppm, and lead 0.25 
ppm) and that Endert had accepted Norpac’s pipe specification and decant 
method. Construction would commence ‘immediately’.196 Now the discharge 
from the pond was diverted to the Tunakohoia Stream rather than recycled 
to the mill, which in future pumped water from the spring within the pond 
(a later investigation reported that this water was not contaminated by 
tailings).197 This was a satisfactory result for the company, as Downer noted 
in a letter to Pentland: 
 
During the current year costs were inflated by some non-
recurring items in respect Catchment Board requirements in mill 
water discharge and stowage of tailings. Both these points have 
been overcome in that millwater can be discharged into the 
Tunakohoia, and the area now available for tailings provides for 
about 400,000 tons, and an application is in for a further area 
giving an overall capacity of 1,000,000 tons.198 
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For his part, the despondent catchment board secretary had written in 
September to the secretary of the Otago Catchment Board to ask whether it 
had similar difficulties caused by mining and pollution. His board’s problem 
was ‘how far to go with formal objections if the pollution angle tends to be 
overlooked (more or less) by a mining-oriented Court’.199 No reply is to be 
found in the files. 
 
1970 
 
Experience with Norpac shaped the catchment board’s submissions to 
the Labour and Mining Bills Committee of parliament, which was 
considering the Mining Bill introduced in 1969. The first submission, 
drafted by Harris, dealt with mining and the board’s responsibilities. He 
pointed out that in mountainous areas such as the Coromandel peninsula, 
with steep slopes, many streams, and heavy rainfall, it was ‘reasonable to 
suppose that the Mining Industry can only observe effective water and soil 
conservation practices by the taking of stringent precautions’. As this would 
mean extra costs it would be claimed that these were ‘not really necessary, 
or is economic, and has never been required in the past’. He explained the 
lack of clarity in past legislation and the way the Mining Act took 
precedence over attempts by statutory bodies to protect water quality. The 
new Bill seemed likely to repeat the system laid down in the Mining Act of 
1926, which meant that ‘only specific conditions attached to the license have 
any real significance’. The proposed legislation was likely to mean the 
catchment board was ineffectual in the face of ‘increasing interest in mining 
in the Coromandel-Kaimai Range, and the number of active mining 
ventures’.200 The board was very concerned that mining was to receive 
‘special encouragement’ at the expense of its being able to provide this 
protection.201 The following month Harris made a second submission 
dealing with the threat of more silt entering the river if mining increased. 
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‘On the present comparatively modest scale of mining, the incidence of 
induced erosion, pollution of natural waters, destruction of native forest, 
and so on, resulting from mining, is relatively small’. However, large-scale 
mining could magnify all these problems unless there were ‘stringent 
precautions’ concerning roads, controlling the building of tailings and 
mullock heaps, and especially open-cast mining. To stem the trend towards 
increasing pollution and erosion new mining enterprises must not ‘merely 
repeat the past’ but instead ‘fully observe the provisions’ enacted to 
conserve water and soil.202  
The Ohinemuri, Thames, and Coromandel county councils also made 
submissions. One of their concerns was that local bodies were not to be 
notified about applications for mining privileges, citing ‘numerous cases’ 
where individuals and companies had polluted streams and destroyed bush 
when prospecting. ‘It is realized that the terms of a license might be 
construed as sufficient to preclude this type of damage but with the 
Inspector of Mines resident at Huntly and making infrequent visits the 
damage is likely to be done before any material action can be taken’.203 
In February Norpac applied for Special Tailings Site No. 4, of five 
acres, at Fern Flat. As this would require rerouting part of the mountain 
road, there was another site visit by several councillors and council officers 
at which Handcock convinced most councillors that it should be approved. 
Opinions were divided in the subsequent council debate, but it was agreed 
to after a clause was added requesting Norpac to provide ‘as soon as 
possible … a projected forecast of its future requirements … concerning the 
disposal of tailings and waste water from its operations over the next 10 
year period’.204 
In April, Handcock reported that a ‘rise in slime level’ had 
‘necessitated immediate raising of level of ponding area generally’. 
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Retaining walls were to be built up ‘with least possible delay’ while the 
weather held. An additional cone had been acquired ‘to assist in distribution 
of sand portion’.205 Next month he reported that ‘tailings area retaining 
walls have been built up considerably and new cone brought into operation’. 
The old cone was ‘now used in series’, which meant that the overflow was 
‘virtually pure slime’.206 
Norpac’s worry that conservation concerns threatened its operations 
was indicated by its setting up, in conjunction with six other mining 
companies working in the Hauraki district, of a Mineral and Mines 
Association. This supported the development of mineral resources and ‘a 
unified approach in dealing with legal and physical matters of common 
interest’. Norpac’s secretary, Peter Carter, informed the press that the 
association was worried about the new Mining Bill and the new Water and 
Conservation Amendment Bill. He claimed the companies were all ‘taking a 
responsible attitude towards pollution and conservation’, and emphasized 
the substantial economic benefit to the community of the industry.207  
Despite such soothing words, the company was still difficult for local 
bodies to deal with, as indicated by the way in which it applied for mining 
rights over 1,000 acres that encompassed all the streams needed for 
borough water supply in summer. It gave insufficient time to consider the 
plans, and when the council’s solicitors sought discussions they ‘were 
surprised to receive an instant rebuff’ and a refusal to confer. This attitude 
was ‘a complete reversal of procedure in past applications’. When the 
warden considered the matter on 27 August, he suggested that ‘the parties 
should get together and settle the conditions and then come before him’ at 
an adjourned meeting on 24 September.208 
The catchment board was also concerned about what Norpac was 
doing. Handcock recorded a visit on 12 August: ‘a party of 18, being all 
Board members plus engineers and secretary - a very short visit that lacked 
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inquiry or explanation’.209  The board was not opposed to the extra 1,000 
acres as long as conditions preventing pollution were imposed, but it was 
worried about the increasing size of the pond.210 But, as White told Harris, 
 
obviously there are two conflicting interests in the mountain 
area, each of which seems to be protected by Acts of Parliament, 
and Council is seeking the support of your Board ... to ensure 
either, that Council’s water rights are suitably safeguarded or 
alternatively to determine that the two uses on the mountainside 
are incompatible and to support a case that the cost of providing 
and obtaining water from an alternative source should not be a 
burden on the Council’s ratepayers.211 
 
Harris assured White of his support at warden’s court hearings, and 
would give the council a copy of the report he was preparing.212 He asked 
the board members whether they should just report the problem to the 
warden or ‘take a positive action’ by pointing out ‘a conflict of interests’ and 
‘bluntly’ state that there could ‘either be a mine or a water supply but not 
both’ in the small mountain streams.213 To the mining registrar, Harris 
wrote that, because of the risk of pollution, the streams must be regularly 
tested for deterioration in quality. The board offered to do this provided it 
was ‘sufficiently reimbursed for the costs’. He expected all parties 
concerned, including the government, to contribute.214 (All the alarm was 
unnecessary, for negotiations with the Mines Department over the question 
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of royalties dragged on during 1971, and this delay meant that no work was 
done in the area applied for before the company collapsed.)215  
The year ended with Handcock informing White that, in response to 
the council’s request, Norpac would meet the cost of disposing of decant 
water into the north branch of the Tunakohoia Stream instead of into the 
tributary of the Tui Stream that ran under the tailings pond.216 As a 
footnote to the arguments during the year, and as an illustration of how 
Handcock and the Warden was regarded by the staff of the local bodies, a 
hastily scribbled note to Harris from David Griffiths, Soil Conservator for 
the Hauraki Catchment Board, is revealing. He reported that Endert had 
brought Report No. CD 2104 by the DSIR, published in August 1968,  
 
into the office today for us to have a look at. It was recommended 
to the Te A. B. C. by Mr Handcock who in effect said that this 
proves conclusively that the waters of the South branch of the 
Tunakohoia St are totally unsuitable for future water supplies in 
that in the stream tests show that there was 500 ppm of 
Pb.[lead]. He failed to mention unfortunately that the tests were 
taken of sediment on the bed of the stream & not the stream 
waters. Apparently had almost convinced the Borough until 
someone asked whether the tests were in the water or not as 
Endert has tests taken by the Health Dept showing that there is 
only 0.01 ppm Pb in this stream... Mr Endert would like us if the 
point is brought up by the Company that they have tests proving 
that there is 500 ppm of Pb in the stream, to ask whether these 
are tests of the water or tests of the soil or stream sediment, as 
Mr H. could endeavour to mislead the Warden as he tried to 
mislead the Borough. 
Mr White apparently does not want us to tell the Warden that we 
have the Health Dept’s figs in case the Warden says that the 
water is OK what are they worrying about ... or something.217 
 
1971 
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This year saw the passing of a Mining Act and a Water and Soil 
Conservation Amendment Act, both of which recognised that there needed 
to be more protection for the environment compared with how this had been 
treated in the old days.218 However, these Acts did not affect Norpac’s 
operations, as it held existing rights. 
During the Christmas shutdown period, work on the pond included 
relocating the No. 2 sand cone and related piping.219 In February, McAra 
contacted Handcock over an effluent discharge sample taken in the previous 
December that had ‘close to the critical amount’ of lead, and asked for 
details of the sampling method used.220 McAra inspected this when he 
visited later in the month, and then formally warned Handcock that it did 
not comply with the conditions laid down: the samples were being taken 
half a mile downstream, not at the point of discharge. To test whether this 
made any difference he intended to take samples at both points in 
Handcock’s presence when he visited on 23 February.221 As nothing further 
was recorded, this dispute must have been resolved satisfactorily. The 
directors expected that the second tailings site would provide ‘adequate 
facilities for many years’, and in autumn the company experimented to see 
if it was possible to establish ‘grass coverage on prepared tailing 
surfaces’.222  
On 5 April there was a moment of high drama. James Henry Lynam, 
Transmission Superintendent for the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation, was driving up to the mountain road when he witnessed what 
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he later recalled as a ‘near disaster’. There had been rain, and a lot of water 
was contained within the pond. He thought a machine shaping its walls 
probably cut through the wall, for there was a sudden rush of water, it 
started to collapse, and the machine fell into the pond. The driver had 
managed to get away in time, and as the water level lowered the flow of 
water stopped; but silt ended up on the golf course.223 
This was an accurate recollection, apart from the embellishment of the 
machine falling into the pond, as the account written on the day by Carter 
revealed: 
 
8.20 – PJC[arter] on way to town to pick up Mail ... at mill site 
Acland [the mill superintendent] stated some seepage from front 
wall of dam. 
9.00 - PJC arrived back from town & walked down to Tailings 
area where Haszard & [Percy] Growden [foreman of the surface 
workers] were discussing dam condition. Both expressed concern 
& misunderstanding as to present state of dam. Growden 
unhappy with 10’ depth of water in front area of dam - Haszard 
unhappy with present structure of dam. Inspected front of dam 
with Haszard, who pointed out seepage in a couple of places & 
cracks. Haszard very apprehensive about any machine (FEL or 
bulldozer) work on top of front of dam. Growden anxious to re 
establish cone laying unused at road side of dam. Requested a 
quick supply of 9” x 2” timber & carry cone & existing timber with 
FEL to new position. 
9.30 - Haszard rushed into office & told PJC that dam front had 
gone. Did not know if Percy [Growden] & Stephen Growden had 
made it to safety. Attempted to calm Haszard & put immediate 
call through to FJH[andcock] in Thames. Requested J[ohn] 
A[batematteo, the mine manager] to come down from mine & 
assist. Walked to Mill & instructed Acland to inspect immediate 
damage to Dam front etc & remained temporarily with Haszard 
to see that mill was closed down. 
Percy Growden was driving FEL when wall collapsed. Stephen 
Growden was in vicinity but jumped clear & warned two men ... 
working on gabion structure to get out. This they did just in time, 
one man apparently losing his jumper & lunch. 
Subsequent inspection showed that water had flowed down 
narrow valley & risen to a considerable height, sweeping away 
gabion structure. The two men concerned were fortunate that 
Stephen Growden had warned them in time. The water level in 
the lower stretches of the Tui immediately prior to & through the 
golf course had also risen but on inspection at 10.10 had fallen 
again to a reasonable level. All indications were that the stream 
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bed & culverts had managed the flow but that considerable clay 
had been swept away with the head of water & was very obvious 
at the main road creek level. 
1.45 Mill closed down by this time & men available. Haszard took 
control having quickly recovered his composure on observing no 
loss of life or apparent damage at valley floor level. Growden by 
this time was visibly shaken but following a brief spell & cup of 
tea returned to assist. 
11.25 Call from Moran224 - concerned at dirty water & stock 
waterway. Calmed him down & told him that volume of water 
had carried clay down hill. Gang of men working on fault & all 
would be well. 
11.45 PJC drove down to bottom of hill & requested Bottomley225 
to bring up trailer immediately. Haszard looking very sick and 
shaky again. 
Met two catchment board men at bottom of hill - past cattle stop - 
had received complaints of dirty water - informed them a large 
volume of water had been accidentally released & had carried a 
quantity of clay with it. They were aware of sudden increase in 
volume - did not visit mill site as a result of our conversation. 
12.00 Rang Thames - Grant226 informed me that FJH left an hour 
ago.227 
 
Handcock upon arrival telephoned Feasey and then wrote to him 
giving his version of events: a version markedly less dramatic than Carter’s: 
 
At 9.30 a.m. this day a water pondage adjacent to the sand cone 
and down stream of the main tailings area displaced a section of 
the retaining bank and continued down mill stream overtopping 
the under-construction gabion work. 
Eyewitnesses say this flow passed over the gabion work area in 
approximately eight seconds. 
Repairs to the water pondage bank were commenced forthwith 
and will be completed tomorrow. 
Restoration of the gabion area has also been commenced.… 
We regret this occurrence and the effect on the draw off from the 
stream, we will make three men available tomorrow to restore 
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the small fore-bay area at the pipe inlet and scour the main 4 
inch pipe line as far as the scour valve....228 
 
To his directors, Handcock described the event as follows: 
 
On April 5th at 9.30 a.m. a temporary pondage or water holding 
area adjacent to and associated with a sand cone and tailings 
area proper through deterioration of sand grading precipitated a 
body of water causing a subsidence which displaced a section of 
retaining bank. The main tailings dam was in no way affected by 
the occurrence. Repairs were effected and milling resumed by 
3.30 p.m. the same day.229 
 
This attempt to minimize the reality of what had happened was also 
an attempt to mislead. The clearest and most detailed account of which 
portions of the pit were affected was made by David Griffiths, which 
revealed Handcock’s evasiveness: 
 
In response to a telephone call at about 10.55 a.m. on 5 April 
1971, from Mr J. Wilson, of the Te Aroha Golf Club,230 an 
inspection was made of the Tui/Omahu Stream in the vicinity of 
the bridge over this stream at the main entrance to the Golf club. 
It was obvious that the stream had recently been flowing some 
3Ft higher than when we inspected it, and it was dropping quite 
quickly. 
The water carried a very heavy load of clay silt and it was 
apparent from froth below the waterfall that there were mine 
tailings liquor present in the stream. The silt deposit along the 
banks of the stream was up to 2” to 3” deep. 
Mr [Roderick Kaye] Moreton [a hydrologist]231 collected a sample 
of this water and it was a thick suspension of clay which took a 
long time to settle out and after 2 weeks had settled down to a 
deposit of approximately 1/3 of a milk bottle or 30-35% by volume 
or 300,000-350,000 p.p.m. 
We spoke to Mr Carter, Office Manager for Norpac Ltd, and he 
confirmed that there had been a break out. 
Later we went up to the ponds to inspect the damage, and met Mr 
Handcock, who explained things as well as he could. He 
                                            
228 F.J. Handcock to I.E. Feasey, 5 April 1971, Norpac Papers held by Inspector of Mines, 
Box 16D, ML 4/70, Royalty Details file, MC. 
229 F.J. Handcock, Report 4/6 for period ending 17 April 1971, Norpac Papers, Box 6, NMC 
19/6, UA. 
230 John Ronald Wilson, a farmer of Stanley Avenue?: Piako Electoral Roll, 1972, p. 323. 
231 Piako Electoral Roll, 1972, p. 208. 
65 
mentioned that he was pleased to see us, so that he could explain 
things before every thing had been returned to normal. 
Apparently there had been two ponds on the tailings heap, liquor 
running from the western to the eastern pond through a drain, 
cut through a low bank. A section of the Western bank had 
broken or collapsed and liquor spilling over had gullied, back into 
the sandy tailings and cut a 10’-20’ wide gully. 
The area of the pond was approximately 80’ x 80’ = 6,400 sq ft 
and was at the most 4ft deep = 25,000 cubic ft and at 6 gals/cub ft 
approximately 150,000 gals of liquor had escaped. In fact the 
quantity of water was probably considerably less than this and 
more like 100,000 gallons. 
Tailings were evident for some distance downstream.... 
The cause of the failure is not known for certain, but it is possible 
that the drain between the two ponds may have blocked, raising 
the head and causing a portion of the dam to blow out, or 
alternatively, that the ramp down the western face may have 
caused a weakening of the dam. But the only explanation for a 
sudden break out is that the drain blocked. Apparently two men 
were working in the valley downstream of the tailings and 
building a retaining structure which was also washed out by the 
flood.232 
 
Although the problem with the tailings was not reported in the press, 
thus avoiding public controversy, the local bodies were concerned at the 
occurrence and its implications for the future. Feasey informed the Works 
and Town Planning Committee that  
 
a small tailings dam (80’ x 80’ x 4’) at the mill site collapsed and 
water and silt discharged into the Omahu stream from which 
Council is taking part of its water supply. This Borough was not 
notified at any stage of the occurrence. The Catchment Board, 
however, was notified and is investigating the matter. 
The Committee felt that such an accident should never have 
occurred if the tailings dam had been properly constructed and 
was concerned at the possible danger to the public. The Company 
has agreed to clear the Borough intake. 
 
The committee recommended that the company be told of the council’s 
concerns and that it required precautions to prevent another occurrence 
                                            
232 [David Griffiths], Memorandum entitled ‘Failure of Norpac Tailing Dam on Mt. Te 
Aroha’, 21 April 1971, HCB, Series 1, Box 205, 7/2, vol. 1, WRC. 
66 
‘when a much larger slip could have disastrous results’.233 The full council 
concurred, and formally complained that no official report had been made to 
its staff. As this was the second major stream pollution, it sought 
assurances that adequate precautions would be taken ‘to prevent any 
shifting or collapse of the tailings area’.234 Handcock replied denying that 
the main tailings dam had been affected: a ‘temporary pondage or water 
holding area, adjacent to and associated with a sand cone and tailings area 
proper, through deterioration of sand grading precipitated a body of water 
causing a subsidence’. To prove that he had contacted council staff, he 
included a copy of his letter of 5 April to Feasey. He added that delays in 
getting the special site license had ‘severely hampered the execution of 
necessary work in this and adjacent site license areas’, for otherwise this 
work would have been done during the Christmas shutdown. Rebuilding the 
gabions and other work would prevent future problems.235 In Carter’s initial 
draft of this letter, possibly dictated by Handcock, there was an additional 
paragraph claiming that  
 
only a minimum of tailings sand had been carried by the released 
water. Mr Griffiths queried the discolouration of the Tui Stream 
at its lower level. On inspection it was determined that clay & silt 
had been picked up by the water on its way down the valley and 
that virtually no tailings had been released.236  
 
Presumably Handcock omitted this statement because he realized 
Griffiths knew that tailings had been traced for some distance down the 
stream. 
As Handcock had not informed McAra of the pollution, he first heard of 
it through a telephone call from Feasey; he decided to wait for a written 
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complaint before responding.237 This did not come until three weeks later, 
when White wrote that ‘through our Mr Feasey’ McAra was ‘aware of the 
recent collapse of a small tailings dam’ and asked for adequate precautions 
to prevent a repeat.238 McAra immediately telephoned Handcock and then 
wrote seeking an explanation and asking how a recurrence would be 
prevented, for ‘it would appear’ that the dam was ‘insecure at present’.239 In 
his dictated response, Handcock stated that the company was  
 
surprised that based on information supplied by a clerical officer 
of the local Borough Council you saw fit to make the statement 
that the Tailings Dam structure is unsafe. We can recall no 
previous comment, written or verbal, by you or your department 
relating to the insecure nature of the existing structure & 
following our telephone conversation of yesterday were left with 
the impression that you appreciated the current work being 
carried out would consolidate an already strong, safe dam rather 
than strengthen an unsafe one. 
The release of water on April 5th was not intended, but we 
reiterate that the occurrence in no way affected the main dam 
structure. An area of water in front of the clay dam was released 
& flowed down the Tui Stream. No tailings were carried with this 
water, but a quantity of clay from the banks further downstream 
was picked up & badly discoloured water flowing through the golf 
course & under the main road. Hauraki Catchment Board 
personnel visited the Tailings area & the stream & will verified 
these facts.240 
 
Presumably Carter, who took down this dictation, pointed out that the 
water had come not from what Handcock described as ‘an area of water’ in 
front of the main dam but from behind it, scouring the front of the dam and 
enabling some tailings to escape into the stream. Whatever the reason, this 
draft was not typed and instead a brief letter was sent which in provocative 
style denied that the dam was insecure: 
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The structure was built over the Christmas/New Year period 
1966/67 in accordance with the accompanying drawings and is 
well known to you. We appreciate your enquiry and suggest that 
a visit be made to the site so that full explanation of “the 
insecurity of the structure” can be made know to us.241  
 
The secretary of the golf club then complained to McAra that after the 
‘collapsing of the dam’ their reservoir had washed away, their water system 
was blocked, and they were without water for five days.242 
McAra inspected the dam on 24 May, when Handcock had returned 
from leave. As McAra had neither sought not received any information from 
the catchment board and the damage had been repaired by this time, 
Handcock was able to convince him that less water had escaped than had 
really happened and that no tailings had entered the stream. In his report, 
McAra wrote that Handcock had explained that  
 
a small breakaway of a pocket of water of the order of several 
thousand gallons which had been allowed to accumulate near the 
crest of the dam through the cone discharge not being properly 
controlled to maintain the gradient of about 6% from the cone 
discharge to the pond at the far end.... This appears to have 
shifted a quantity of red clay which had built up at the foot of a 
waterfall about 300 yards from the dam, where it had been 
dumped from roading excavations. 
The main body of water in the dam at the time would be within 
100ft of the eastern end of the tailings dump so that there was no 
danger from this as there would be over 100ft of tailings above 
water level before the pocket of water near the crest of the dam 
would be encountered. This pocket would occupy a small corner 
near the crest on the south-western corner of the dam and being 
close to the coarse, freshly deposited material, would saturate it 
and cause it to slump suddenly and break away and run down the 
creek. Two men were working on the gabion structure in the bed 
of the stream about 600ft downstream from the dam which is 
intended to act as the main downstream buttress of the dam 
when it is extended. This gabion structure should provide an 
excellent support when it reaches the height of the dam. 
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It seems that no one concerned with the maintenance of the dam 
realised the danger of allowing a pocket of water to accumulate in 
the coarser sand near the crest although instructions had been 
issued for the regular inspection of the cone discharge.... 
What seems to have occurred to cause the collapse of a section of 
the face of the dam is that the coarser sand from the underflow of 
the hydraulic sand separator became saturated owing to the 
formation of a pool of water above it and a film of water formed 
between the individual grains of sand which was thus “fluidised” 
and lost all its cohesive properties so that it suddenly slumped 
down into the creek bed together with the pool of water above it. 
This pocket of water would travel swiftly down the creek as a 
solid block of water. One observer is said to have estimated that it 
filled a space about 5ft high by 12ft wide in the stream bed and 
passed in approximately 8 seconds. 
This occurrence shows that much greater care and understanding 
is required in the control of the tailings dam and Mr Handcock 
has undertaken to see that in future half-hourly inspections are 
made of the sand-cone discharge to ensure that the proper 
gradient is maintained from the cone discharge to the pond and 
no build up of water is allowed to occur between the cone 
discharge and the pond.  
To check the position thoroughly I think it will also be necessary 
to determine as precisely as possible all factors involved in 
maintaining the stability of the dam such as the effect of pressure 
and water content on the cohesion of the sand particles in the face 
of the dam and also the range of particle sizes and the 
permeability of the material between the point of tailings 
discharge into the dam and the actual pond to determine the 
limits to which the pond can be allowed to extend. 
This could best be carried out be a soil engineer with a knowledge 
of such structures. I think it will probably be found that the 
permeability of the tailings beyond half-way between the face of 
the dam and the eastern (mill end) of it is negligible owing to the 
deposit of the finer fraction in this area and that the pressure 
exerted by several feet of thickness of this material gives an 
adequate degree of coherence and stability to maintain the pond 
in this portion. However, until this has been reliably determined 
it seems necessary to restrict ponding to this portion. 
There are three 4” tailings water overflow discharge pipes in the 
tailings pond and these seem adequate to deal with any 
foreseeable intake as Mr Handcock informs me that the 
maximum rise in level due to phenomenal rains so far 
experienced has been four inches.243 
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Lloyd Jones, who had received a copy of White’s letter of 28 April, was 
confused about whether the main dam had been affected. After noting that 
Handcock had given no explanation of what had happened, he asked for 
more information from McAra, whom he said had ‘accepted that there had 
been a breach of conditions without first checking yourself’.244 In response, 
McAra sent Handcock’s latest letter, written after his inspection on 30 May. 
This gave details of the piping system being installed at the base for 
decanting excess water and promising that ‘final drawings of Area 2 
requirements’ would be agreed with McAra before construction started. 
Further details would be sent, and he was invited to collect from him a 
sample block of solidified tailings ‘representative of fines deposition 
adjacent to decant pipe, in Area 1’. This sample was collected during the 
‘Christmas shutdown period in 1967 (the annual dewatering and drying out 
exercise)’ and was ‘of interest in appreciating possible final condition of area 
at depth’ when operations ceased.245  
Jones supported McAra’s conclusions and recommendations, adding it 
was ‘to be hoped’ there would be ‘no repetition of this failure which could 
have had more serious results if a breach had really developed in very 
heavy rain’.246 He wondered whether Norpac was still employing an 
engineer to supervise the dam construction. Clarifying the issue of 
responsibility raised by McAra, Jones wrote that ‘the primary responsibility’ 
lay with the company. The department’s responsibility was to see that 
conditions were complied with and that the dam was safe. It was ‘within our 
powers to require civil engineering design of tailings dams and the company 
should show proof that this has been done’.247 McAra therefore asked 
Handcock if a civil engineer was still supervising the work, and instructed 
him that one must be appointed if this was not the case;248 there is no reply 
on file, but presumably Handcock reassured him. 
In letters to White and the golf club, McAra summarized his 
explanation of the occurrence and assured them that there had been ‘no 
danger of a major breakaway’. The escape of water had come ‘as a shock and 
a surprise to those concerned with the dam’, giving them ‘a salutary 
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lesson’.249 McAra’s technical advice to Handcock about how to prevent a 
repetition required the height of the dam to be maintained, its width kept 
at 20 feet at the top, and saturation of the sands guarded against:  
 
Any build up of water near the crest of the dam will almost 
certainly cause this saturation and consequent slumping of the 
face so that this must be avoided at all costs. There seems to be 
no information available as to the size-distribution, permeability, 
moisture content and slump points of the dam materials 
generally so that it is not possible to establish it’s cohesiveness, 
strength and stability accurately. 
I think it is necessary to determine these facts so that as the pond 
gets higher with the raising of the dam it can be demonstrated 
that there is no possibility of an extensive slump and the limit to 
which the pond can be extended towards the front or crest of the 
dam can be determined.... 
Your undertaking to apply much closer supervision and control of 
the depositing of the tailings by enforcing half hourly inspection 
of the sand-cone discharge should obviate the formation of water 
pockets near the front of the dam and as I cannot see that it 
would cause any inconvenience I should be pleased to have your 
further undertaking as early as possible that the pond will not be 
allowed at any time to approach within 100ft of the front or crest 
of the dam. 
If the tests mentioned show that the requisite physical conditions 
exist for the construction of a safe tailings dam I am hopeful that 
it may not be necessary to impose further restrictions on it’s 
operation.250 
 
Handcock’s response, if any, has not survived. He informed the 
directors that two new dam sites had been investigated and that 
preliminary drawings had been discussed with McAra, whose suggestions 
were being incorporated in a final drawing to be submitted to the catchment 
board and borough council for approval.251 After suggesting improvements 
for the new dam 350 feet downstream of the existing one, McAra warned 
that it must be managed well, for, ‘as we have seen, critical conditions can 
arise through inadequate control of the deposition of tailings’. It was 
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especially important to confine the pond within the impermeable section 
and to install seepage pipes to prevent any build-up of water beneath the 
tailings.252 To Jones, McAra explained that Handcock expected the dam 
could be 40 feet high and stepped like a pyramid. Norpac had done 
‘considerable research’ into tailings dam construction, and Haszard had 
studied them in Japan. A particular difficulty was to find an engineer in 
New Zealand with ‘the necessary experience in this work to advise’.253 Jones 
replied that the main requirement was good drainage, because once a 
‘slime-sand mixture’ had drained it was ‘very difficult to re-mobilise’, being 
‘comparatively impermeable’.254 In June, Handcock told his directors that 
the council now said it ‘did not appreciate the magnitude of tailings 
involved’. 
 
I suggested that the use of all further tailings off the hill - to fill 
in swamp areas within the Borough - was very much in the 
Council’s hands. Suggested transfer of tailings by pipeline was 
economically out of the question, but transfer by water in 
Tunakohoia Creek to stilling basins near N[ew] Z[ealand] 
R[ailways] embankments was feasible and relatively cheap and 
that Norpac would be prepared to assist to the extent of say six 
cents per ton of tailings for the right to discharge to the 
Tunakohoia Creek.255 
 
The following month, Handcock informed the directors that the council 
would prefer that the tailings be taken down to the flat. They confirmed 
Handcock’s offer to assist the council to pay for constructing stopbanks, but 
insisted that was the council’s responsibility ‘to have this action approved 
by all parties entitled to object to it and that once the tailings were dumped 
into the stream the matter would become the Borough’s responsibility’. As 
proposals for improved processing being put forward by Britton Research 
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Ltd would mean finer grinding of ore and hence an increase in slimes, ‘it 
would be much better that these should be dumped in the creek’.256 
The council was in no mood to make a hasty decision to turn the 
Tunakohoia Stream into a sludge channel. Its Works and Town Planning 
Committee resolved that it would not consider this proposal until there had 
been a ‘very full feasibility study’ carried out by Norpac and distributed to 
all the authorities concerned. The offer to supply coarse sand tailings at 15 
cents per cubic year plus metal chips at $1 per cubic yard was declined until 
it had investigated their suitability.257 
Finer grinding began in July, and while this meant that more of the 
minerals were recovered, it had other consequences in the pond: ‘Wind 
action was agitating the surface of the pond and preventing the fines from 
settling. This caused problems in decanting the water’.258 Also during that 
month there was controversy over the blockage of culverts where the road 
crossed the north branch of the Tunakohoia Stream, caused by nine inches 
of rain falling during 24 hours on 2-3 July.259 Lynam, who had complained, 
was joined by representatives of Norpac and the catchment board, plus 
McAra, at the site on 5 and 12 July. Mining debris had blocked several 
culverts, resulting in water scouring the road surface. Lynam complained 
that three times in the last five years these blockages had occurred, and 
argued that Norpac should at least contribute to the cost of clearing them. 
Griffiths told Harris that three of the conditions on Norpac’s license had not 
been met: there was no bypass for the run-off, there was no retaining 
structure to prevent material entering the stream, and the condition that 
‘no mining wastes, tailings or debris’ be ‘discharged into any water course 
either directly or indirectly was clearly NOT adhered to’. Handcock assured 
them that he would construct a gabion retaining structure, but did not offer 
to help meet the NZBC’s costs of clearing the blockages.260 One day after 
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this memorandum was written, another was drafted for the board, 
presumably by Harris, summarizing the position and stating it was ‘obvious 
that Norpac have been blatantly disregarding the conditions’. After 
suggesting that the Soil Conservation Committee inspect the area and a 
letter sent insisting that conditions be adhered to, he raised the concern 
that the pond was ‘increasing rapidly in size and could pose a real threat to 
any body on the face down stream’. Would the gabions being built hold, and 
might not the tailings become saturated and flow down the stream? He 
recommended that Norpac and the Mines Department be asked to request 
the carrying out of stability tests, and suggested a better method of building 
the gabions.261  
After inspecting the slip on 7 July, McAra reported to his department 
that some thousands of tons of mullock from the dumps outside mine levels 
4 and 5 had been washed down, ‘contrary to the provisions of the license’. 
 
I endeavoured to obtain agreement between the parties as to 
remedying the situation but pointed out that it was the function 
of the Warden’s Court to deal with such disputes. 
While the conditions of the license require that no material be 
deposited in any water course it was not in my opinion feasible to 
carry this out to the letter and only “reasonable” control could be 
obtained when mining in steep high country subject to such heavy 
falls of rain. 
Mr Handcock eventually reached some agreement with the 
Catchment Board representatives and will carry gabions up to 
the downstream end of the No. 5 dump. The N.Z.B.C. is still 
apparently not satisfied.  
 
He thought that Norpac should do more to prevent the dumps 
moving,262 though apparently did not say this to Handcock. (In December, 
he was to tell Handcock that, as the gabions were not being built in the 
manner agreed, they would not prevent mullock entering the stream in 
heavy rain.)263 He told those upset with Norpac that 
 
I hoped that they would be able to come to an understanding, 
bearing in mind that the infant mining industry had many 
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difficulties to overcome and as it might one day provide a 
substantial contribution to the economy, it should receive 
whatever encouragement was possible, although it was realized 
that it must as a general principle bear its own burdens and 
should not seek to impose them on other sections of the 
community.264 
 
During August Handcock started preparing the No. 2 tailings area, 
warning Feasey that this would cause some discolouration of the water.265 
When board members inspected the storm damage and gabions in mid-
August, he assured them he appreciated their visit, thanked them for their 
interest, and gave details of the improved gabion structure being 
constructed. He emphasized that the gabions already in place had withstood 
the storm of 2-3 July.266 
In October, after the Soil Conservation and River Control Council 
inspected the Tui area, its director, A.W. Gibson, reported to Harris that 
‘passing observations were made’ that ‘some of the works appeared to leave 
much to be desired’. He asked whether the board was satisfied or whether 
the provisions of the Mining Act were ‘taking precedence in control’.267 After 
discussions between Harris and Gibson and a review by the board, Harris 
replied noting that the requested information concerning its responsibilities 
over the stability of the pond had not been received. He summarized 
developments and enclosed copies of letters and memoranda.  
 
As discussed this is obviously a difficult subject for a catchment 
authority with few precedents to act as a guide. A catchment 
authority is naturally reluctant to “get in the way” of mining as it 
were, but nevertheless has certain statutory functions in terms of 
the Act under which it is created.... 
In retrospect, no doubt, there are various aspects which could 
have been differently and perhaps better handled. The cost of 
remedial measures which (say) could otherwise be avoided and 
always likely to create problems in arriving at some satisfactory 
compromise. 
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In short, conservation in connection with mining can cost money 
which in turn might understandably be held to affect the viability 
of a particular mining operation, although the Board, of course, 
has no way of determining this aspect. 
However, in the presence of all these unresolved matters it 
remains as a fact, that the Board, at any rate, has no way of 
knowing whether the heap is, or is not stable, or if it is stable 
now, whether it will remain stable, regardless of eventual size or 
any other future developments. 
As Board cannot but be aware of the existence of the growing 
tailings heap, at the very least, it must satisfy itself as to its 
present and future responsibilities (if any) in the matter. 
Your comments on the situation would therefore be much 
appreciated.268 
 
The reply, not received until April the following year, noted that ‘in the 
case of stockpiled waste, the degree of potential damage’ was ‘high 
compared with other forms of pollution and precautions taken should be 
conservative’. As the conditions on Norpac’s license appeared to be 
inadequate, the board was encouraged to check the stability of the tailings 
‘and if necessary convey its concern to the Secretary for Mines. An estimate 
of the damage likely to the river system in the event of a slip’ might be 
‘useful’.269  
 
1972 
 
Mining slowed in 1972, caused largely by another form of pollution, 
mercury, as explained below. While this was of most concern to Norpac, it 
still had to defend itself from continued criticism over pollution. At least the 
dam wall proved that it had been well-constructed: a severe earthquake in 
January did not affect it.270 But there was another complaint from the 
NZBC to the Mines Department about mine waste blocking culverts and 
causing damage to the mountain road; Norpac was believed to be depositing 
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mullock into the watercourse.271 No action seems to have been taken over 
this complaint. 
In February the board agreed to spend $11,000 of the $60,510 
expenditure approved for the year on the No. 2 tailings area to cope with 
increased production. Charles Taylor, a civil engineer, approved the 
specifications of the proposed dam.272 He visited in March and had 
discussions with Haszard, Sakai, and Handcock; Sakai’s design for area No. 
1 was in general repeated in the design of the second area, ‘with 
refinements such as the coning of sand’. C. Papanidils, an Auckland civil 
engineer, had prepared the detailed plans for Tailings Area No. 2, which 
were revised to include features suggested by McAra. After spending ten 
days inspecting the design and working of the mill and pond, Sakai told 
Norpac, so Handcock told McAra, that ‘the operation of tailings disposal ... 
was also extremely smooth, with no fear of pollution’.273 Handcock began 
‘practical work on establishing grass coverage on prepared tailings surfaces 
... to take advantage of the autumn seeding season’;274 as he made no 
further mention of this trial, it must be assumed to have been a failure. 
When a flood took pollutants from the lowest level of the mine down 
the Tunakohoia North Stream in April, letters were exchanged with McAra, 
Handcock as usual insisting that Norpac was doing all that was required. 
However he did intend to take a trip to Australia, subsidized by the 
company, to investigate tailings disposal by mining companies there.275  
On 11 May, McAra inspected the extension to the dam and suggested 
that Handcock take out a dam license, ‘but he was averse to this’. McAra’s 
reasoning was that 
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the purpose of a dam license is to ensure that any depository of 
water will be constructed in such a manner that no danger will 
arise and in view of certain complaints and criticisms regarding 
these tailings dams such a license would indicate that the criteria 
required by Regulations 41-44 would be met. 
Also under the terms of the license for a Special Site for the 
deposit of tailings the Minister of Mines ... is responsible to see 
that the terms and conditions of the license including those 
relating to the deposit of tailings in such a manner as not to be a 
nuisance or danger, are carried out. 
In view of this responsibility it seems reasonable that the 
Company should be called upon to operate under a Dam License 
and thus provide some assurance that the work will be carried 
out in accordance with the appropriate Regulations. 
In general the work of constructing the No. 2 tailings area is 
following the plan provided by C. Papandils, Reg. Engineer ... in 
June 1971. However, in the vicinity of road elevation 1128 
seepage drains below the bottom of the clay dam are not working 
efficiently and there is an accumulation of 5ft depth of water over 
a narrow width upstream from the dam. I understand that this 
situation will be remedied and that sub-surface seepage drains 
will be installed to provide drainage for the whole of the proposed 
tailings area. 
The construction work does not appear to be under the 
supervision of the Engineer responsible for the plan.... 
If a Dam License is not taken out I think the construction of the 
dam should be under the supervision of a registered engineer 
whose name should be furnished to this office. 
Mr Handcock had indicated that he would like to have a fuller 
discussion before the requirement for a dam license is imposed.276 
 
The day after his inspection, McAra informed Handcock that the 
foundations for the extension of the dam appeared ‘to be impermeable and 
that an accumulation of water against the dam face several feet deep’ had 
occurred. 
 
As this will probably cause saturation to the foundations of the 
crest of the new dam it seems to be in contradiction to the 
discussed policy of maintaining free drainage under the dam and 
as there would appear to be a possibility of instability of the 
foundations developing at a later date with the attendant danger 
of slipping, in the absence of other information I am concerned at 
this condition. 
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He concluded by expressing his concern at the lack of a dam license 
and asked for details of any modifications that were made to the dam.277 
Jones, who received a copy of this letter, considered the question of the 
license ‘very valid’ and asked to be told Handcock’s reply.278 McAra 
responded that he had since had ‘some discussion’ with Handcock ‘on the 
design and construction of these dams’ and was not satisfied that they were 
‘under sufficiently rigid control’. He wanted ‘a more definite responsibility 
for correct design and construction placed upon the company’, preferably by 
appointing a registered engineer to supervise the design and construction of 
the foundations, and sought Jones’ guidance on how best to control the 
construction of the dam.279  
Also in May the National Water and Soil Conservation Organisation 
asked the catchment board to inspect the pond because it considered the 
dam inadequate. The board replied that ‘any real check on the stability of 
the stock-pile waste’ was ‘a complex matter requiring a full professional 
investigation with laboratory back-up’, which it could not afford. At its 
meeting, the District Commissioner of Works, Reginald Ernest Hermans,280 
‘commented that the onus to investigate safeguards should be on the private 
individual or enterprise and should not involve the Board in the 
expenditure of public money’. The board agreed to his suggestion that the 
Mines Department be asked to investigate.281 
Norpac prepared to pipe water for disposal in the Tunakohoia North 
Stream, should it receive permission; its second dam was not yet in use. 
When the board asked that both dams be investigated, the directors 
responded that, as their engineers had approved them, they had ‘done 
everything possible to be assured of the best construction’.282 The board 
remained unconvinced, and in June Harris wrote to the Secretary of Mines 
expressing its deep concern ‘at the situation, size and potential danger’ 
posed by the tailings. After summarizing the dimensions of the problem and 
the effects of them slipping down the mountain as a type of lahar, as in a 
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recent disaster at the Welsh mining village of Aberfan, the board requested 
assurances before its July meeting  
 
(1) That proper engineering steps have been taken to determine 
the stability of the heap, and 
(2) That your department has acceptable assurances from a 
Professionally qualified and recognised Authority that the heap is 
in fact stable and safe, both for the present and for the future.283 
 
The reply, written by Jones in late August, noted that McAra had, with 
the board, inspected the 1971 flood damage: 
 
It is significant that there was no appreciable damage to the 
tailings area during the two quite unusually severe storms which 
caused damage to the mullock heaps and consequent blockage of 
the road culvert on the NZBC road. The Inspector is aware of the 
dangers inherent in the storage of mill tailings on a hillside site 
and would welcome engineering opinion from both the Board and 
the Ministry of Works. 
In conclusion it appears to Mines Department that the 
engineering concepts used i.e. the preparation and drainage of 
foundation areas, the lack of depth of ponded water, the fact that 
the material is of the same grain size and close attention to 
maximum height and batter to obviate slump through gravity - 
are all being considered. 
Aberfan had no site preparation, no attention to foundation 
drainage, no attention to maximum height and batter and worst 
of all was a waste pile of a mixture of coarse rock and fine slack 
and other material. 
The company and the Department are as interested as the Board 
in preventing any major outflow of material from these mill 
tailings and would welcome the cooperation of the Board’s 
engineers in making any such contingency impossible.284 
 
This, Handcock told his directors, was ‘a very good reply’.285 It was 
based on a report from McAra explaining the operation of the pond and 
stating that, if worked properly, there was no danger. He did have one 
qualification: 
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The volume of water in the pond is about 400 - 500 tons. In 
constructing the foundation for the breastwork for the tailings 
dam extension, the soil drains through and on either side of the 
breast-work appear to be inadequate and some water has 
accumulated at an estimated depth of 3ft. So long as the soil 
drains are functioning properly and the material used in building 
the crest or westerly end of the dam is the permeable coarse 
fraction from the sand spigot, and the overflow of fine material is 
deposited evenly by gravitating down a gentle slope to the syphon 
controlled pond at the easterly end of the tailings dump, there 
should be no occasion for concern particularly as the area is 
naturally protected from the possible effects of storm water.286 
 
When Harris told Jones that he needed the details of the engineering 
design and of previous investigations of the pond and dam before he could 
give full consideration to the issues raised, he was told to discuss the issues 
with Norpac and McAra.287 Handcock had offered Harris the drawings of 
the dam to show to his board in 1971, but Harris had declined this offer 
because, according to Handcock, he did not feel competent to comment.288 
What Harris continued to seek were assurances from an independent civil 
engineer with more specialist knowledge than himself. At its December 
meeting the board resolved that the stability should be investigated, and 
offered to arrange for the appointment of a suitable expert if the Water and 
Soil Division of the Ministry of Works would meet the cost.289 Harris also 
made the same offer to the National Water and Soil Conservation 
Organisation. The latter’s cautious response was that first there needed to 
be an estimate of cost, clarification of the legal right to enter Norpac’s land, 
and an indication of the action the board anticipated taking if investigations 
showed the pond to be potentially dangerous.290 
                                            
286 J.B. McAra, Report for August 1972, p. 7, Inspector of Mines, Monthly Reports 1972-
1973, BACB A654/106, ANZ-A. 
287 R.W. Harris to Secretary of Mines, 29 September 1972; L.S. Jones to R.W. Harris, 27 
October 1972, HCB, Series 1, Box 205, 7/2, vol. 1, WRC. 
288 F.J. Handcock, Report 9/6 for period ending 4 September 1971, Norpac Papers, Box 6, 
NMC 19/6, UA. 
289 David Griffiths to Director, Water and Soil Division, Ministry of Works, 19 December 
1972, HCB, Series 1, Box 205, 7/2, vol. 1, WRC. 
290 D.J. Bagnall (for A.W. Gibson) to R.W. Harris, 9 January 1973, HCB, Series 1, Box 205, 
7/2, vol. 1, WRC. 
82 
 When sending Pentland copies of correspondence and press reports to 
illustrate ‘the activity that the pollution people’ were showing, Handcock 
wrote that when Norpac’s management heard of the board’s approach to the 
Mines Department they expected ‘any investigation of tailings disposal 
being based on a mining point of view and not on an exclusive soil 
mechanics coverage and of course within the provisions of the Mining Act 
only’. Reading of the First International Tailings Symposium to be held in 
Tucson, Arizona, in November, ‘we considered there would be value in 
establishing between ourselves, Mines Department and the Pollution 
Control Authority a standard for the stowage of mill tailings based on 
mining practice’, and suggested to the department that one of its officials 
attend.291 Norpac sent Haszard, whose report noted that, while 
environmentalists were forcing expensive pollution controls, the industry ‘in 
some respects’ had ‘brought this upon themselves by blatant pollution by 
tailings and smelter gases’. His quick tour of American mining regions and 
smelters had quite shocked him. At the symposium he had discussed the 
type of dam Norpac had built and was told that the greatest danger was 
sand or slime in liquefaction because of over-topping or over-filling when 
the water level was against the berm or dyke. This situation would cause 
saturation of the dam and its subsequent failure, especially if there was 
seismic activity. Therefore there should be ‘as much free board as possible’ 
in the ponding area, with water kept at a minimum and ‘as much “beach” as 
possible’. The dam and tailings must be monitored for unusual phenomena, 
especially seepage; any weak points found in the dam must be reinforced. It 
was considered that their methods were ‘as safe as can be expected’.292 
 
MERCURY 
 
Cinnabar, the natural form of mercury, was found by early prospectors 
of the Tui area.293 An 1887 report on the newly exposed lodes noted that in 
the galena there were ‘a good many patches of cinnabar - too small, 
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however, to be of any practical value’.294 A geological survey published in 
1913 reported that the Tui ore carried ‘a little cinnabar’.295 Norpac made no 
mention of this in its reports, although cadmium was mentioned in 1965 as 
a useful mineral that had been found.296 The implications of these heavy 
metals being part of the concentrates sent to Japan for smelting became 
apparent in September 1971, when Mitsui informed Norpac about the sharp 
increases in their production costs: 
 
Environment pollution problems in particular have severely 
affected the non-ferrous metals industry in Japan through the 
most severe emission standards required for cadmium and other 
heavy metals, as well as SO2 gas, in the world. 
The Anti-Pollution Fundamental Law accompanied by the Anti-
Air Pollution Law, Prevention of Water Pollution Law and 
Prevention of Soil Pollution in Farm Lands Law were enacted 
and put into enforcement as from June 24th this year. These laws 
set up extremely severe emission standards for cadmium and 
other heavy metals in the smoke and water discharged from 
smelters, and soils in neighbourhood.... 
Japanese zinc smelters will be ordered to improve and/or install 
facilities at the plants to meet these regulations if any such 
standard has been exceeded. Any violation will be severely 
penalized. 
In fact, even before introduction of these laws, strong 
denouncement by inhabitants around smelters and 
administrative order by the Government forced some of Japanese 
zinc smelters to curtail their production. 
 
Because of the ‘huge amount’ of extra expenditure needed to meet the 
new requirements, Norpac was asked by Mitsui to agree to ‘a reduction of 
about US$7.00 per dry metric ton of concentrates, as a contribution on the 
part of mine for a part of extra costs of anti-pollution expenditures at 
smelters’.297 Another letter of the same date asked Norpac to accept a 
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reduction of US$4.00 per dry metric ton of lead concentrates, for the same 
reasons.298 
Norpac’s directors resolved that ‘While the Company was sympathetic 
to Mitsui ... it was felt that in view of Norpac’s present financial position the 
Company was unable to reconsider the terms of the contract which had been 
entered into with Mitsui’.299 Ernest Kenneth Haddy, the company’s 
secretary, in conveying this decision, wrote that Norpac had also faced 
‘relatively substantial cost in pollution control’. It had not solved all its 
metallurgical problems, inflation had increased the costs of labour and 
other expenses alarmingly, world metal prices had fallen, and Mitsui’s 
request could force operations to cease if Norpac was unable to improve its 
‘metal recoveries’.300 As Norpac refused to agree to a lower price Mitsui 
decided not to renew their contract to purchase concentrates beyond the 
expiry date of 31 December 1972.301 Another justification for the non-
renewal was that assays of some shipments revealed a mercury percentage 
higher than the Japanese new anti-pollution regulations permitted.302 The 
general manager of an Australian mining company found this latter reason 
puzzling, because ‘the small tonnages involved could have easily been 
absorbed along with their other purchases and their production in Japan’. 
He understood that Japanese Kuroko lead-zinc mines, ‘the same age as 
those mined at Tui’, had ‘a substantial mercury content’.303  
A letter to Handcock from the local Member of Parliament, John 
Luxton, upon the latter’s return from Japan explained the Japanese view 
very clearly: 
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Everyone is very pollution-conscious and every day during our 
visit mercury pollution seemed to be a feature in the news. 
From discussions, it would appear that Japan is investing money 
outside the country for smelter operations rather than face up to 
the stringent requirements that are being demanded and likely to 
be required in the future. In my discussions I was not encouraged 
to believe that the position would become easier for Norpac, 
rather it would become much more difficult and the standards 
required for Norpac would become punitive.304 
 
Because the Japanese government prohibited the import of 
concentrates containing mercury and there were no smelters operating on 
the west coast of the U.S.A. and Canada, the Tui mine became 
uneconomic.305 To prevent its closure, government assistance enabled 
Norpac to continue mining in a small way while another market was found 
and a method was found to reduce the mercury level. Areas of low mercury 
content were identified in the mine, but Downer told the Development 
Finance Corporation in July 1973 that ‘all enquiries into the methods of 
reduction of mercury in the concentrates at mill site would indicate a 
substantial cost factor, and the creation of an air pollution problem’.306 The 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research researched ways to reduce 
the mercury content, for Mitsui was willing to purchase a zinc concentrate 
provided mercury did not exceed ten parts per million.307 In October, the 
DSIR reported some successful experiments, but warned of the cost; Jones 
also worried that with the proposed system of lowering the mercury content 
‘the disposal of wash water could shift some of the pollution problem to New 
Zealand instead of Japan’.308 For Norpac the fundamental issue was cost: 
Haszard was reportedly ‘not over-enthusiastic because of company’s 
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precarious situation - thought it would be foolish to install any further 
plant’.309 
After nearly a year of experimentation on the mercury problem, the 
government in November appointed Ian Sommerville as receiver/manager 
of Norpac. This was explained by the Minister of Mines, Fraser Colman, as 
being another ‘holding phase’ while he awaited Mitsui’s testing of the 
DSIR’s pilot studies on mercury contamination.310 Downer explained to the 
main overseas director that all Norpac’s efforts had been focussed on 
making a concentrate acceptable to Mitsui, and although ‘some progress’ 
had been made by the DSIR, mercury levels had not been reduced to that 
required by Japan. He expected the Receiver to continue the quest for a 
solution to the problem.311 An accompanying press cutting quoted the 
deputy director of the DSIR’s Chemistry Division as saying that their 
laboratory tests and field experiments at the mine with a chemical leaching 
process looked ‘interesting’ but there was ‘a fair way to go with it’.312 This 
newspaper report indicated that overseas smelting companies in general, 
not just in Japan, were not prepared to pay the going market price for a 
product that required ‘intensive refining’. Having to construct expensive 
new plants to conform to new anti-pollution regulations, they had ‘become 
more selective in their purchasing’.313 
The receiver did investigate the mercury issue further. Although 
Mitsui might purchase concentrates if mercury was at a maximum of 10 
p.p.m., the DSIR told him that ‘even after leeching the mercury content was 
not falling as low at 10 p.p.m. and due to the extremely volatile nature of 
mercury it was difficult to give any guarantees with respect to the mercury 
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content’.314 This ended any hope of a deal with Mitsui, and as no other 
company would buy the mine, it closed. 
 
AFTER NORPAC: 1973 TO 1980 
 
1973 
 
Some Te Aroha residents regretted the closure of the mine, for 
economic reasons. The Chamber of Commerce and several shopkeepers 
expressed concern at the loss of income to the community, and Skidmore 
hoped another company would buy the concentrates and so ensure the 
continuance of mining.315 Others were more concerned with the 
environmental consequences. Lynam, who passed the pond regularly, 
wanted it cleaned up before all mining ended, as the conditions on the 
license required. He managed to get the television programme This Day to 
cover the issue; it suggesting the pond was a potential danger to life and 
property, especially if left unattended once mining ceased.316 This prompted 
the Te Aroha News to ask whether there was a real environmental problem 
and to call for the allaying of fears, which it implied were exaggerated. 
Apart from anything else, mining and treatment was subject to conditions 
and there were regular inspections by Mines Department officials; was it 
feasible ‘that if Norpac was deliberately and flagrantly committing breaches 
of legal requirements that operations would have been permitted to 
continue?’ Skidmore was quoted as assuring the populace that their lives 
and property were not in jeopardy, as illustrated by the fact that the 
torrential rainfall at the end of November 1972 had not caused either the 
ore stockpile or the tailings pond to slip.317 Allen George Palmer,318 who had 
replaced McAra as Inspector of Mines, privately dismissed Lynam’s views 
and accused him of ‘trying to kick Norpac when it was down’, while Lynam’s 
superior officer wrote asking if he was ‘crying wolf’.319 
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The follow-up article was not quite so reassuring. Harris was quoted as 
telling the catchment board that determining the safety of the stockpile was 
an ‘urgent necessity’. Because of ‘previous experiences and seeming 
complete lack of jurisdiction’, board members asked for their powers to be 
clarified to permit them to act effectively. ‘Without the co-operation of the 
mine operators it would be a lengthy legal process to even gain entry to 
conduct a survey’. The warden imposed the conditions sought by the board 
were imposed only in 1966; subsequent licenses granted in 1968 and 1969 
did not include these. Believing that the Mining Act of 1926 over-ruled the 
Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act of 1941, they felt that they had 
‘some responsibility in the matter but insufficient powers to exercise it’.320 
One member said that the board was ‘in the hot seat and it is not our place’, 
while another said they had ‘no real power’. Harris repeated that since 1968 
they had been seeking to clarify their legal powers.321 Another member 
commented that ‘all the conditions reasonably required by a Catchment 
Authority or a Regional Water Board might make the operation of an 
efficient mining enterprise well nigh impossible’.322 The board resolved to 
approach Norpac to inquire if any investigations of the safety of the tailings 
had been carried out. Should this not be the case, Norpac would be asked to 
approve their inspecting the site ‘solely with a view of estimating the cost of 
an investigation into the stability and safety of the structure’, after which a 
decision would be made into any necessary action. A resolution was carried: 
 
In view of Board’s previous experiences and seemingly lack of 
jurisdiction that the National authority be advised that the Board 
cannot take any further action in respect of the Norpac Mine 
situation until such time as board’s present position and 
responsibilities are clarified, and if Board is required to accept 
responsibility authority be given to Board to adequately lay down 
and enforce reasonable requirements to ensure the safety of this 
type of operation, and enforce such requirements.323 
 
                                            
320 Te Aroha News, 20 February 1973, pp. 1, 7. 
321 New Zealand Herald, 15 February 1973, press cutting in Inspector of Mines, Box 16A, 
13/11, vol. 4, MC. 
322 Te Aroha News, 20 February 1973, pp. 1, 7. 
323 G.H. Caddie (Secretary, Hauraki Catchment Board) to Director, National Water and 
Soil Conservation Organisation, 23 February 1973, HCB, Series 1, Box 205, 7/2, vol. 1, 
WRC. 
89 
 Handcock countered the expressions of concern by insisting that 
Norpac had abided by the conditions, adding that ‘the proper stowage of 
tailings’ was ‘the most important function in the mining field. The Tui Mine 
staff have made a particular study of the subject, keeping abreast at all 
times with the latest in world techniques. Visits have been made to Japan, 
Australia and USA’. The latest visit of Mines Department inspectors a week 
ago had ‘again confirmed the complete acceptance of the methods 
adopted’.324 This had been made by Jones, McAra, and the Acting District 
Inspector of Mines, Gerard Klemick, who had formerly gained his mining 
experience in Norpac’s mine. After their detailed examination of Tailings 
Area No. 1, Handcock was able to tell his directors that they expressed 
‘satisfaction’ at the methods used ‘and the phreatic line attained’.325  
Members of the catchment board also inspected the pond in April, at 
Handcock’s invitation (an invitation that initially excluded their technical 
staff),326 and in May the Ministry of Works arranged for Tonkin and Taylor, 
consulting engineers, to inspect the dam.327 This was at the request of 
Colman, who argued that as Norpac’s consulting engineer, the mining 
inspectors, and Jones all said the dam was stable, it was unfair to ask 
Norpac to pay for another investigation; instead, the government would 
meet the cost. He wanted a prompt study to end the doubts (raised not only 
by the catchment board but also by the Soil Conservation and Rivers 
Control Council and the Water and Soil Division of the Ministry of Works). 
Colman also commented that Harris was aware of the consulting engineer’s 
report but had ‘not availed himself of the opportunity to examine it’.328 The 
Mines Department authorised the spending of $4,000,329 while both Klimick 
and Palmer assured Handcock that they felt that the dam was safe. The 
latter wrote that he considered that the investigation was to confirm that 
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the tailings were safe and would ‘not constitute a menace to the 
environment in the future’.330 When asked by Harris late in the year 
whether Norpac had fulfilled the conditions, Palmer simply responded that 
‘it would be best ... to specify the reasons for concern regarding departures 
from conditions on title. Investigations can then be carried out to a positive 
conclusion’.331 Finally, at the end of January 1974, Tonkin and Taylor 
started drilling to obtain cores from the dam ‘for Soil test purposes’.332  
 
1974 
 
 After government assistance that enabled Norpac to continue mining 
in a minimal way ended in February 1974, Palmer contacted the borough 
council and the catchment board to ask whether Norpac had fulfilled the 
conditions.333 The board asked for time to consider the issue because Tonkin 
and Taylor were still drilling and until they had finished it was not possible 
to determine this. Harris wrote that, when the mine was in operation, the 
‘immediate risk’ may well have been small and the technical investigation 
of the pond a ‘double check’, but its closure lent ‘much more emphasis to the 
investigation’. The board again asked that responsibility for the tailings be 
determined.334 
In May, Tonkin and Taylor presented their report. It noted that, since 
tailings had ceased to be deposited in 1973, the phreatic line [‘relating to 
ground water occurring below the water table’]335 had dropped within the 
tailings and that the surface had been ‘subject to considerable desiccation’. 
The crest level of the dam was approximately R.L. 1193 feet, ‘compared 
with a final proposed design height of R.L. 1205ft when full’. There were 
two small dams downstream of the main dam, the first made from coarse 
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tailings sand and the second from rock gabions. ‘No tailings have been 
deposited behind either of these two small secondary dams and they will 
function as effective silt traps, in the short term, for scour from the main 
dam face’. The tests for stability revealed that  
 
factors of safety, under static conditions, are of the order of 3 with 
the existing measured phreatic line and even after inundation 
and assuming the highest likely water levels, the factor of safety 
drops to just less than 2. The risk of liquefaction of the tailings 
under earthquake induced shock loading is low under existing low 
water-table conditions. However, even if liquefaction of the 
tailings within the pond were induced under high ground-water 
conditions the low downstream slope of the dam means that 
sufficient resistance is available to withstand the lateral 
pressures from full liquification within the pond. 
As a result of detailed stability analyses we conclude that the risk 
of a major catastrophic failure of the tailings dam is low and an 
adequate factor of safety against overall stability is provided. 
The long term performance of the main dam and the return bund 
on the south side will be influenced by any surface erosion or 
scouring of the downstream slope which may occur. Although 
there is a natural cemented crust which forms at the tailings 
surface this would be broken down by activities such as digging 
and removal of the surface layer. It is therefore recommended 
that public access be barred to the downstream face of the dam 
and bund. A more permanent solution would be to place a clay 
cover on the downstream faces as indicated in the drawings of the 
proposed dam when completed to its design height. Planting on 
the downstream faces at the dam and bund would then provide a 
permanent long term control of scour. The ponding of water at the 
eastern end of the tailings area could be a hazard to children, 
particularly as the tailings are finer and softer in this area. It is 
recommended that the public be prevented from entering the 
pond area. 
Alternatively a clay cover could be placed over the pond area with 
provision to prevent ponding of surface runoff water. The surface 
could then be planted. However, it should be borne in mind that 
with the increasing world demand for mineral resources, that the 
mine and mill may be reopened in the future and a scheme 
including planting or relandscaping of the tailings deposit may 
not be warranted at this stage. 
 
The report recommended regular maintenance of the contour drain 
around the northern boundary of the tailings because this diverted surface 
run-off water, as well as the maintenance of the existing outlet pipes to 
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drain the pond’s surface. They repeated that there was ‘an adequate factor 
of safety against an overall failure of the tailings dam’.336 
Palmer thought the report and its recommendations 
 
present the position fairly. There is no danger from dam 
subsidence but reopening of the mine and mill would require 
fresh planning of the tailings disposal area, particularly in regard 
to the permanent drainage of the sands. 
I feel that this dam has been given undue publicity and that the 
actual menace to society is slight. The full direction of all waters 
in the catchment area of the same into one course would be 
unlikely to generate a stream of sufficient power to transport 
more than token amounts of sand and these would be absorbed in 
the bed and banks of the present stream before reaching the 
Borough boundary. I cannot conceive any danger from massive 
movement of the dam material. 
 
Because vandals and others using the area as a playground assisted 
the erosion of the sides of the dam, a cover of vegetation was required. 
Drainage must be directed away; ‘the main source of danger’ was the spring, 
which kept ‘material in a soft state in its immediate vicinity’ but did not 
threaten ‘the stability of the dam as a whole’.337 Harris instructed the new 
owner of the site that the insecure cover over a 19-feet deep well on the 
tailings was a danger to children and must be made safe.338 
When discussions were held between the interested parties at the time 
Norpac ceased operations, Haszard had ‘emphasized the need to maintain 
the integrity of the confining wall of the tailings dam. This advice was later 
disregarded and sand was removed from the face’.339 When on 8 October 
Klemick inspected the dam at Palmer’s request, he reported that material 
was ‘being removed from the forward end of the Dam by Moran Contractors 
for Race Course fill’. Although this was being excavated from the same area 
used by Norpac for similar sales, Norpac had continually deposited new 
                                            
336 Tonkin and Taylor, ‘Stability Study of Norpac Mine Tailings Dam’, May 1974, HCB, 
Series 1, Box 206, 7/2, vol. 2, WRC. 
337 A.G. Palmer to L.S. Jones, 8 August 1974, Inspector of Mines, Box 13C, 13/11/E, vol. 2, 
MC. 
338 R.W. Harris to Julian Barbarich, 14 September 1974, Ministry of Commerce, AATJ 
6090, 13/25B, ANZ-W. 
339 Roger Dewhurst to R.W. Harris, Memorandum entitled ‘History of Tui Mine and 
Tailings Dam’, 26 October 1978, HCB, Series 1, Box 206, 7/2, vol. 2, WRC. 
93 
sand. The dam walls were ‘not affected so far’.340 As well, the new owners, 
Mineral Resources (N.Z.) had taken bulk samples to see whether it could 
sell the whole dam to a concreting firm.341 Approximately 2,000 cubic 
metres of sand were taken from the lower section of the dam, thereby 
reducing its stability.342 Harris was alarmed that these excavations were 
made on the toe of the heap, ‘just where the consultants are of the opinion 
that nothing should be touched for fear of damaging heap stability’.343 Once 
he heard the claim that material was being removed from the toe of the 
dam, Jones asked Palmer to check urgently; if true, extraction must cease 
immediately, and Mineral Resources must repair the damage.344 Palmer 
confirmed his earlier instruction to J.P. (Jack) Barbarich, general manager 
of Mineral Resources, that ‘no further sand may be removed from the face 
that has been developed towards the toe of the dam’, and if further removal 
of sand downstream of the toe affected the dam’s stability, all removal was 
to stop. ‘It is appreciated that the sand is being taken for bulk sampling 
purposes and that you hope to sell the whole dam to a concrete company’, 
but approval must be sought before the dam was removed.345 
In response to Tonkin and Taylor’s report, Griffiths recommended that 
the tailings ‘should be covered (by Mines Dept of course) with spray on grass 
... and also planted up with pine trees, radiata or contorta to give long term 
cover & binding. The combination should stabilise the surface quite 
satisfactorily’.346 The board accepted his recommendations except the use of 
contorta. Before planting trees it would cover the dam and pond with clay, 
and wanted the contour drain maintained, public access prohibited until 
revegetation was complete, and future removal of the heap done in an 
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acceptable manner. All work should be supervised and certified by a 
registered civil engineer, and finance provided to meet all costs, including 
future maintenance.347 Since this work was ‘necessitated solely by mining 
operations, the finance required should come from the mining sector, 
probably, practically, from the Ministry of Mines’, in Harris’ opinion. In a 
long letter to the Director of Water and Soil Conservation, he voiced 
concerns over the ownership of the mines: 
 
The situation now pertaining highlights some of Board’s earlier 
comments regarding liability for cost of works in the somewhat 
shaky economic climate prevailing in the mining world. 
Regarding the stability report, I do not know if the new owners 
are familiar with it, or even know of its existence. I feel that the 
information in the report should be made available urgently to 
the new owners ...  
Board’s responsibilities in mining matters are not clear....  
The whole situation has been frustrating in the extreme, 
especially as there is more than a feeling that, while Board’s 
statutory powers appear to be limited, its responsibilities may not 
be so limited, especially if it could be shown that it had some 
knowledge of dangers and did not act or say something. In recent 
years, because of the foregoing, Board has refrained from undue 
involvement in mining matters, but recently the question of the 
stability of the tailings heap was thrust upon it, and the 
consultants engaged for an investigation.... 
[Mineral Resources’ acquiring of some of Norpac’s assets] is not 
unusual in mining operations, but it does underline the weakness 
and danger of the Board’s situation, with limited powers, and 
possibly no limit on responsibility. I very much fear that much of 
the earlier frustrating experience with Norpac could now be 
repeated. Board cannot deal with a mining operation when the 
operators know very well that Board’s statutory powers in this 
respect are limited. 
The position on Mt Te Aroha has already received national 
publicity on television, with the Board in the unenviable position 
of being the local authority most directly concerned, and yet 
unable to make any definite statement. A minor problem has 
already occurred with the new operators over a small dam, and 
the Inspector of Mines, Huntly, when approached, stated that 
Board should deal directly with the mining operator. This 
involves staff time, and past experience has not been 
encouraging, either in time expended or in results achieved. 
Nevertheless, it is being attempted again on this occasion. 
                                            
347 R.W. Harris to Director of Water and Soil Conservation, 17 September 1974, Ministry of 
Commerce, AATJ 6090, 13/25B, ANZ-W. 
95 
It is, therefore, urgently requested that this matter be reviewed 
and a clear statement made as to the Board’s part in the 
proceedings, in particular with respect to the tailings heap and 
associated structures. If this cannot be done, then I feel that I 
must recommend to board that it consider making a public 
statement on the whole position, to avoid the situation whereby 
Board might be held responsible for a development over which it 
has little or no control. 
To some extent, I fear that this situation already pertains.348 
 
The director asked Jones to advise him about how to stabilize the dam 
and meet the cost, pointing out that the catchment board could not require 
its ratepayers ‘to finance works or maintenance’ that were ‘part and parcel 
of the mining operation and which should be a condition of a mining 
lease’.349 Palmer’s advice to Jones about Gibson’s letter dealt with all the 
conditions proposed by the catchment board: 
 
(a) The contour drain should be maintained by the licence holder. 
When the licence is surrendered, periodic inspection could be 
arranged by this Department. In effect, the drain is a token 
gesture only; the little water that accumulates in it would do no 
harm to the dam if the drain were blocked. 
(b) I am against the planting of grass and pinus radiata in a clay 
cover. This seems bad practice because, 
     (i) impervious clay cover would allow water to accumulate,                                  
ultimately to do damage when it finds a week spot, 
     (ii) tree roots could produce unstable conditions by providing 
channels for water movement. It is preferable to allow natural 
cover to develop. 
(c) I agree that public access to the dam area is undesirable, as 
breaking down the walls could allow erosion to develop, but this 
is not really of any great moment as there is seldom more than a 
few inches of water at the upstream end of the dam now that 
operations have ceased, and then only after rain. Even if decant 
pipes were blocked, little water would accumulate. 
(d) It is possible that the dump will be sold and completely 
removed from the site. In such a case, I should think we are quite 
capable of determining how it should be removed. However, the 
Board has some points to make and their early opinion as to how 
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this should be done should be requested because the present 
owners move quickly.  
It is noted here that bulk samples were taken and tested by a 
concrete-block company, and that fine sands are in short supply 
for this industry. 
Regarding the allegation that material was removed from the toe 
of the dam, I have to report that material has not been removed 
from the toe of the dam, but from an area in that locality. briefly, 
sand and slimes were separated by a cyclone at one end of the 
dam crest and part of the sands was allowed to fall outside the 
dam. When required, the sand was hauled up the dam face by 
dragline to heighten the wall. There was naturally an 
accumulation near the toe of the dam of sand not required for its 
enlargement and some of this was sold from time to time by the 
previous owners. Further, to stop this sand getting into the 
water-course, gabions were erected downstream of the dam at the 
request of the Catchment Board. 
 
The ‘small dam’ referred to by Harris was ‘about 3 chains downstream 
of the tailings dam and about 2 chains upstream of a permanent gabion 
structure’. It had probably been erected during the initial construction to 
stop sand entering the stream. It held about ten feet of water, and Klemick 
ordered this released when asked by a board engineer. As the dam no longer 
served a useful function and ‘might be considered dangerous’, the board 
should be asked if it wanted its removal (which he doubted the new owners 
‘would be glad to pay for’).350 
Harris continued to recommend to Palmer that a registered civil 
engineer have responsibility for the safety of the tailings, especially if they 
were to be removed.351 Palmer considered that Harris’ requirement that any 
removal of sand be done under the supervision of an engineer followed by 
periodic inspection by same ‘even after title surrendered’ was ‘reasonable’, 
given that Harris lacked  
 
the staff or resources to do the technical work required, and 
solves the problem of current and future control. After the title 
has been surrendered, the Ministry of Works may be able to 
supply him with the periodical reports he requires but when the 
thing is finally static his own organisation should be able to do 
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any inspections required - this would seem to me to be part of 
their job.352 
 
Palmer ordered Barbarich that all sand removal from the dam and 
downstream of it ‘must cease immediately’. As the dam was ‘the subject of 
much official and public notice’, his action was ‘being taken to reassure 
everyone that there is no inherent danger in these tailings’. Sand might be 
removed later from places approved by Palmer and an engineer.353 At the 
end of October, Barbarich informed Palmer that he was recommending that 
his firm surrender the site licenses for the tailings dam, ‘as my personal 
opinion is that it is going to be to much of a headache, and I would not 
recommend my Board spending any money on Engineers reports. I see no 
finish to the problems that may arise’.354 Palmer arranged for an engineer 
to check the dam whilst it remained under Mineral Resources’ ownership, 
and considered the responsibility should go to the catchment board 
thereafter. ‘If they cannot police it’, perhaps the Ministry of Works might 
inspect.355 Not till 20 November did Jones inform Gibson of these actions. 
He doubted whether the tailings, if left alone, would ‘cause any threat to life 
or property and no further action will be taken by this Department other 
than routine inspections while any work is being carried on, on the property 
as a whole, unless there is a proposal to remove the sand for sale’.356 
The threat of the tailings to the environment was worrying others. In 
September, a visiting expert on toxic mine waste told the Waikato Times of 
tracing the cause of a 12 foot wide strip of dead bush to the tailings, the 
‘most toxic’ he had experimented with, for grass could hardly grow on it.357 
The Inspector of Mines’ office checked with the scientists who had tested the 
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tailings and found that they considered them to be unstable, needed to be 
‘grassed etc’ and were ‘concerned about the Toxicity of the draining 
creek’.358 Palmer was not impressed with this ‘ill-informed’ article, for there 
was growth in the stream below the dam, and the general mineralised 
nature of the stream, which had nothing to do with mining, would affect 
plant growth. ‘Generally the writer of the article had obviously no mining 
background and certainly little professional etiquette - there are means 
other than rushing into print of attracting attention to any problem’, he told 
Jones.359 
 
WHAT TO DO WITH THE CONCENTRATES? 
 
Officials did not want the lead and copper concentrates still held at the 
mill site exposed to the elements, but would not meet the cost of protecting 
them. Klemick noted that the Receiver claimed that a written agreement 
with Mineral Resources placed responsibility for dry storage on the latter: 
Barbarich felt he had been duped and wanted ‘to demolish the present 
storage area to extract the processing machinery’. Klemick believed that ‘a 
realistic approach to the conflict would be to cover the pile with tarpaulins 
in situ’ as it was ‘housed on a concrete basement’, but ‘of course’ each side 
wanted the other to meet the cost.360 Palmer warned Barbarich that his 
company must ‘avoid any tendency to pollute the water in adjoining 
streams’ by the concentrates and the mill that it was demolishing.361 He 
informed the Secretary of Mines that the concentrates were deteriorating 
and causing a ‘risk of pollution’.362 In October the Receiver was told that if 
he could not sell them, they must either be buried or some other 
‘satisfactory means of disposal’ carried out that would minimize any 
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potential environmental hazard.363 Somerville then arranged with 
Barbarich that, when the concentrates were buried to the satisfaction of the 
authorities, it would be ‘released from its obligation to store’ them.364 
Barbarich was willing to bury it at no cost, ‘but he would not be prepared to 
pay anything for it’, as it could not be sold profitably.365 The department 
required that it be buried to the satisfaction of board, council, and Palmer, 
Jones recommending to the latter that it be totally enclosed in polythene ‘to 
minimise leaching and metal contamination of nearby streams’. Should the 
company object, the department would pay for the polythene.366 That this 
was done was indicated by a subsequent letter Palmer wrote to Barbarich 
in which he stated that ‘there would be no objection’ were it to remove the 
concentrates ‘for disposal elsewhere’, because there was ‘a certain risk of 
water pollution even though they were buried in plastic’. Their ‘complete 
removal from the mountain might be advantageous’.367  
 
1975 
 
In late January 1975, Griffiths raised with Palmer issues noted a 
month previously by a member of the board’s staff ‘when in the area during 
a fire spotting inspection’: 
 
1. There were signs of rilling and erosion, both on the inside and 
outside batter of the bank around the heap; 
2. There were signs that material apparently is being or has been 
taken from the downstream end of the heap; 
3. The gabion dam, being some 20ft high, is of some concern. 
The netting appears to be corroding generally through. The tie 
wires are of very light wire which has corroded thus weakening 
the structure to such a state that in a relatively short time the 
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gabion dam will be reduced to no more than a heap of stones 20ft 
high. 
 
The board was concerned about ‘the ultimate fate of the heap’, for if 
the site license was surrendered, who retained responsibility? And who was 
to fix the corroded gabion tie wires?368 Palmer agreed that there was rilling 
and erosion, but this had not changed materially  
 
for a considerable time. In fact, it is of interest that the water in 
the dam has almost dried up and withdrawn from the area 
around the natural spring; all this in spite of heavy rains in 
recent months. 
No material has been taken from the downstream face of the dam 
– some small boys have disturbed the surface by using it as a 
slide. 
I would not agree entirely that the gabion dam will be reduced to 
a heap of rubble in a comparatively short time. Admitted, the tie 
wires are rusting, but there is as yet no sign of movement. 
I will take up the question of replacing the tie wires with the 
present owners.369 
 
Palmer then required Barbarich to fix the tie wires, noting that they 
had been made ‘of ordinary wire instead of the special wire’ used for the 
gabions. He warned that the rust attracted comment, and ‘proper wire 
would make the structure as reasonably permanent as might be 
required’.370 At the same time he told Jones that Barbarich ‘might not 
appreciate the point that such preventative action is in his best interest’. 
Palmer could not see why the gabion dam had been erected, and considered 
it along with ‘the temporary sand dam above it’ should be removed.371 By 
this time there was ‘less water than ever in the dam’.372 
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Removal of the tailings was the favoured option of the borough council, 
which in early 1975 was negotiating with Mineral Resources to do this.373 It 
continued to ask who was responsible for the dam and its safety.374 Palmer 
argued that as the council owned the land, had received rent, and the 
conditions of the license had been met, ‘they could be deemed to be 
responsible for the dam’, although he had ‘no doubt that considerable legal 
argument could arise’. The tailings should be grassed by Norpac ‘if the 
receiver has any available funds and, if not by the Mines Department. The 
Borough may feel that they, as the landowners, should contribute’. The 
council should then annually inspect and clean the drains; the catchment 
board should advise on the state of the dam ‘from time to time’.375 For its 
part, in May the council strongly recommended to the board that the heap 
be ‘removed under supervision’, offering ‘its co-operation and assistance’.376 
In July it still wanted the responsibility for the tailings resolved, fearing 
that with the sale of the license to Mineral Resources the agreement with 
Norpac was no longer applicable.377  
The last attempt in 1975 to pass the financial buck was the board’s 
suggestion to Palmer in September that the tailings be inspected annually 
by a registered civil engineer, which it would be happy to arrange if, it was 
implied, the Mines Department would pay.378 Later that month, Feasey told 
the council that a test of Tui water showed it be ‘of a very high colour and 
with a lead and cadmium content requiring further attention’.379 Late in 
that year, three researchers from the Department of Chemistry, 
Biochemistry, and Biophysics at Massey University checked the levels of 
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copper, cadmium, lead, and zinc in the soil, streams, and vegetation around 
the mine.380 They concluded that it was ‘clear that there is a widespread 
distribution of air-borne cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc from dust particles 
emanating from the ore treatment plant at the Tui Mine. Stream sediments 
and waters are also heavily polluted in the immediate area of the mine and 
treatment plant’. They refrained from assessing ‘the overall environmental 
impact’ because their initial investigations had not been extended to the 
township.381 If any further investigations were made, they were not 
published. 
The legal situation concerning the site was ‘complicated’, as a Mines 
Department official advised Palmer in September 1975: 
 
If Norpac were not in receivership, and likely to go into 
liquidation shortly, and the company’s assets being sold, it could 
be said that the responsibility for carrying out the work should be 
that company’s. However, it is in receivership and the assets are 
being sold! While an agreement exists between the receiver and 
Mineral Resources for the sale of the mining privileges, this 
agreement has not been registered against the particular site 
licence concerned – nor is it ever likely to be. 
It is doubtful that the site licence should ever have been granted, 
since it was over alienated land, and it now can’t be exchanged for 
a new privilege under the 1971 Mining Act. Until an agreement is 
registered, in terms of the Act it does not have any force or effect. 
Thus it can hardly be said that Mineral Resources have any 
responsibility at this stage! 
The Council own the land but as it did not construct or use the 
dam I doubt that it would feel it had any real responsibility 
because of its agreement with Norpac. It may have a legal 
responsibility as owner if there were any hazard, but if Mineral 
Resources wish to continue operations using the tailings dam this 
work might be the price of its approval to do so! 
Clearly the surfacing, grassing and regular maintenance should 
be carried out as soon as possible and unless you can see some 
arrangement between the Council and Mineral Resources being 
agreed we may even have to contemplate having the surfacing 
and grassing done ourselves. 
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Palmer was asked to indicate the likely cost of doing this, and whether 
Mineral Resources needed the tailings dam for its operations. The 
department ‘had suggested the special sites be surrendered and the 
company enter into a lease for use of the land with the Council, but have 
not heard further from them on this suggestion’.382 After receiving a 
reminder, Palmer responded in late January, explaining that the delay was 
because ‘the situation was uncertain’. As Mineral Resources seemed ‘to have 
clarified their plans’, and did not wish either to use or to sell the tailings, 
they ‘should be grassed and I suppose we must assume this responsibility. 
Norpac have not the resources to pay for it, Mineral Resources cannot be 
expected to assume responsibility, and no doubt the Council will not make 
any funds available’. The council should be asked if they would agree to the 
grassing, for he ‘did hear talk of their wanting to sell the tailings’. Once 
grassed, it should be the responsibility of the catchment board to inspect the 
tailings occasionally. ‘They have offered to engage a suitable registered 
engineer to do this work, presumably at our expense’, but this was not 
necessary.383 In June, Lynam told the Senior Soil Conservator, Paul 
Hansen, that the dam had recently been almost completely full and, ‘if 
overtopped, would almost certainly fail’. His staff ‘would be willing to 
remove the dam in the interests of safety’. Palmer was contacted; he 
doubted there was any danger, but agreed to inspect.384 Two months later, 
the Paeroa Racing Club applied for some of the tailings for its new sand 
track. Because of the question of their stability, the board was approached 
to see if removing sand was possible.385  
Heavy rain in August causing deep scouring of a clay dam prompted 
the council at the beginning of September to ask Palmer to inspect and to 
once more ask who was responsible for repairs.386 Palmer responded that 
this was only a temporary dam needed to control the water whilst work was 
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done, and did not create danger.387 A week later, after having inspected the 
site with board engineers, he telephoned Jones to report that urgent work 
was required because the 
 
rain storm was so severe that the contour ditch protecting the 
tailings dam overflowed resulting in material being carried from 
the main dam to the lower secondary dam which was filled with 
tailings. Remedial work was immediately necessary to prevent 
sand being washed into the small stream of which these dams 
form the head.388 
 
In a subsequent letter he stated that ‘urgent repairs to the clay dam 
downstream of the tailings dam’ were necessary ‘to avoid damage both to 
the area downstream and to the stability of the tailings area’. It would cost 
less than $1,000 to repair and raise the clay dam plus clean out and sand 
bag some of the contour drain pending ‘more permanent measures’; the 
department should meet the cost.389  
In early October the Broadcasting Council of New Zealand sought 
Palmer’s assistance in alleviating the flood damage to the mountain road, 
because as their transmitter was permanently manned, ‘an assured access 
at all times is vital’. In the August floods, ‘only the foresight of the road 
supervisor who had men and machinery standing by to clear the culverts of 
flotsam and blockages as they occurred, prevented more substantial 
damage’ to the road where it crossed the Tunakohoia Stream.  
 
A subsequent inspection further up the stream showed that at the 
No. 5 working level of the Tui mine, material was eroding from 
the toe of the fill and of greater concern was the dumped material 
from mining operations – timbers, discarded equipment etc – 
which was finding its way into the stream and its potential for 
blockage of the culverts. 
 
The council’s consulting engineers had ‘expressed concern at the threat 
the tailings, mullock heap and sediment ponds, now in a state of neglect’, 
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posed to the road ‘near the junction of the mine and Broadcasting roads’. 
Requests to Mineral Resources ‘to clear up their discarded material and 
site, has as yet been of little avail’, and the matter was now urgent because 
it would be relinquishing its interest in the mine in December. The council 
sought assistance and a discussion with its staff on site.390 Palmer 
responded briefly: the matter was ‘being dealt with in spite of press 
statements to the contrary’, and there was no need to talk about the issue 
until more progress was possible.391 
 This erosion coupled with the proposal to remove sand prompted 
Lynam to restate his earlier fears about the danger above the township. In 
a front-page article in the New Zealand Herald in mid-October he was 
quoted as saying ‘we do not know whether we will have another Aberfan or 
not’. White feared that the tailings might slide onto the golf course or a row 
of houses, and the deputy chief engineer of the catchment board did not 
know if the tailings were safe. He also noted that the minerals leaching 
from the tailings were killing the bush, even large trees over 100 years old. 
Asked for his response, Palmer said there was ‘absolutely no threat of a 
disaster’. Lack of maintenance had caused a minor dam breach during 
recent heavy rain, but this had been stopped as soon as his department 
discovered the problem. As for pollution, ‘there were massive mineral 
deposits in the mountain and natural springs brought them to the 
surface’.392 On the same day, the Waikato Times had a front-page 
photograph of Desmond Robert Ladyman,393 the Broadcasting Council’s 
supervising technician, standing ‘in the scar left by mining operations’ after 
the stream’s headwaters were diverted by mining ‘and it became a raging 
torrent carrying boulders and debris which scoured out road links to the 
television repeater station’. Above the photograph was the caption: ‘The 
miners’ memorial’.394 A full-page article on an inner page was entitled ‘The 
Mess the Miners Left Behind’ and illustrated with a dramatic photo taken 
from the base of the dam showing heavy scouring caused by winter rain and 
another of trees killed by the chemicals seeping from the tailings. Audrey 
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Eagle, of the Waikato branch of the Royal Forest and Bird Protection 
Society, was quoted as calling for ‘a requirement on every mining license 
that the area be returned to its natural state after they’ve finished’. 
Ladyman complained of mine debris still washing into the stream and 
affecting the road, and reported tourists commenting on the mess. Cyril 
Eastwood, the mayor since 1974, wanted the tailings removed, arguing 
that, as the Mines Department ‘gave the license in the first place’, it was 
their responsibility. He hoped people would buy truckloads of the tailings to 
use as fill, the sales meeting the cost of excavation; ‘the operation would 
have to be completed during summer months under expert direction’. He 
worried that official inaction would allow the tailings to remain: the dam 
‘could sit there for 20 years until someone forget about the drainage and 
then down it would come’. Harris considered the tailings certainly could not 
be left, because drainage could affect their stability. He did not ‘want to 
cause a scare’, but heavy rain would cause more erosion. Work to be done 
during the year would make the heap more stable, but he complained that 
it was not work that the catchment board should have to do. ‘It had made 
strong - but unsuccessful - submissions asking for tough conditions to be 
attached to the Tui mine license, which would have avoided the present 
problem’.395 Palmer had the chance to comment before the Herald article 
was published, but the Waikato Times had not extended the same courtesy 
over its ‘ill-informed to say the least’ article.396 He wrote to the council 
quoting Eastwood’s desire to have the tailings removed, for it was clear that 
the councillors wanted this done ‘and have some concrete ideas on how this 
can be done. This is the obvious solution to the problem’, and he asked them 
for ‘any suggestions’.397 Their response was that they had received requests 
to use the sands but wanted to discuss with the catchment board the 
difficulties of removal.398 
 By the time these articles were published board staff had repaired the 
clay dam on Palmer’s behalf. Harris told Palmer that the ‘short term work’ 
of strengthening the gabion dam and ‘dealing with the stormwater/spring 
discharge’ would cost about $3,000 and should be done without delay. Their 
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investigation of ‘the general state of the heap’ was ‘ample demonstration of 
the results of lack of maintenance’, and he was ‘beginning to be alarmed at 
it. These repairs would ‘still leave unresolved how to ensure that water 
reaching the tailings heap is shed safely and also, how to ensure the safety 
of the toe of the heap, both in the long term and in a fashion that relies on 
maintenance as little as possible, if at all’. He was ready to carry out the 
short term works on Palmer’s behalf, but unless these were ‘undertaken 
very soon I regret that I will be placed in the rather invidious position of 
having to report to Board that the situation has become potentially 
dangerous’. These measures would not eliminate the danger, and ‘longer 
term measures and policy are almost as important and urgent’. While 
‘appreciative of your assistance’, the board’s position was ‘becoming 
increasingly awkward’ as the project was not its responsibility.399 Palmer 
told Jones the amount needed for repairs, adding ‘I’ll press to get the sands 
removed, but a large scale operation would be necessary because piecemeal 
removal could only lead to unstable conditions’.400 
On the same day that Palmer asked Harris for his views on removing 
the tailings and whether there were any interested buyers.401 Also on that 
day Donald Taylor of Tonkin and Taylor reported to Harris on his visit to 
the site earlier that month, the first time this firm had seen it since 1974. 
Inspection had shown that ‘the contour dam around the west side’ of the 
pond had overflowed: it had since been ‘cleared out and the side raised with 
sand bags in some places’. A ‘visible high water mark’ confirmed that ‘outlet 
pipes from the spring, and the decant pipes had been unable to keep pace 
with surface water inflow and water had ponded to a depth of about 6 feet 
at the back (north end) of the tailings deposit’. There were two deeply 
scoured gullies in the dam which ‘significantly reduced’ its stability, and 
‘continuing erosion will result from current seepage from within the tailings 
and from surface water concentrating in these gullies’. The capacity of the 
stormwater pipes and channels to discharge peak rainfall should be 
investigated, and the dam should be reshaped and protected ‘to maintain 
long term stability and to reduce its susceptibility to erosion’. The firm 
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offered to investigate ‘on a time and expenses basis’.402 Harris sent a copy of 
this letter to Palmer and offered to be his agent in carrying out these 
investigations, estimated to cost $2,000, as being the most convenient way 
of getting action ‘carried out expeditiously’.403  
On 28 October, Palmer met Harris ‘at his urgent request’, and they 
discussed the state of the dam. Both men agreed that ‘urgent temporary 
repairs should be made’. Palmer considered this necessary ‘both from the 
safety angle and also to establish good public relations in view of the 
adverse recent criticism in local and national papers’. Drains and ditches 
‘should be put in hand immediately in case of storms which may be expected 
at this time of the year and have an intensity of around 4 inches of rain an 
hour’. The board’s offer to fill the gullies on the dam face should be accepted, 
and Tonkin and Taylor should be asked to report.  
 
I have stressed that any work projected should be designed 
towards the establishment of a permanent asset which should not 
rely on maintenance of pipes and drains, and on constant 
surveillance, for its stability. 
It is apparent that the tailings constitute a danger if they become 
super-saturated as they have during this last wet season. The 
construction of the dam has perhaps not helped because an 
impermeable core has prevented drainage and allowed the 
formation of a fluid mass behind it and this material could create 
havoc if it broke loose. On the side of the dam near the road I 
have the impression that this mass is near to breaking out – the 
recent heavy seepage has stopped but the bank is still soggy. 
Ideally the sands should be removed but their fineness and iron 
content makes them unattractive. The unauthorised removal of 
the coarser sands from the dam wall was attractive obviously, but 
the fines must be removed from the upstream end first if any such 
project is possible. 
  
He added that this letter had not been copied to the board’,404 clearly 
because he confirmed Harris’ fears about the inherent danger posed by the 
tailings. Instead, Palmer contacted the board to confirm the cost of ‘the so-
called short term works’, which he estimated would cost $6,000. In addition, 
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he agreed to meet the $2,000 cost of Tonkin and Taylor’s investigations, but 
wanted an assurance that their report would ‘recommend means of 
attaining permanent maintenance-free stability’.405 At the same time he 
told Jones that he ‘had doubts about the necessity of an engineer’s report 
but now consider it vital to have this problem settled without doubt for all 
time. The expense is necessary in the interests of public safety – and of 
public relations’.406 
The National Conservation Council had sent an officer to inspect the 
heap, who recommended its immediate removal, as did Forest and Bird.407 
In another interview with the Te Aroha News, Lynam explained that the 
worst pollution was of the Tunakohoia Stream:  
 
“The runoff is pretty potent,” he said.  
Speaking as a private individual, Mr Lynam said he saw the only 
solution to be the complete removal of the tailings. 
From a Broadcasting Council point of view there is the added 
concern of rubbish and fill being carried down into culverts 
causing blockages.  
“These have to be cleared with machines at considerable cost. 
Norpac Mining Limited is now out of existence, and we feel the 
taxpayer will have to meet the expense. This is a major concern of 
ours,” he said.... 
Mr Lynam said while the environmental aspects were of prime 
concern to him, along with the cost of removal, there was the 
added problem of stability as long as the tailings remained in 
their present position. 
“If there was to be a breakout sideways from the stockpile it 
would affect the road up to the top of the mountain,” he said. This 
is causing concern to the Broadcasting Council.”408 
 
Alf Williams, who had been a maintenance worker at the mine for the 
last three and a half years of Norpac’s existence, warned against touching 
the pond, which could be 60 feet deep:  
 
“When you remove the hard outer crust of dried out sand you 
come to slime and sludge. 
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Using heavy machinery, once they get down a certain number of 
feet they’ll find what’s beneath the surface moving like a swamp,” 
he said. 
“Pockets of slime could erupt suddenly with a loss of machinery, 
or possibly life.” 
 
He stated that Norpac had done everything possible to ensure the 
safety of the dam; as for pollution, all the creeks were polluted in times of 
heavy rain, ‘but they soon cleared’. The tailings should be left alone, and his 
advice to Lynam was ‘the same as that given him by the Norpac Mine’s 
Manager a few years ago: If you want something to talk about talk about 
something you know about, and give us better television reception in this 
area’.409 Williams’ views created the story that after a storm, when a 
bulldozer drove onto the pond to repair a collapse of the dam, it sank, and 
although the driver’s workmates succeeded in saving him, the bulldozer 
sank to the bottom and was never recovered; unfortunately for this urban 
myth, when the pit was finally totally excavated and stabilized no 
machinery of any kind was discovered.410 
During November the catchment board filled the gullies to the 
satisfaction of a Tonkin and Taylor engineer, and arranged for surveillance 
and maintenance till the following March. To deal with ‘the spring-water 
discharge pipe’ Harris proposed ‘to collect the water in a chamber and take 
it by way of a new pipe either above the gabion dam or to discharge via a 
perforated pipe onto the dam itself’. The existing gabion dam would be 
‘completely covered by a new rock-filled basked 0.8 metres in thickness to 
retain the existing structure which has been subject to severe corrosion of 
the wire’, using copper wire and possibly ‘some of the rock around the mine 
complex’. He confirmed that Tonkin and Taylor had been asked to 
recommend ways to leave the heap ‘in a stable but maintenance-free 
state’.411 To meet all these costs, the Mines Department agreed to spend up 
to $8,000.412 
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While officials continued to argue over responsibility and financial 
liability, Harris told the press that the Mines Department did not want to 
get involved, but there was ‘no alternative’.413 The council for its part was 
irritated at a three-month delay in getting advice from the board, without 
which it could not reply to the Paeroa Racing Club’s requests, and sought 
conditions for completely removing the heap. It was keen to have the area 
restored to its natural environment, thus avoiding the increasing costs of 
maintaining the tailings in a safe condition.414 But at a meeting with board 
representatives at the site on 26 November, Eastwood was told that no 
decision to remove the tailings could be made until Tonkin and Taylor’s 
report was received. When the Works Committee was informed of this, ‘the 
view was expressed that if the Board will not permit removal of the tailings 
then it must accept full and absolute responsibility for the tailings area’.415 
And once more the golf club complained that water pollution was ruining its 
greens, and wanted the council to stop this.416 At the end of the year, the 
council received advice about how to grass and vegetate the tailings and 
dam.417 
Williams again warned the council and the board, who were finally to 
meet in December, against tampering with the tailings: 
 
“There are four inch drainage pipes which go down through the 
heap, and these are set in concrete lower down. If any damage is 
done to these at the lower end then pollution will result,” Mr 
Williams said. 
He said it would be almost, if not impossible to stop the pollution 
because of the tremendous depth of the slime and sludge that 
forms the tailings heap estimated to be at least 60 feet. 
“The vulnerable end of the dam in this respect is the end nearest 
the mill site. Because it holds water, for safety reasons the depth 
of the sand will be considerably less which means you can’t get at 
any depth without trouble,” he said.... 
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“I do not think the Hauraki Catchment Board or the Mines 
Department would be so silly as to agree to the removal of the 
tailings, even after thorough investigation.”418 
 
The board did indeed decide that nobody would be permitted to remove 
any tailings until engineers had advised that this would be safe. Williams 
might ‘well be right about the nature of the tailings heap’, commented 
Harris, who admitted that the board had taken no pollution readings of the 
Tui and Tunakohoia Streams, although he thought the Health Department 
might have.419  
 
1977 
 
Early in the year, Harris thanked Palmer for the grant of $8,000, and 
hoped that there would be no need ‘for frequent maintenance measures’. 
The clay dam had been repaired, and work done ‘to by-pass the spring water 
so it flows through the gabion dam’, upon which an extra layer of rock had 
been placed.420 As the Mines Department did not expect the dam to collapse, 
it discouraged talk of totally removing the tailings, an unwarranted ‘hardy 
annual’ in Jones’ view.421 They represented ‘a minimal risk to the town’, 
although ‘any flow of sand could represent a nuisance by causing some 
pollution’.422 Eastwood hoped that Tonkin and Taylor’s report would give 
information about how the sands could be removed safely, for he had a 
buyer for fill.423 Palmer considered that the removal of sand ‘lies outside my 
jurisdiction and is really a matter for the Council to take up with the water 
authority’.424 
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In July, Jones informed Palmer that, as the special site license had 
expired, the council now owned the tailings site because it had ‘obviously 
not declined ownership in terms of S122 (5)’.425 Palmer informed it that as 
the tailings were ‘deemed to have been abandoned by the company’ they 
were now ‘vested in the Council as owners of the land’.426 When advising 
Harris to make a ditch around the side of the dam to avoid water in the 
pond activating the slimes and grumbling at the time Tonkin and Taylor 
were taking to report, Palmer repeated Jones’ argument that as the council 
‘did not request removal of the tailings under section 122 (5) of the Mining 
Act’ and had acknowledged ownership by trying to sell them it could be 
‘fairly construed’ that it accepted responsibility for them.427 This argument 
exaggerated the council’s knowledge of the Mining Act and tried to remove 
all responsibility from the Mines Department. When, on 20 September, the 
council resolved that it was ‘imperative that the tailings be removed as soon 
as possible’ and requested Palmer’s formal approval,428 this was 
immediately given, and Palmer encouraged Harris to see the financial 
benefits of supporting his view of what the agreement meant. ‘As the 
Borough clearly assumed responsibility for the sands’, he argued ‘that any 
maintenance charge raised by the Board after that date should be paid by 
the Borough’.429 However, the board’s position remained that agreed to in 
August: that the government must assume ‘full and continuing 
responsibility’ for meeting all current and future costs.430 Palmer privately 
encouraged his department not to pay these: 
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I do not think we should continue payments, especially for 
temporary remedies. If the Te Aroha Borough say categorically 
that they do not wish to remove the tailings and they want them 
to be permanently stabilized, then I feel we could help with 
suitable works. 
The delay is receipt of the Tonkin-Taylor report is clearly at the 
root of the present trouble. I doubt we should pay for this.431 
 
At its November meeting, the council’s works committee received a 
letter from Palmer formally approving the council removing the tailings ‘in 
a safe manner’.432 In December, he publicly explained that the council was 
now ‘fully responsible’. When the special site license expired it had had 
three months in which to ask the Mines Department to remove the tailings, 
which it would have been obliged to do. This possibility had lapsed by 
default, for the council had only asked for approval to remove them, 
expecting to find ‘an outlet for the material’. Eastwood responded that the 
council did want the heap to go but could not afford the $200,000 needed to 
remove it, and complained that the department had washed its hands of 
it.433 
Approval to remove the sands did not mean there would be immediate 
action, for the catchment board had to be consulted on the conditions 
governing any removal. As before, the council declined to meet the cost.434  
Tonkin and Taylor’s supplementary report, received in August, noted that 
revegetation had not been attempted, as earlier recommended, and that 
more sand had been removed from the retaining wall; they warned that if 
this persisted the dam might collapse. It also warned of the ‘consequences of 
unchecked erosion’: 
 
As pointed out in our 1974 report the tailings dump as a whole 
has an adequate margin of stability provided the outer “dam” of 
sandy material is preserved.  
If deep scouring, such as occurred in 1976, persists then there is a 
grave risk of major collapse and escape downstream of the 
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tailings. The two small dams downstream have only a limited 
capacity to retain sediment and once it passes them the steep 
drop into Tui Stream would result in great damage to the 
watercourse downstream. 
The gullies which form, reduce the mass of the dam of sandy spoil 
retaining the softer “slimes” behind it, and also greatly shorten 
the path of seeping groundwater thus increasing its erosive 
potential even after the passage of surface runoff. 
 
The storm of September 1976 proved that ‘continuous maintenance of 
the water disposal system is critical to the safety of the dam’. Maintenance 
work such as clearing fallen leaves at the onset of a storm was necessary ‘if 
the existing system is to be depended upon’, but quite apart from the 
question of who was responsible for such maintenance it was debatable 
whether this was realistic. Instead, ‘work should be done as soon as possible 
to make the tailings dump more secure against erosion and less dependent 
upon critically times maintenance’. It recommended ‘a better system of 
surface water runoff disposal, and surface protection of the tailings dam 
including denial of public access’.435  
At its December meeting the board accepted Harris’ recommendation, 
based on this report, that the dam be protected at a cost of $50,000 instead 
of the difficult alternative of removing the tailings for $200,000: 
 
Mr Harris told the Board a report had been compiled by 
Consulting Engineers, Messrs Tonkin and Taylor, and by 
A.N.Z.D.E.C. Limited. Both reports made the point that within 
the limits of the investigation the dam and tailings dump 
appeared to be quite stable (and safe) provided that the outer 
dam of sandy material was preserved. 
As far as could be determined by the consultants the outer dam of 
sandy materials was gradually built up by the mining company to 
retain finer sands and silts comprising the softer (slimes) which 
constitute, it is believed, a large proportion of the total tailings 
heap.... 
The A.N.Z.D.E.C. Limited report ... states: “...the principal 
sources of toxicity are the extremely high lead, sulphur and 
arsenic contents in the spoil and the very low pH of the stream 
waters.” 
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Mr Harris said this factor was likely to restrict demand and there 
could be problems in finding a safe place to dump the material so 
that it did not pollute yet another water course. 
The Chief Engineer said that in a removal project there was no 
way in which the outer sandy materials could be removed first, 
and that work would have to commence in the difficult area of 
“slime.” This would be costly. Such an engineering process would 
have to be strictly controlled, with no allowances for casualness.... 
He said the demand for the tailings material was likely to be 
minimal, and the returns from a sale would probably be 
insufficient to meet the costs of expenditure.... 
The materials which may be wanted would more likely be the 
outer sandy materials. 
“These are, of course the very materials which may not be 
removed in the first instance without creating a grave danger of 
failure,” he said.... 
A further major factor was the sheer size of the tailings heap. The 
volumes are estimated at a hundred thousand cubic metres with 
depth of about twelve metres (40 feet) near the outer dam, and 
about 7.5 metres (25 feet) in the middle of the heap. 
 
The consultants recommended re-forming the outer dam and 
revegetating it to minimize future scour. Trail bikes and other vehicles 
should be prohibited and pedestrian access discouraged. Storm water 
diversion should be installed urgently. It was ‘accepted by all parties 
involved that inaction’ would, ‘sooner or later, create a hazardous situation, 
perhaps quite suddenly under certain storm conditions’. The board decided 
to seek funds from the department to carry out stabilisation measures.436 
The New Zealand Herald reported one member angrily stating, ‘We warned 
the Mines Department against allowing the mining operation to start in the 
first place. We were ignored and now we have the responsibility of seeing it 
is cleared up’.437 The reporter then discussed the issue with Palmer, who 
‘acquainted him with the facts which are very different’.438 There were 
indeed some exaggerated versions of past events being recounted, as when 
Charlie Thom, now a member of the council and an advocate for the 
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complete removal of the heap, stated that part of it slipped down the 
mountain in 1969. ‘The slip ended up in a gully during a women’s golf 
tournament where up to a dozen women could have been playing’.439  This 
implied threat to life was an inflated version of the deposit of a small 
amount of tailings on a green.440 
The summary of Tonkin and Taylor’s report made public did not give 
full details of the problem. An appendix to the report gave the result of 
testing of the water coming from the mine itself which revealed the water to 
be strongly acidic with free sulphuric acid and acid sulphates. It would be 
‘very corrosive towards concrete, iron, steel and galvanised iron’ and ‘toxic 
to humans and animals’.441 The mine had caused Te Aroha to lose 40 
percent of its water supply, including its ‘most dependable summer low flow 
stream’, and the golf club would be forced to move its intake to a point 
upstream of the tailings, where the supply was meagre.442 
 
1978 
 
In February 1978, the council’s Works Committee discussed the 
catchment board’s December recommendations and reached a consensus 
that ‘total removal of the tailings was the only solution’ acceptable. Failing 
this, it supported the board’s maintenance proposals, and invited its 
members to meet with the council and the Mines Department on-site to 
discuss removal.443 When this meeting was held on 16 May, Jones stated he 
agreed with the report and recommended that the front face of the dam be 
revegetated to prevent further erosion and the drainage system upgraded 
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by making a side spillway so that water could not pond. The dam was well-
constructed on lines used throughout the world, and the slimes, if kept dry, 
compacted and were difficult to fluidise again. He, like Eastwood, did not 
think the tailings should be removed, and was willing to negotiate over 
financial assistance.444 With this assurance, the board started work on 
erosion control on the dam face plus a drainage system for the surface area 
behind it.445  
Other pollution hazards concerned the local bodies. Late in 1977 an on-
site meeting between Barbarich and representatives of the council had 
agreed that in return for Mineral Resources paying $200 the council would 
clean up the site adjacent to the tailings and remove the scrap iron. They 
agreed that the stockpile of lead concentrate could remain on site until the 
end of February 1978.446 In July that year, Palmer confirmed with 
Barbarich that that the council was to clean up the special site areas and 
that the remaining concentrates were ‘required by you’. The Jaycees would 
remove all the old iron. ‘You will recall I have offered to go to Tui with your 
men and clean up the place. Please inform when this may be arranged and 
also arrange to move or bury the concentrates at an early date’.447 Instead 
of burying the concentrates as ordered ‘on several occasions’, Mineral 
Resources later sold them for $71,642.448 
Yet another meeting at the site was held between council, board, and 
departmental representatives in May. Eastwood informed his council later 
that Jones, who had been present, ‘was in no doubt as to the structural 
safety of the Tailings Dam provided adequate steps were taken to direct 
natural drainage’. It had been suggested that the council and the board 
make a combined approach to the department ‘regarding the provision of a 
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spillway to direct surface water around the edge of the Dam’. The board 
would estimate the cost, and once this work was completed they could 
consider ‘removing the Tailings Slimes in slices providing they could be 
moved to a site which would not result in pollution of other waterways’. The 
suggestion of a joint approach to the department to meet the cost was 
agreed to.449 
The difficulties and the cost created by the tailings made Harris 
dispirited, as illustrated by a July report: 
 
“The Tui Mine Tailings are proving to be a uniquely difficult 
problem to solve satisfactorily and economically”.... 
The Chief Engineer, Mr R.W. Harris, told the Board that he was 
concerned to see a report of a similar case in Australia where it 
was necessary to go through complicated and expensive 
procedures to eliminate the danger of the tailings. 
It would be necessary to cover the whole of the tailings area with 
clay in order to seal the toxic mineral traces. 
This clay would then be covered with gravel, and later topsoil, 
before vegetation could exist. 
“I am hopeful we will find some way around it. If the nearby 
water supply is not destroyed forever it will certainly be 
destroyed for a lifetime”.... 
He pointed out also that downstream of the tailings area, the 
rocks below the low flow mark were discoloured as was the 
stream itself. 
“It isn’t that we can’t do anything, it’s simply that it isn’t 
cheap.”450 
 
He was not the only person who was becoming frustrated at the lack of 
a solution; Palmer reported angrily after another meeting with Eastwood 
and the board on 3 November: 
 
The usual waffling went on until I became somewhat impatient. I 
asked if anything had been done about moving the tailings seeing 
that they still constituted a menace, vegetation would not grow, 
etc etc: answer - NO. 
I suggested I was not prepared to ask for any more funds to be 
frittered away and that a little positive action was called for. The 
mayor and others thought this a good idea - then Harris said you 
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could not possibly put them anywhere because they were too 
noxious. What to do?451 
 
Worried about the constant hill and gully erosion of the dam by 
rainfall and surface run-off, the board tried to stabilize it. ‘However, the 
high acidity of the tailings made the establishment of vegetation extremely 
difficult’ and it was clear that there was no ‘simple or inexpensive’ method, 
its chairman, Mark Madill, told its November meeting.452 Nor without side 
effects: Thom complained to the council of the ‘shocking mess’ that came 
down the Tui Stream during the remedial work.453  
Palmer still thought ‘the sands should be moved and some enthusiasm 
by the Borough might bring this about’.454 The council did want their 
complete removal, at the cost of what was now the Mines Division of the 
Ministry of Energy because this had been ‘responsible for framing the 
inadequate conditions under which the mining license was granted’. If it 
was not safe to remove them, the Ministry should meet the cost of keeping 
the dam safe.455 
 
1979 
 
Local phobias about the safety of the dam were reported in April 1979. 
Under the heading ‘Slag Avalanche Fears Recur’, the New Zealand Herald 
reported that Harris was ‘very nervous’ because of recent heavy rain. The 
heap was ‘heavily saturated and quick action had been necessary to ensure 
stability’ after 40 millimetres of rain fell in 90 minutes. ‘There would have 
been serious trouble three weeks ago if something had not been done’. Why 
he made his concerns public was implied by his statement that he had 
overspent his original maintenance budget of $8,000 by $1,000 with $3,000 
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outstanding.456 Harris insisted that the work was ‘essential’ and ‘had to be 
done whether financial authority was available or not’. It was ‘so urgent 
that it had been impossible to finish funding negotiations before work had 
to start’. He estimated the cost of removal was $200,000.457 Shortly 
afterwards, a Sunday newspaper quoted some residents as fearing a repeat 
of the recent Aberfan disaster. This article claimed that the dam had 
started to move after rain, and only quick action by the catchment board 
‘stopped a deadly sea of toxic sludge from spewing down the Mt. Te Aroha 
mountainside’. One woman had discovered her home had been built ‘in the 
path of the looming Tui avalanche’, her stock would not drink from the Tui 
Stream, and plants watered from it died. The superintendent of the golf 
club’s greens said club members were ‘terrified’ something would happen. 
The only partially positive note was Thom’s statement that tests of the 
water showed the tailings caused little or no damage to the river.458 In the 
following issue, Jones pointed out that the recent freak storm had created 
only minor damage to the dam. ‘The tailings had been laid down in the best 
engineering principles’ and he doubted that $20,000 was needed to stabilize 
them, as claimed by the board. He stressed that the dam was not dangerous 
and there was no similarity to Aberfan. ‘Even if the tailings were not kept 
drained they would not come down the hillside with a surge’. It would 
gradually erode away, which was why people must cease taking sand from 
the front of the dam, which had to be ‘protected and adequate overflow 
provided’.459 
In early 1979 Feasey’s tests of water from the Tui and the north 
branch of the Tunakohoia Streams proved that whilst the latter was 
acceptable the Tui had unacceptable levels of cadmium, zinc, iron, and 
manganese compared with World Health Organization standards. Although 
not a ‘potable water source’, the Inspector of Health considered that small 
quantities could be used in an emergency because other streams would 
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dilute it.460 ‘Gully erosion and stream pollution’ was so serious that in 
March and April ‘immediate use was made of the gravel on site’. 
Subsequent storms indicated, in the views of an official of the Health 
Department, that the board had ‘achieved almost total control of erosion 
and greatly reduced the flow of dump materials into the streams’. However, 
he warned that ‘if the heap were sufficiently neglected a “slush out” could 
take place effecting the Tui road area and the Waihou River waters’. For the 
sake of the river he considered it to be ‘essential that the Government take 
ultimate responsibility for any future mining privilege issued for the 
Kaimai-Coromandel ranges’.461 
Although Williams claimed he had had some success with growing 
trial plots of grass on the tailings, the catchment board doubted this would 
succeed. Harris stated that they were ‘completely infertile, but a lot of lime 
might do it’.462 In June the board informed the Minister of Energy that the 
dump was ‘an immediate danger’ to water quality and requesting urgent 
funding to stabilize it and minimize pollution. The board wanted to ensure 
that water and soil conservation qualities be protected in future mining 
operations, both during and after prospecting and mining, and repeated ‘its 
strongly held belief that such effective protection’ could only be achieved if 
the government ‘as the licensing authority’ assumed ‘full and continuing 
responsibility’. Harris considered that the water supply streams had been 
seriously damaged, ‘probably irreparably’: 
 
“A vivid indication of the acidity of the 100,000 cubic metre 
tailings heap ... and the corrosive nature of run-off or leachate on 
the heap is provided by drainage from the tailings pond into the 
north branch of the Tunakohoia Stream via pipe and metal flume 
under Mountain Road,” he said. 
“The metal flume comprising a new 16 gauge galvanised Marco 
fluming was virtually destroyed by corrosion in a little more than 
two months. Corrosion on this scale is thought to be due to 
significant concentrations of sulphurous and sulphuric acids.” 
Mr Harris said the samples taken from the Tui and Tunakohoia 
streams clearly shows the presence of toxic heavy metals 
including lead, cadmium, arsenic together with zinc in 
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concentrations which are above maximum levels set by the World 
Health Organisation for water supply purposes.... 
Over about ten years absolutely nothing has grown on the 
dump.... 
“A combination of inevitable high intensity storms and the total 
absence of vegetation steadily worsened the erosion to the point of 
being a definite threat to dam stability.” 
He said control of this erosion proved a most difficult conservation 
problem and board staff investigation has therefore been a long 
story with the use of gravel (as a possible solution) finally 
emerging in March/April of this year. 
“So serious was the gully erosion and stream pollution that an 
immediate decision was taken to utilise the gravel on the site,” he 
said. “From performance in recent storms it appeared that the 
Board has now achieved almost total control of the erosion and 
greatly reduced the flow of dumped materials into the stream.”... 
Given sufficient neglect of the heap some trigger items [causing a 
‘slush-out’] could be: 
* the heap is perched 300 metres up a steep mountain 
* the area is subject to very high intensity rainstorms 
* earthquakes are not unknown 
* the unpredictable nature of the heap if saturated through poor 
drainage and weakened by continued loss of the sand face 
* failure of the underground spring water drainage system... 
[For the Mines Department] to insist that removal is practical 
and saving can be achieved at virtually no cost by use for horse 
racing tracks under the remote control of an inspector is totally 
unrealistic. 
“It is also misleading in that it obscures the fact that the heap 
remains on the mountain side in sore need of attention and 
finance while the charade is maintained that the problem can be 
removed or will vanish at little or no cost if only all concerned 
would agree. 
“I believe that the safe removal of the heap could only be achieved 
by an integrated engineering operation with close and continuous 
supervision and that it is in no way suited to casual low cost 
removal,” he said. “Costs would start at $100,000 to $200,000.”463 
 
His recommendations, apart from the usual request for funds from the 
Minister of Energy, sought this minister’s support in ensuring that water 
and soil conservation values were ‘effectively protected in future mining 
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privileges (both during and subsequent to prospecting or mining 
operations)’. A copy of his report was sent to the council,464 which still did 
not wish to meet any costs: its only acceptable solution was the complete 
removal of the tailings by and at the expense of the Mines Division.465  
On 10 July staff of the board and the Mines Division met on site. 
Donald Carter of the former organisation reported that his samples taken in 
April indicated that the heavy metal content of the Tui Stream had 
‘influenced the Waihou’. After the visitors were shown how the face of the 
dam had been surfaced with half-inch quartz chips taken from the mill site, 
which had protected it from erosion during a recent storm, Harris ‘said that 
the stability problem with the tailings dam was under control’ to the board’s 
satisfaction. He also reported having tried to plant on the south face of the 
dam, as recommended by Tonkin and Taylor: ‘although an initial strike was 
gained the plants were eventually washed out’. He planned to build a 
spillway and drain as recommended, plus diversion drains on the ridge 
above the tailings to divert storm run-off; this would ‘provide a permanent 
solution to the hazard of ponding on the surface’. Vegetation should be 
established on the southern half of the dam to prevent scouring. The Mines 
Division staff supported these plans, and it was agreed to take more water 
samples.466 
 After Jones visited the site in May he sought Palmer’s opinion on 
Harris’ proposal. He then informed the town clerk that Palmer claimed that 
he and a catchment board engineer had agreed some years ago on the 
‘obvious solution’ that if water from the catchment was diverted around the 
dam by a ditch any danger would be avoided. Jones quoted Palmer’s view 
that Harris’ reluctance to remove the tailings because these would possibly 
pollute the environment was ‘specious in the extreme’. Jones agreed with 
Palmer that there would be little pollution from sands being used on race 
tracks.467 What Jones did not repeat was the end of Palmer’s letter in which 
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this ‘specious’ comment was made. Palmer had written that the Mines 
Division  
 
should not continue to pay for maintenance of a situation which is 
capable of early rectification. Any further discussion with the 
Board is useless - they are completely dominated by the opinions 
of the Chief Engineer to the exclusion of their own common-sense 
approach to the problem. Until they direct or approve that the 
sands be removed this sand bogey will not be laid.468  
 
The Mines Division did not agree with Palmer’s desire to remove the 
tailings totally, and in December Jones informed the town clerk that this 
was not ‘a practical solution’.469 In August Harris complained that the board 
had been reimbursed only for the $8,989 spent on the tailings up to 30 
November 1977 and not for the $21,404 subsequently spent. As well, he 
anticipated having to spend another $30,000.470  
Tests continued to be made of water quality by the Health 
Department. In August, a government analyst informed the Medical Officer 
of Health that two tests of water at the golf course revealed that ‘the low pH 
of these waters may make them aggressive to metallic reticulations. Colour 
and turbidity may be objectionable’, and the iron and manganese levels 
were ‘excessive’.471 After the visit of a senior Health Department official 
from Wellington, John Hugh Feltham, the council was advised not to use 
the Tui Stream because cadmium and lead were twice the World Health 
Organization levels.472  
 
1980 
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In 1980, the last year to be covered in this chronology, at a meeting of 
the executive committee of the board on 3 March Harris rather dramatically 
highlighted the lack of any resolution of the issues: 
 
Remarks by Chief Engineer. 
1. Drainage system for tailings pond failed recently in part, 
underlining the absolute need for constant maintenance. 
2. Neither Board nor Chief Engineer could or should be 
responsible in the continued absence of the drainage works for 
this pond (about $15,000). 
3. All this has been before Mines Division. 
4. This situation, combined with the attitude of the Mines 
Division and the Lands Department over Amax, confirms that no 
progress whatsoever has been make on the acceptance of long 
term responsibility for rectifying mining damage. In my opinion 
this has frightening implications for the Thames Valley in view of 
the certain resurgence of mining. 
5. In addition the Chief Engineer is at a complete loss concerning 
recommendations concerning new mining ventures where the 
same old story seems to apply - i.e. (quote) “state your conditions.” 
6. In opinion of Chief Engineer, there is a real danger that 
something will go wrong on the Mt Te Aroha tailings heap in the 
absence of a continuation of the works proposed by Board. Hence 
this means the possible failure of some part, great or small, of 
about 100,000 cubic metres of highly acidic materials. Should 
these reach the foot of the mountain, extreme damage will result 
with possible loss of life. 
7. It would be recommendation of Chief Engineer (1) that Board 
give serious consideration to a call for public enquiry into the 
whole matter, and (2) that Board approve immediately the 
expenditure of further Waihou Valley Scheme monies to ensure 
the continued safety of the heap meantime. 
Failing some positive action in this direction now, the Chief 
Engineer regrets that he is not able to accept any further 
responsibility for the safety of the structure or heap.473 
 
Later the same month, the golf club again complained about pollution. 
Although town supply water was used for the clubhouse, water from the Tui 
Stream was used for summer irrigation of the greens, and in consequence 
‘vast areas’ had become ‘completely barren’. The greens were once regarded 
as the best in the Waikato and Thames Valley, according to the Te Aroha 
News, but ever since Norpac started mining the stream meandering 
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through the course had steadily become a darker brown and contained 
mineral waste. Thom, in his capacity as a longstanding member of the club, 
said this problem started about three years previously, caused by ‘the 
greens receiving a build up of minerals’ which did not wash off.474 In 
addition, ‘local farmers found animals suffering from dehydration because of 
refusal to drink the water’.475 The club told the Mines Division that it had 
the moral obligation to accept responsibility and pay for mitigation.476 
Because there was no response, in the following month a formal letter was 
sent asking for financial assistance to replace the water supply and the 
greens, plus compensation for lost tournament revenue caused by the 
pollution.477 A month later, Mato Brdanovic, the new Inspector of Mines, 
was asked to inspect the greens ‘without prejudice’ as the division had not 
‘accepted financial responsibility for any remedial work’.478 He reported that 
most of the greens were ‘in quite a poor state. The brown turf has almost 
disappeared and in many places replaced by undesirable poa grass’. The 
greens ‘were damaged by very acid water taken from the Tui stream for 
spraying’; as the Tui was very low in pH, the roots of the grass had been 
killed. The club had since moved its water intake to the north branch of the 
Tui, which was unpolluted, at a cost of nearly $5,000, which they expected 
the Mines Department to help pay for.479 Whether this was agreed to is not 
recorded on this file. 
In late 1980, Feltham discussed the pollution issue with the chairman 
of the Water Resources Council, who felt that ‘adequate controls’ could be 
imposed ‘either under condition of water rights, mining rights or possibly by 
a bond system on the mining company’.480 Maurice Benjamin Marks, 
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supervising inspector for the Department of Health in Hamilton,481 noted in 
the margin of the letter reporting this view: ‘What if Co goes bung’.482 He 
made the same point more diplomatically by telling the Health Department 
that he was ‘not satisfied’ that a bond was a ‘sufficient safeguard’ unless it 
was ‘backed by funds’, for, quoting Norpac as an example, a company that 
became ‘defunct’ or went bankrupt could not be ‘brought to account’.483 
 At the end of the year, under the headline ‘Town Living in Fear of 
Toxic Waste’, Dr Chris Hendy, a University of Waikato scientist who had 
tested the Tui Stream, was quoted as saying that ‘a cubic centimetre of iron 
hydroxide sludge ... could give a person a lethal dose of cadmium 
poisoning’.484 Asked by Jones to check if this could be substantiated, 
Brdanovic discussed the article with Hendy, who explained that he was 
concerned with people drinking the water and with children playing in the 
stream. Brdanovic’s view of the newspaper’s ‘unrealistic and even 
frightening’ report was that he did not think that anyone would drink the 
water. The Tui Stream was not used for the water supply, nobody could 
drink ‘a dangerous amount’, and children would ‘not eat the sludge’.485  
The pollution continued to worry the council. In December, after 
reiterating that removal of the heap was the only ‘completely acceptable’ 
solution, the town clerk told the Minister of Energy, Bill Birch, that it was 
‘appalled’ that a source of its water supply could ‘be rendered unfit for 
human consumption by pollution and no party be legally responsible for 
providing compensation to assist with the location and establishment of 
alternative water supply sources’.486 The Mines Division continued to be 
unsympathetic, Jones telling Brdanovic that neither the Tui or Tunakohoia 
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streams could be ‘regarded as a possible potable water supply and in fact it 
may well be, never were’.487 
In September, the last detailed article for 1980 in the Te Aroha News 
had a headline that explained why no lasting solution had been found: ‘Who 
Will Pay?’ There had been recent erosion of tailings and mining debris, and 
‘countless disused mines in a small stream’ discharged silt into the pond, 
‘blocking flumes and culverts’, polluting the Tui Stream and both branches 
of the Tunakohoia Stream. Trail bike riders and children playing on the 
tailings worsened the problem. Despite repeatedly seeking financial 
assistance, the catchment board had received only partial reimbursement. 
Jones admitted no progress had been made about who should meet the 
costs: this was ‘out of my hands at the moment with our legal eagles and 
what not’. Eastwood said that there had been no communication from the 
Mines Division for six months. The golf club had had to tap a new source to 
irrigate its greens, ‘at considerable expense’. The Te Aroha News had been 
given access to the ‘battle of correspondence in the 1966/67 years’, which 
revealed the ‘underlying theme’ that ‘Norpac was a profit geared company 
unlikely to be interested in treading carefully in the Tui Valley’. Conditions 
imposed by the catchment board were ignored, and the paper argued that it 
was  
 
unfair that the Catchment Board, which emphatically opposed 
the license being issued, was left to clean up the mess afterwards, 
and the Mines Division whose over-riding powers could have 
refused the license, or made sure the conditions were adhered to, 
can turn its bureaucratic back to the matter.  
 
The article ended with a list of questions it wanted answered: 
 
Why should ratepayers in the Thames Valley pay for work carried 
out by the Hauraki Catchment Board when they can ill-afford it? 
What power is given to central government authorities to stall, 
delay, and if they had their way completely, ignore requests from 
local authorities in the area acting on behalf of their ratepayers? 
When conditions are imposed on licenses of this kind, why aren’t 
they policed, so when mining companies do go broke, the problem 
is not inherited by another party? 
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With the experience of Tui Mine, how can the Mines Division 
seriously entertain granting licenses for companies to prospect in 
the Kaimai range, as is currently being considered?488 
 
COPING WITH NORPAC 
 
In 1985, when looking back over the Norpac years, Donald 
McConnochie, the deputy mayor from 1965 to 1974, noted such problems as 
the grass on the golf course turning black and dying when irrigated with 
water from the Tui Stream. ‘From the time pollution started I am aware 
that the executive officers of the Borough approached the Mines 
Department time and again to do something about the pollution, but always 
reported back the same result, that the Mines Department were reluctant to 
do anything to help’. The siphoning in late 1968 of tailings water into the 
stream ‘was typical of the sort of thing that Norpac did when they were not 
being policed. Norpac made excuses about this and said that they intended 
expenditure’. One fundamental point he made was that, while the council 
was unhappy about pollution, ‘it did not want to get heavy with Norpac as 
they did not want Norpac to close down. The Borough was really in a cleft 
stick about the matter’.489 The government likewise had always wanted the 
mine to operate.490 
Harris in his June 1979 report on Norpac described his attempts to 
impose controls: 
 
It is a fact that Board received little support, either locally or at 
Government level, with the result that while some specific 
conditions requested by Board concerning rock waste etc were 
imposed virtually none of Board’s conditions relating to the 
tailings dump were approved. Moreover it became clear that any 
conditions that might affect the economy of the operation would 
not be welcome. [When Norpac collapsed], most of Board’s worst 
fears [were realized].491 
 
                                            
488 Te Aroha News, 18 September 1980, p. 1. 
489 Statement by Donald K. McConnochie, 7 June 1985, pp. 2, 6, Te Aroha Borough 
Council, A/26/6/1, Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
490 Interview with Sam Guernier, Te Aroha, 18 August 2001. 
491 Report by R.W. Harris, ‘Mining in Coromandel-Kaimai-Mamaku Ranges with 
Particular Reference to Mount Te Aroha and the Tailings Heap’, 8 June 1979, Te Aroha 
Borough Council, A/26/6/1, Matamata-Piako District Council Archives, Te Aroha. 
131 
 In December 1980, Harris said that the government had ‘shunned 
responsibility for the problem’, adding that ‘there was a serious risk that 
other active mining operations could end up the same way’. The worst 
feature was that ‘the catchment board warned the community years ago but 
had not received any support.492 
Could the problem have been solved by selling the tailings? Handcock, 
before he left Norpac’s employ to work in Australia, told Lynam that he had 
planned for the tailings pond becoming 12 metres higher than attained and 
stated it would be too expensive to remove them.493 But in 1983, when the 
local Member of Parliament discussed the problem with him in Australia, 
he maintained ‘that the stockpile would be ideal material for road 
foundation work. The product would also be very suitable as a concrete 
aggregate’.494 The officials’ response, when this suggestion was put to them, 
was that while it was ‘not a particularly difficult process’ to remove the 
slimes from the sands, the difficulty in extracting usable material coupled 
with transport costs had ‘not made the use of the tailings an attractive 
proposition’.495 The suggestion about using the sand for concrete had been 
tried and found not to work, for the tailings reacted with the cement; 
pollution worries prevented its use for roads. Some Te Aroha residents did 
surreptitiously remove some sand for their driveways, and were pleased to 
find that no weeds grew on them thereafter.496 
Whilst Norpac did not set out to create pollution, it did not want to 
spend more than absolutely necessary on preventing this because its 
operation was always financially marginal. Prompting and supervision by 
regulatory authorities helped to ensure that an adequate dam was built, but 
the tailings were more toxic than anticipated. Local authorities were 
concerned about the effects of mining, and their worst fears were realized.  
 
THE NORPAC LEGACY 
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Subsequent to the Tonkin and Taylor report of 1977, remedial action 
was taken. The dam face was ‘fully covered with gravels to prevent further 
gullying during heavy rain’, stream erosion downstream of the dam was 
arrested by new gabions, and pipes under the road were ‘replaced to bring 
decant system into proper working order’. To improve the drainage, surface 
water from the mining site above the tailings were ‘collected and diverted 
away from the tailings dam’, and ‘shallow surface drainage was constructed 
on the ‘tailings floor to prevent ponding’. Drainage was constructed at the 
head of the dam ‘to collect and remove an subsurface flows resulting from 
raised water-tables during prolonged wet periods’. Borough staff checked 
the site weekly as well as ‘during and following any heavy rainfall’ to 
ensure drainage channels were kept open and erosion prevented. The 
Ministry of Works and Development visited quarterly, ‘or by special 
request, to monitor ground water levels’.497 This ministry revised Tonkin 
and Taylor’s inspection plan of the tailings to include new recommendations 
for improving the drainage.498 As before, there were periodic alarms, as for 
instance in June 1983, when a routine inspection after heavy rain revealed 
much increased seepage, exceeding the capacity of the decant pipe of 60 
litres per second. The new chief engineer of the catchment board, David 
Howie Smith,499 considered this ‘dramatic’ change to be ‘the most serious 
and urgent problem which has arisen in connection with this tailings heap 
to date’. He feared it would collapse because whereas previously water was 
diverted from the tailings, the heap was ‘obviously being progressively 
saturated from its upstream end by the inflow of water through the existing 
ground.500 The danger was not as great as Smith believed, but the heap’s 
existence continued to worry engineers and residents alike. 
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Continuing investigations into the content of the heap and its 
downstream impacts raised awareness of the legacy of Norpac’s mining.501 
In August 1981 Chris Hendy published findings based on his own 
monitoring of the Tui and Tunakohoia Streams and the work of a graduate 
student. Drainage from No. 5 drive and the tailings pond exceeded the 
World Health Organisation’s limits for drinking water by up to ten times for 
zinc, up to 14 times for cadmium, up to 19 times for copper, and up to 1,300 
times for iron; and the tailings drainage fell ‘well outside the range of 
acceptable pH values’. As well, there were ‘other serious environmental 
problems’: 
 
Firstly oxidation of ferrous iron to ferric iron in the Tui Stream, 
and a gradual rise in pH by dilution of the tailings discharge 
waters, resulted in precipitation of ferric hydroxide in the stream 
bed. This acted as a scavenger removing some of the toxic heavy 
metals from solution to form a toxic sediment in the stream 
bed…. This sediment forms a particularly toxic solid which is 
easily accessible to the general public and is within 100 metres of 
a housing area. In my opinion, this constitutes a serious health 
hazard to children playing in the stream.  
 
The steam was ‘devoid of even algae’, and after eight years no plants 
had grown on the surface of the tailings, despite the catchment board 
sowing grass seed. 
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Heavy metals released into water supplies often have far-
reaching and drastic effects on aquatic and marine life. Some 
elements, such as cadmium, are preferentially accumulated by 
filter-feeding shellfish such as oysters. This can result in 
cadmium concentrations in the shellfish reaching toxic levels for 
humans. Other elements such as mercury are preferentially 
accumulated in body fats and at each stage along the food chain 
become further enriched. This places carnivorous fish, which 
made up a large proportion of the commercial fish harvest, at risk 
and places domestic and export fisheries in jeopardy.502 
 
As this was published in an environmental journal, this might be seen 
as preaching to the converted, who might not consider whether people were 
unlikely to drink water where it came out of a mine or a tailings pond, but 
periodically such issues were raised in newspapers as well. 
The main legal issue after Norpac collapsed was to decide which 
agency was responsible for the tailings, a question raised early in the 
discussions but never resolved because whichever body accepted 
responsibility would be expected to meet the cost of stabilizing or removing 
them. The government did not want to shoulder the financial cost. For 
instance, in early 1981 Birch, responding to a request to contribute to the 
cost of stabilizing the tailings and reducing the pollution, in his cautious 
words, ‘apparently caused’, sought legal advice, which argued that the 
government had ‘no legal liability to meet such compensation claims’. 
However, he promised to investigate whether he could assist.503 He then 
offered, in February 1981, to meet half the $50,000 cost, but added the 
‘rider that this was the limit of government contribution toward costs 
incurred’.504 By September 1982, when the cost of removal had risen to over 
$1 million and of stabilisation at $63,000, Birch offered to meet 70 percent 
of the latter, if the catchment board and borough council each found $9,500: 
they claimed they could not.505 Which meant that the issue remained 
unresolved. 
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(The legal reasoning behind this refusal to accept responsibility was 
that the special site licenses were invalid because they were not issued over 
‘unalienated Crown land’. Accordingly there could be no valid claim for 
compensation. Crown Counsel noted that the licenses were granted at the 
request of the borough council, and that, even if they were valid, the Crown 
could not be sued, for Norpac, not the Crown, had caused the damage.506 In 
addition, the pit was on borough land, the council had made the agreement 
with Norpac, and it had received the license fees.)507 
 
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
 
In his ‘Report on the Preservation of the Quality and Availability of 
the Waters from the Coromandel-Kaimai-Mamaku Ranges’ dated 30 August 
1977, Harris touched on the impact of mining. He considered the situation 
at Te Aroha was ‘particularly unfortunate’, for two mining ventures had 
‘created a situation where large quantities of sediment have been washed 
into the tributary streams, quite apart from the tailings dump’. Mining in 
these ranges was always likely to threaten water quality. Conditions 
imposed were administered through the Mines Department, and ‘no matter 
how sincerely accepted by the Mines Department and the applicant, can 
easily turn out to be impracticable, ineffective, difficult to enforce or police, 
“uneconomic,” and so on’. As the catchment authority had the statutory 
duty to protect the water, any mining permitted needed  
 
to be of such value to New Zealand as a whole, as to justify over-
riding any risk to the Water Resource, and to warrant a 
Government Guarantee that whatever precautions needed would 
be taken (even if expensive), or, alternatively, that the loss of, or 
damage to, the Water Resource, made good in some other way. 
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The small-scale mining of the past 20 years should not be supported.508 
The catchment board agreed with Harris’ analysis, and in March 1980 
advised the Mines Division of four policies it had devised for future mining 
operations. The first was that mining would only be permitted in the 
Kaimai ranges if it would be of such economic value to New Zealand as a 
whole that the risk to water resources was justified. Secondly, the costs of 
restoring these resources after mining ended would be met by the mining 
company, under a guarantee by the Mines Division. Thirdly, conditions 
would be placed on all mining, and lastly, none would be permitted in any 
catchment used for specific water supply.509 The Mines Division agreed in 
general to the tighter conditions proposed, and also that ‘in specific 
instances it may be advisable to incorporate conditions in a title requiring 
payment of a substantial bond as security for compliance by the licensee 
with the conditions of the title’.510 The board applauded this suggestion of a 
large bond and felt that it should be required even at the prospecting stage 
in some instances. In addition, it suggested that because of ‘the 
incompatibility of mining with the adequate supply of high quality water to 
the Thames Valley and the Coromandel Peninsula’ all prospecting 
applications should include an environmental impact report.511 In this 
manner policy was developed that would be applied to mining throughout 
New Zealand. 
Unwillingness to provide the funds needed to remove the tailings 
meant that the issue was never resolved, and it continued to be a problem 
for local authorities and a horrible example for environmentalists. For 
instance, on 26 May 1982 Brian Dixon, co-ordinator of Waikato Watchdog, a 
group opposed to mining, spoke to the Te Aroha Jaycees. He ‘presented the 
major arguments against large-scale mining using the Te Aroha Tui Mine 
as an example (the Tui mess is a miniature-scale warning of the dangers of 
present threats)’.512 This organization also noted that ‘the Norpac partners 
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have escaped liability although all have survived and some are active in 
other mining ventures!’513 Mining Monitor in 1982 warned the ratepayers of 
New Zealand of the Norpac example of leaving tailings behind to be looked 
after by them. ‘A key issue for local bodies dealing with multinational 
mining companies is how to force those companies to be responsible for their 
wastes for many years after the mine has been closed and the company has 
moved on’.514 In a 1984 article entitled: ‘Tui Tailings: Setting the Record 
Straight’ it noted that ‘not only was no bond ever charged for Tui, but Mines 
Division did not begin to levy bonds until after the 1981 law change’.515 ‘The 
question of who is responsible for the mess that the Norpac operators 
walked away from remains the centre of controversy. Is it the Government 
which issued the licence, the Borough that owns the land, or the Catchment 
Board which has responsibilities for the water and soil values of the 
area’.516 It pointed out that landowners were responsible for tailings left on 
their land even if they had been ‘opposed to the grant of licences in the first 
place!’.517  
 
The only guidance the law gives as to the regulation of tailings is 
the stunningly inadequate piece of information contained in the 
Mining Regulations to the effect that if you, as owner of a Mining 
licence allow tailings to go over the boundary of the Mining 
licence you hold, then the tailings aren’t yours any more!518 
 
In part because of the legacy Norpac bequeathed to the district, mining 
companies and their supporters were forced to admit that better 
environmental protection was needed. Gil Fletcher, an Australian-based 
‘environmental agronomist’ employed by Amax Exploration (N.Z.) Ltd, in 
January 1981 told a newspaper that modern mining must meet the 
environmental conditions imposed. The only recent example in New 
Zealand was ‘perhaps the Tui Mine, at Te Aroha, and it was obvious this 
was a matter of concern in the reference to metal-contaminated tailings’.519 
In its June 1983 submission to the Thames Valley United Council Mining 
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Study by Metallum Research Ltd, ‘Independent Geological Consultants and 
Contractors’ of Thames, it was admitted that mining had been criticised ‘for 
alleged environmental damage’. While this firm conceded that there had 
been errors in the past, ‘generally’ these had been ‘errors of ignorance, or 
the result of ill-conceived regulation – for example the option under the 
1926 Mining Act whereby companies could pay either £7 10s an acre 
compensation or restore the land. They invariably chose the cash option’.520 
It noted that the Mining Amendment Act of 1981 had introduced ‘formal 
consultation with territorial authorities on economic social and 
environmental effects of prospecting and mining proposals on districts’, and 
had established a new procedure for dealing with objections.521 This Act had 
certainly made changes, based on discontent with the former procedures 
expressed in some parts of the country, notably Coromandel,522 although 
the worries about mining in the Kaimai ranges must in part have referred 
to concerns felt at Te Aroha.523  
In introducing that legislation, Bill Birch, the Minister of Energy, 
stressed that it required that applications for a prospecting and mining 
licenses must be accompanied by environmental assessments. Clause 5 
added to the conditions currently imposed on these licenses the requirement 
to take ‘all necessary steps’ to ‘prevent damage to features of scientific, 
wildlife, fishing, or historic interest, or of special visual appeal’. Clause 19 
added five new sections dealing with the protection of land, the most 
important ‘undoubtedly’ being section 103C, which for the first time 
provided ‘for the territorial authority to give its views on applications for 
mining privileges, other than exploration licences and prospectors’ rights’. 
The local authority would be able to give its opinion on whether the license 
should be granted and any conditions to be attached if it was, ‘having 
regard to the economic, social, and environmental effects of the proposal on 
its district’. The Minister was required ‘to have regard to these 
recommendations in dealing with the application’. Clause 23 brought 
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together ‘the provisions scattered throughout the Act regarding deposits or 
bonds to be lodged as security for compliance’ with the conditions. Clause 25 
made the planning tribunal the forum for hearing objections against the 
grant of a mining privilege, the criteria again including the economic, social, 
and environmental effects. Birch stated that he sought to bring the 
legislation ‘more in line with the environmental planning and water and 
soil legislation’ that had evolved over the past decade. The views of 
environmental groups, local authorities, Federated Farmers, the mining 
industry, and ‘the concerned public’ had been obtained, and the legislation 
proposed ‘a middle course, bearing in mind the importance of maintaining a 
viable mining industry in New Zealand’, and ensuring that it was ‘both 
practical and workable’.524 
The Labour Party wished the bond to be compulsory ‘to cover any 
damage that might have to be made good’.525 One National Member of 
Parliament, Michael Minogue, noted that with the rise in the price of gold 
and other minerals, low-grade ore would be mined using opencast methods: 
 
People rightly discerned that that could have a very damaging 
effect on the local environment, particularly in the Coromandel 
and the Kaimai areas, where there is very heavy rainfall over 
short periods. It was foreseen that mining could lead to 
considerable erosion, contamination of local water supplies, and 
ecological damage of various kinds.526 
 
Ian Shearer, Minister for the Environment, referred to criticism from 
local bodies about their having ‘mining schemes foisted on them without 
any opportunity to comment, and without any right of appeal through the 
courts’, considered the new legislation ‘a radical departure’ that brought the 
Mining Act ‘away from the 1970s and into the 1980s’.527 Only one member, 
in referring to the need to restore the land ‘to its original state’ and 
therefore largely ‘satisfying environmental concerns’, raised the problem of 
many overseas companies being subsidiaries of overseas one. ‘If the New 
Zealand company folded, that would eliminate the ongoing responsibility to 
restore any damage that might have occurred’.528 
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After its introduction, the bill was considered by the Commerce and 
Energy Committee, which received 215 written submissions, many of which 
were supported by personal appearances before the committee. Amongst the 
concerns covered were ‘the need for adequate bonds or deposits, and for 
those to be applied, first, towards damage arising from mining’.529 During 
this select committee stage, as Birch was pleased to note, all the MPs 
agreed to the changes proposed.530 Birch explained that the procedures in 
Clause 23 relating to the bond had been rewritten ‘to make it clear’ that the 
bond was ‘to be applied first in the restoration of any damage caused by 
breach of conditions, and additionally to allow applications of those moneys 
towards damage occasioned by the mining operations’. All or part of the 
bond could be retained after these had been completed for ‘such further 
work’ might be necessary.531 On behalf of the Opposition, Bob Tizard stated 
that ‘most people’ would applaud this arrangement: 
 
Reassurance should be given to New Zealanders, particularly 
when an overseas company is involved. A lot of evidence was 
presented by the local body representatives about the effect of 
past mining…. There is no doubt that in some parts of the 
country mining has, in the past, done serious damage, and local 
authorities do not have the funds to restore the areas.532 
 
In 1983, the select committee considering the Mining Moratorium Bill 
on the Thames-Coromandel received a submission from the Physical 
Environment Association of the Coromandel opposing all mining on the 
peninsula. ‘Recent prospecting and mining has made its presence felt in a 
sporadic way on the Coromandel and while money has been made, 
destructive wastes have been left behind, for example the Tui Mine at Te 
Aroha’.533 This was one of the rare occasions when this mine was mentioned 
explicitly; it was usually a background to the opinions expressed. 
In May that year, the Thames Valley United Council sought 
submissions for its Regional Mining Study. Seventy-four were received, 
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expressing a general concern for protecting the peninsula. The Norpac 
legacy was explicitly mentioned by only three submitters apart from the Te 
Aroha Borough Council: even Peninsula Watchdog, Watchdog (Waikato), 
and the South Auckland Conservation Association did not use it as an 
illustration, even though it was one of the main causes of their concerns. 
Carl Jensen, a consultant geologist and drilling consultant, submitted that 
‘the recent commercial extraction under a prospecting license at Waihi and 
the Tui Mine tailings dump illustrate the need for effective control of 
mining activities’.534 The Physical Environment Association submitted that 
‘the quality of water available to residents and horticultural projects’ was 
‘very important’. Any future mining must make adequate provision to 
prevent contamination of water, with funds provided to the catchment 
board for adequate testing. ‘The example of the Tui Mine Tailings Dam 
cannot be repeated’.535 R.J. Nicholls of the Paeroa office of the Ministry of 
Works and Development was also concerned about water quality. ‘For 
example the Te Aroha Borough Council has had to change its source of 
water due to pollution of Tui Stream from mining activities in that 
catchment’. Toxic wastes continued to pollute waterways ‘for many years 
after the operation has ceased’, and he cited Hendy’s testing of the water 
coming from the tailings as evidence.536 The catchment board merely asked 
the study to consider ‘the vulnerability of different areas to soil erosion’, and 
to produce a map showing the environmental dangers of developing 
resources.537 
The borough council’s planning consultant, Matheson and Stewart, a 
Te Aroha firm, produced a report that was approved by the council’s 
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planning committee.538 After noting ‘the political motivations of 
environmental groups for impeding the mining industry’, the report 
assessed the legislation as amended in 1981. Requiring environmental 
assessments when applying for licenses, protection of ‘areas of established 
scientific, wildlife, fishing or historic interest or established scenic 
significance’, the imposition of conditions to prevent or reduce or make good 
impacts on the environment, increased input by local authorities, and 
general oversight by the Planning Tribunal with increased entitlement for 
local bodies, the catchment board, and individuals to object made it 
‘unlikely that a Tui Mine tailings situation could occur’ again. It identified 
nine issues that should be considered: 
 
1. Identification of mineral resources in the district showing old 
workings. 
2. Identification and protection of Borough water supply 
catchment and reticulation (already noted in Kaimai-Mamaku 
State Forest management plan.) 
3. Identification of mountain streams traversing Borough and 
protection of their catchments from pollution, siltation, slippage, 
defoliation or any other damage likely to result from mining 
operations. 
4. Because of known mineral resources, that areas suitable for 
ancillary mining processing be identified having regard to 
roading, servicing and amenity requirements. Input from the 
mining industry could be invaluable in determining this question. 
5. Preservation and lack of interference with thermal springs in 
the Te Aroha Domain which are a key amenity to a developing 
tourist industry. 
6. Protection of slopes of Mount Te Aroha as a visual backdrop to 
the town. 
7. Protection of recreation reserves and school grounds within the 
Borough. 
8. Identify and protect natural wildlife habitats within Borough 
and fishing in Waihou River. 
9. Identify and protect sewerage treatment works and 
reticulation. 
  
After offering assistance by providing data, the report concluded: 
 
Te Aroha, as an early mining town, has empathy with the mining 
industry and has in a recent decade had an operational mine 
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contributing to the livelihood of the community. The aftermath of 
that activity has, however, not proved acceptable. Recent changes 
in the legislation to enable the setting of mining operating 
conditions give confidence that the potential benefits of a renewed 
mining industry based on Te Aroha could be realized.539 
 
The report, published in June 1984, made explicit reference to the 
influence of Norpac’s mine in changing rules relating to mining: 
 
One of the major reasons for public objections to prospecting and 
mining in the Coromandel Peninsula is the fear that the effects of 
mining will be severely detrimental to the local environment, 
which has high scenic, habitat, and recreational value. This fear 
of the potential for severe damage has not been alleviated by the 
environmental damage problems of the Tui mine at Te Aroha. 
Although the Tui mine situation is never likely to happen again, 
and thus represents the worst case scenario, it does demonstrate 
the potential for damage if stringent environmental controls are 
not applied.540 
 
Senior officials of the Mines Division annotated the recommendations 
from this study. Where the first point of the ‘Suggested Work Programme’ 
stated that ‘Mining and Mineral processing activities have the potential to 
adversely impact on the environment’, the word ‘potential’ was underlined 
with the annotation: ‘only – should not occur with modern techniques etc’.541 
The report recommended that ‘clear and strict environmental controls and 
guidelines’ should be ‘urgently developed to minimize this risk’; the officials 
agreed with the concept and the actions listed.542 They agreed with 
recommendations for further research into water quality and areas of 
‘environmental sensitivity’, but were against closing off the peninsula to 
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mining, preferring controls to prohibition.543 Recommendation 26 was 
implicitly based on the experience of the Norpac mine: 
 
The legislative responsibilities for administering and enforcing 
regulatory requirements and conditions for mining operations are 
not clear and there appear to be numerous anomalies. This is to 
be expected given the recent lack of a developed mining industry 
in New Zealand. Appropriate controls are usually developed over 
a long period as the industry evolves. However the potential for 
serious environmental damage due to inadequate legislation is 
considerable and high priority should be given to delineating a 
more appropriate legislative framework (in terms of controls, 
responsibilities, ability to police and enforce etc).544 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The debate over how to avoid or limit the environmental impacts of 
mining continues, with the example of the Norpac mine at Tui still being 
relevant to the discussion. Until 2013, when the tailings were completely 
stabilized at last and the adits were blocked to stop polluted mine water 
entering the mountain’s streams, it continued to be of great concern to the 
local community, and it remains an example to environmentalists of what 
should never happen again. 
 
Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Norpac, plan attached to application for Mineral License, 18 
May 1966, showing roads and reefs, Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining 
Applications 1966, 8/1966, BCDG 11289/6a, ANZ-A [Archives New 
Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kawanatanga, Auckland Regional Office]; 
used with permission. 
 
Figure 2: Norpac, plan attached to applications for Special Site, 1 
September 1966, showing drainage, buildings, rock storage area, mill site, 
and tailings area, Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1966, 
13/1966, BCDG 11289/6a, ANZ-A [Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o 
te Kawanatanga, Auckland Regional Office]; used with permission [in three 
sections because of size of the original]. 
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Figure 3: ‘Objector’s Plan’, August 1969, attached to ‘Application for 
Tail Race License, Mt Te Aroha, Norpac Mining Limited, Decanted Waste 
Water Disposal’, 30 June 1969, Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining 
Applications 1969, 5/1969, BCDG 11289/6a, ANZ-A [Archives New 
Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kawanatanga, Auckland Regional Office]; 
used with permission. 
 
 
 
146 
 
 
Figure 1: Norpac, plan attached to application for Mineral License, 18 May 1966, 
showing roads and reefs, Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1966, 
8/1966, BCDG 11289/6a, ANZ-A [Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te 
Kawanatanga, Auckland Regional Office]; used with permission. 
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Figure 2: Norpac, plan attached to applications for Special Site, 1 September 
1966, showing drainage, buildings, rock storage area, mill site, and tailings area, Te 
Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1966, 13/1966, BCDG 11289/6a, ANZ-A 
[Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kawanatanga, Auckland Regional 
Office]; used with permission [in three sections because of size of the original]. 
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License, Mt Te Aroha, Norpac Mining Limited, Decanted Waste Water Disposal’, 30 
June 1969, Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1969, 5/1969, BCDG 
11289/6a, ANZ-A [Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kawanatanga, 
Auckland Regional Office]; used with permission. 
